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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The assessment and monitoring of the effects of various tax reforms in Member States
has become a key policy concern in the Community. In the Presidency Conclusions of
the Lisbon European Council on 23-24 March 2000, the European Council requested
the Council and the Commission to assess “the contribution of public finances to
growth and employment, and assessing, on the basis of comparable data and
indicators, whether adequate concrete measures are being taken in order to …
alleviate the tax pressure on labour …”. Such an evaluation needs an accurate, timely
and comparable system of tax indicators enabling the Commission and the Council to
quantify the early impact of tax reforms on the tax rates on labour, capital and
consumption. This paper presents a proposal for such a system, discusses its
properties and compares it with other available sets of tax rates.
The most operational approach to analysing the effects of tax reforms is to construct
synthetic tax indicators, so-called “effective” or “implicit” tax rates. These are
calculated as the ratios between the tax revenues from particular taxes and the
corresponding tax bases obtained from national accounts. Such tax rates are published
by several institutions. In ‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union’,
the European Commission publishes “implicit” tax rates on employed labour,
consumption and other production factors for the 15 Member States and several EU
aggregates. The OECD has also published series of effective tax rates on labour,
capital and consumption for OECD countries up to 1997. In ‘Public Finances in EMU
–2000’, DG ECFIN calculated and analysed series of effective rates on labour, capital
and consumption over the period 1970-2001. Such rates were used to assess the
impact of tax reforms on the tax burdens on labour, capital and consumption over the
period 1999-2001.
The paper gives detailed account of the definitions and statistical sources used by
ECFIN services. ECFIN’s tax rates can be calculated using input data from AMECO,
combined with a small amount of auxiliary information available in the OECD
databank ‘Revenue Statistics’. This has the advantage of providing a complete,
transparent, replicable and internationally comparable (including non-EU countries)
set of tax indicators which can regularly be updated on the basis of Commission
Spring and Autumn forecasts. ECFIN indicators allow for an assessment of tax
reforms in Member States in terms of the changes in the effective rates of non-wage
labour costs, personal income taxes, direct taxes on labour and on employed labour,
direct taxes on capital, and consumption taxes. ECFIN indicators also allow for
carrying out sensibility analyses of such assessments in function alternative
definitions of the tax bases for labour, capital and consumption. ECFIN databank on
effective taxation also includes an indicator of the total tax wedge of labour, which is
regularly published in the Commission Spring and Autumn forecasts.
The possibilities offered by ECFIN’s effective tax rates are not free of costs. While
the rates published in ‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union’
and, to a lesser extent, those calculated by the OECD, use very detailed information
and definitions endorsed by the Member States representatives, ECFIN definitions are
in some cases approximations forced by data limitations in AMECO. In other words,
ECFIN effective tax rates give early information about the impacts of tax reforms, but
they may be second-best proxies to the “true” effective tax rates. The question5
therefore arises whether using such proxies would have sizeable consequences as
regards the assessments of tax reforms.
This paper shows that, where the relative levels and general evolution of labour,
capital and consumption tax rates are concerned, the conclusions drawn on the basis
of ECFIN’s rates are robust with respect to alternative definitions used by the OECD
and by ‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union’. As a general rule,
divergences between the different approaches are either negligible or relatively small.
This is particularly true in the case of labour and consumption taxes. Where capital
taxes are concerned, some significant differences may appear in some countries and
periods, especially between ECFIN and the ‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the
European Union’. Similarities apply to a wide range of statistical properties of the tax
rates. These include across-country relative levels of the tax burdens and their
changes, as well as the relative position of the countries in orderings obtained on the
basis of tax rates. They also include within-country comparisons on the basis of time
series analyses, where the series of tax rates are expressed in growth rates. Finally,
comparisons of the relationships between tax rates and investment, growth and
(un)employment performance also suggest that ECFIN rates reproduce the same
effects that those of the OECD and the ‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the
European Union’.
Broadly speaking, the tax burdens on labour and consumption in most EU countries
are higher than in the US or Japan. However, the tax burden on capital income is
much more comparable across OECD countries. Over the last three decades, in
parallel with a steady increase of the total tax burden in most OECD countries, a tax
shift to labour has taken place, with labour income bearing the bulk of the additional
tax burden. However, the tax burdens on capital income and consumption have
remained broadly stable or recorded small changes. In the late 1990’s, there are signs
of a reversal of the trend in favour of lower labour tax rates. Overall, the lowering of
personal income taxes seems to be the strategy chosen by Member States to reduce
the tax burden on labour. During the last thirty years, a clear convergence of tax
systems within the OECD has taken place, with tax systems becoming more similar
across countries. The lowest dispersion of tax rates is found in the case of capital,
which is probably the result of enhanced international capital mobility and capital tax
competition. In the case of consumption taxes, the convergence process is particularly
strong within the EU and seems to be mainly caused by VAT harmonisation in the
Community.
Distortionary effects of taxes on investment, growth and employment are also
invariant with respect to alternative tax rates available in ECFIN, the OECD and in
the ‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union’. Overall, labour and,
especially, capital taxes have a negative impact on investment rates. They also
negatively affect long-run growth rates, but the impacts are much lower. Finally, the
effects of labour taxes on employment are ambiguous, suggesting that it is the
interplay of taxation with labour market institutions that affects employment
performance.
To conclude, given their timely availability together with the comparability within
and outside the EU, the tax rates calculated by DG ECFIN on the basis of AMECO
data are a valuable analytical tool, which complements the information in other
databanks.6
1. INTRODUCTION
The analyses of the structure of tax systems in the EU, as well as the assessment and
monitoring of the effects of alternative tax reforms in Member States, have become
key policy concerns in the Community. The DG ECFIN Report ‘Public Finances in
EMU – 2000’ (European Commission 2000a, -PFR2000 hereafter) has shown that a
tax cut of 1% of GDP would increase employment by 1.5 million jobs in the EU
3.T h e
European Council has reiterated the need of reducing the tax burden in the EU,
especially on labour, in successive recommendations for the Broad Guidelines of the
Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community (BEPGs)
4,a sw e l la si n
ordinary and extraordinary councils. The Luxembourg Process, on labour market
reform, the Cardiff Process, on economic reform and the macro-economic dialogue
under the Cologne Process have very much emphasised the need to reform tax
systems in Member States. More recently, in the Presidency Conclusions of the
Lisbon European Council on 23-24 March 2000, the European Council has requested
the Council and the Commission to present a report by Spring 2001 “assessing the
contribution of public finances to growth and employment, and assessing, on the basis
of comparable data and indicators, whether adequate concrete measures are being
taken in order to … alleviate the tax pressure on labour …”.
The recommended reforms affect the whole tax system. However, there is not a
unique programme to be implemented in all Member States. As shown in the
PFR2000, although tax systems in Member States share broad common
characteristics (viz. high tax burdens on labour and consumption), their structures
largely differ from one country to another. Tax reforms must take into account such
country-specific characteristics. Consequently, there is a need to agree on an accurate
and comparable system of indicators representing such tax systems. This will allow
Commission services to carry out quantitative assessments of the impact of alternative
tax policies on the basis of tax rates on factor incomes (labour and capital) and
consumption.
As proposed by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994)
5 -MRT hereafter-, the most
operational solution to the problem of analysing the effects of the changes in tax laws
is to construct synthetic tax indicators -the so-called “effective” tax rates-. The
methodology of effective taxation basically consists of defining the tax rate as the
ratio between the tax revenues from particular taxes (viz. indirect taxes) and the
corresponding tax bases (viz. value of final consumption) obtained from national
accounts.
The same or similar methods are applied by several institutions and academics
6.D G
TAXUD, in cooperation with EUROSTAT, publishes the so-called “implicit” tax
rates on employed labour, consumption and other production factors. Significant
3 Indeed, such an amount depends on which taxes are cut and how the corresponding revenue
reduction is financed.
4 See, for instance, the ‘Commission Recommendation for the 2000 Broad Guidelines of the Economic
Policies of the Member States and the Community’ (see European Commission, 2000b; in particular,
chapters 3.3 and 3.8).
5 See also Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997).
6 See Volkerink and de Haan (1999) and Fiorito and Padrini (2000).7
differences notwithstanding, they are conceptually equivalent to those proposed by
MRT. Such implicit tax rates, which are published by the European Commission in
‘Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union’ –EC2000 hereafter
7-a r e
currently available for the 15 Member States until 1997. Closely following the MRT
methodology, the OECD has also published series of effective tax rates on labour,
capital and consumption for OECD countries until 1997 (see Carey and
Tchilinguirian, 2000). DG ECFIN also calculates effective taxation indicators. After
some preliminary assessments included in the ‘Report from the Commission on the
Implementation of the 1999 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’ (European
Commission, 2000d) the ECFIN PFR2000 analysed the effective tax burdens on
labour, capital and consumption and assessed the impact of tax reforms on such tax
burdens over the period 1999-2001
8. In addition, the effective tax wedge on labour is
regularly published in the Commission Spring and Autumn forecasts.
This paper explains and discusses in detail the method and information sources used
by DG ECFIN to obtain the effective tax rates on labour, capital and consumption.
The paper also compares the informative content of ECFIN effective tax rates with
the implicit tax rates in EC2000, as well as average effective tax rates in the OECD,
as published by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). Tax rates are calculated for the 15
Member States, the US, Japan, EUR-11 and EU-15 between 1970 and 2001. Section 2
summarises the essentials of the MRT method, compares it with other contributions,
namely those of the OECD and EC2000, and gives an overview of the methodology
followed in DG ECFIN. Section 3 focuses on non-wage labour costs. Section 4
calculates the effective tax rate on personal income, which, in combination with the
indicators of non-wage labour costs, is used in section 5 to obtain the effective tax rate
on labour. Two alternative, but equivalent, indicators for the effective tax rate on
consumption are presented in section 6. Indicators in sections 3 to 6 are used in
section 7 to calculate the total tax wedge on labour, while section 8 presents four
different effective tax rates on capital income, which are based on the personal
income tax rate discussed in section 4. Section 9 compares the informative content of
such alternative indicators of tax burdens on labour, capital and consumption obtained
in sections 3 to 8, while section 10 compares ECFIN indicators with the ones in the
OECD and in EC2000.S e c t i o n1 1r e p r e s e n t sas t e pf o r w a r di nt h ea n a l y s i so ft a x
reforms, which goes beyond the mechanical comparisons of tax rates and their
evolution, and focuses on the quantification of efficiency and growth effects of tax
reforms. Finally, section 12 summarises the conclusions of the paper. Several
appendices present detailed tables of ECFIN’s effective tax rates and other useful
information.
2. EFFECTIVE TAXATION METHODS.G ENERALITIES
Until the early nineties, the effects of taxes had usually been assessed on the basis of
effective marginal tax rates and/or by looking at the evolution of tax revenues
expressed in percentages of the GDP –tax ratios hereafter-. Marginal tax rates
combine information on statutory tax rates, tax returns, and tax codes with data on
income distribution and household surveys, as well as with projections of real present
7 European Commission (2000c).
8 See European Commission (2000a) chapters IV.2 and IV.5.8
values for investment projects. Unfortunately, the complexity of the tax systems
makes constructing effective marginal tax rates extremely difficult, while the lack of
data seriously limits the availability of series long enough as to allow for cross-
country comparisons in the medium to long run.
The much simpler alternative to marginal tax rates, the tax ratios, is of valuable
illustrative potential of the relative weight of taxes in an economy, and a useful tool to
make comparisons across countries, but it does not have an immediate translation into
the theoretical concepts applied in taxation models. For instance, the overall tax
burden -the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP- is not a good proxy to the wedge
imposed by taxes on any particular factor income because GDP is, by definition, the
income jointly generated by labour and capital. Moreover, GDP ratios of the
components of total tax revenues are also poor proxies of the burdens borne by the
corresponding factors or commodities, since their changes may not only be caused by
a change in statutory rates, but also by a change in the share of the corresponding tax
bases in GDP, which may be independent of the tax laws.
The most operational solution to the problem of analysing the effects of the changes
in tax systems is to construct synthetic indicators of broad, aggregate tax bases and
tax rates. On the basis of data on actual tax payments and national accounts, MRT,
following a seminal work by Lucas (1990), produced effective average tax rates for
broad tax groups, which generate the majority of the government’s tax revenues.
Although less rigorous in their treatment of the economic effects of changes in tax
laws than marginal tax rates, such effective average tax rates are consistent with the
representative agent assumption and, by looking at the aggregate data, they also take
account of the effective, overall tax burden resulting from each of the major tax
categories on factors’ income and consumption. In addition, the method is easier to
implement in multi-country research projects because it exploits the international
consistency of available data sources on national accounts and revenue statistics. The
methodology of effective taxation basically consists of associating particular tax
revenues with the corresponding tax bases obtained from national accounts. It
constitutes a simple but powerful way to estimate the aggregate wedges imposed by
taxes, namely the average effective tax wedges driven by taxes on production factors’
incomes, as well as the tax wedge of indirect taxes between the consumer aggregate
price index and the producer aggregate price index.
2.1 The MRT methodology
MRT consider an economy with three goods -consumption, labour and capital-. In
such an economy households decide how much to consume and how much labour and
capital to provide, while firms produce the consumption good by using labour and
capital supplied by households. Fiscal policy is represented by an allocation of total
spending between consumption, labour and capital. Expenditures are financed by
means of taxes on each good. Tax rates are meant to be proportional and the rates are
expressed in units of the respective good. Within this framework, the authors show
that the ad valorem tax rates on consumption, labour and capital can be represented
by ratios where the numerator is, respectively, the difference between the pre-tax and
the post-tax valuation of consumption, labour income and capital income, while
denominators are, respectively, the value of consumption, labour income and capital9
income at pre-tax prices. The difference between the pre-tax and the post-tax values
turn out to be the revenues obtained by the government from each tax category, while
the denominators are the pre-tax value of the corresponding tax base. Therefore, such
ad valorem rates can be calculated by obtaining reliable measures of the
macroeconomic tax revenues and tax bases.
MRT, have exploited the information available in the OECD databanks ‘Revenue
Statistics’ -OECDRS hereafter-, ‘National Accounts. Main Aggregates’ –NAMA-,
and ‘National Accounts. Detailed Tables’ –NADT- to obtain the series of effective tax
rates on labour, capital and consumption for OECD countries. MRT definitions can be
summarised as follows:
MRT effective tax rate on labour income
tl = (RS2000 + RS3000 +=th*W)/(W+RS2200) (1)
where RS2000 is total social security contributions, RS3000 is taxes on payroll and
workforce, RS2200 is social security contributions paid by the employers, -the three
of them available in OECDRS-, and W stands for wages and salaries of dependent
employment -available in NAMA-, while th is the effective tax rate on personal
income, calculated as:
th = RS1100/(OSPUE+PEI+W) (2)
where RS1100 is taxes on income, profit and capital gains of individuals or
households –available in OECDRS-, OSPUE is the operating surplus of
unincorporated enterprises and PEI is household property and entrepreneurial income,
both available in NADT.
Basically, MRT define the direct tax burden on labour as non-wage labour costs
(RS2000+RS3000), plus the part of taxes on household income levied on wage
income. In order to calculate the latter, which is not directly available in OECDRS,
MRT assume that every unit of household income, whether obtained from capital
(SPUE+PEI) or dependent labour (W), is subject to the same effective rate (th), so that
(th*W) in tl is the personal income tax revenues from dependent wage income. The
tax base is defined as the total labour cost of dependent labour, W+RS2200
9. Indeed,
the way tl is calculated assumes that the whole income of the self-employed is capital
income, thus included in OSPUE.
MRT effective tax rate on capital income
It is calculated on the basis of
tk = ((RS1200 + RS4100 + RS4400 +=th *(OSPUE+PEI))/OS (3)
where RS1200 is taxes on income, profits and capital gains from corporations,
RS4100 is recurrent taxes on immovable property, and RS4400 is taxes on financial
and capital transactions, the three of them available in OECDRS. Obviously, on the
9 Note that W in NEMA does not include social security contributions paid by the employers
(RS2200), which has to be added to obtain the pre-tax cost of labour.10
basis of th, the factor [th*(OSPUE+PEI)] gives the part of household income taxes
coming from capital income of individuals. The tax base, OS, is the net operating
surplus of the overall economy, which is available in NAMA, and measured in pre-tax
terms.
MRT effective tax rate on consumption
The effective tax rate on consumption is obtained from:
tc = (RS5110+RS5121)/(CP+CG–CEGG–RS5110–RS5121) (4)
where RS5110 is VAT (or sales taxes) and RS5121 is excise duties, both from
OECDRS. The tax base is defined, as usual in pre-tax terms, as private final
consumption expenditure (CP), plus government final consumption expenditure (CG)
-both from NAMA- minus government final wage expenditure (CEGG) -from NADT-
, minus tax revenues (RS5110+RS5121). CEGG is excluded from the tax base, since,
as a general rule, only government non-wage consumption (CG–CEGG) is subject to
consumption taxes. So defined, tc gives the tax wedge between consumer prices and
producer prices as a percentage of the latter
10.
2.2 The OECD approach
More recently, Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), drawing on a previous work by
Gordon and Tchilinguirian (1998), have introduced a number of more or less
fundamental changes in the expressions (1) to (4) above. Among the most relevant
ones we should mention the following. First, they consider that a part of the income
of the self-employed is actually wage income, so that, as explained in detail in section
3, they calculate the imputed wage income for this category of labour and redefine tl
and tk accordingly
11. Second, these authors argue that the net operating surplus very
much depends on charges for depreciation of fixed assets, which vary a great deal
from one country to another, so that they also calculate tk by including in the tax base
the gross operating surplus, which seems to be more comparable across countries.
Moreover, the gross operating surplus exhibits a less erratic evolution than the net
operating surplus over the cycle. Third, where consumption rates are concerned, they
suggest that if the aim is to relate indirect taxes to total final consumption, then
government wage consumption (CEGG) should be included in the tax base. Fourth,
they also propose to make consumption tax revenues more comprehensive and add
RS5122 (profits of fiscal monopolies), RS5123 (customs and import duties), RS5126
(taxes on specific services), RS5128 (other taxes) and RS5200 (taxes on use of goods
and performances) –available in OECDRS- to the numerator
12. Finally, they relax
some assumptions concerning the personal income tax rate. For instance, they look at
the possibility of considering the whole tax revenues from household income as
coming from labour, and analyse the implications of avoiding double taxation on
dividends.
10 See section 6 for the details.
11 See also Gordon and Tchilinguirian (1998) and Martinez-Mongay (1998).
12 Indeed, such tax items are deducted from the denominator.11
Carey and Tchilinguirian have applied the original formula proposed by MRT to a
sample of 29 OECD countries over the period 1980-1997
13.T h e yh a v ea l s or e -
calculated the relevant rates, namely tl , tk and tc , by applying the above-mentioned
alternative criteria. One of the most interesting contributions of the paper is the
sensitivity analyses conducted by comparing the tax burdens on labour, capital and
consumption obtained under alternative criteria applied to the same input data (from
OECDRS, NAMA and NADT).
The paper stresses that the tax burden has shifted towards labour in most countries
during the last two decades (from the early eighties to 1997). Such a shift has taken
place in a context of rising overall tax burdens, entailing a rise in the labour effective
tax rate on labour, while that on capital has remained broadly stable or recorded small
changes. In addition, cross-country analyses suggest that dispersion of capital tax
rates has narrowed, while the distribution of the effective tax rates on labour has not
changed very much.
Indeed, such overall conclusions conceal important country-specific features. These
will be highlighted later in this paper, but, for our purposes, it is worth emphasising
now that such broad conclusions remain regardless of the criteria applied to calculate
the tax rates, either the original MRT expressions or the Carey-Tchilinguirian
variants. Sensitivity analyses suggest that the main consequences of applying
alternative criteria to calculate effective tax rates consist of changes in the levels of
the rates, without affecting the evolution over time or across-country comparisons.
We will show later that alternative effective tax indicators lead to broadly similar
conclusions as long as the degree of divergence between criteria is not unacceptably
large. However, the analyses carried out by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), and
those presented at the end of this paper, also suggest that such a general conclusion
may not apply to all the countries. Although they are the exception rather than the
rule, in some of them, alternative criteria (viz. treatment of self-employment income,
using gross or net measures of the operating surplus, including or excluding wage
expending from the consumption tax base) may lead to significant differences in the
tax rates.
2.3 The approach in EC2000
In cooperation with EUROSTAT and a Working Party of Member States, DG
TAXUD also produces effective tax indicators -the so-called implicit tax rates-. These
are published in EC2000
14. Broadly speaking, the methodology is conceptually
equivalent to that proposed by MRT. Implicit tax rates are also calculated as the ratio
between aggregate measures of tax revenues from a category of taxes and the
corresponding tax base. The current span of the databank starts in 1970 for a few
countries, and in 1980 in most of them, to finish, as in the OECD, in 1997
15.
However, similarities with MRT or the OECD finish here. First,t h eEC2000
databank only includes EU countries. Second, the data sources are different. EC2000
uses the EUROSTAT New Cronos Databank (NCD hereafter) supplemented in some
13 Due to data limitations the time span greatly varies across countries.
14 See European Commission (2000c).
15 An update until 2001 is now available for internal use.12
cases with data and information directly provided by Member States’ representatives
in the Working Party. Third, and with much more important implications, in some
cases, the criteria applied in EC2000 largely differ from those proposed by MRT.
Moreover, the differences in criteria between EC2000 and MRT are much larger than
those between MRT and the OECD.
The most important differences between both methodologies concern the way
personal taxes on labour income are calculated. No implicit or effective tax rate on
household income is estimated and such taxes are either obtained from the so-called
“wage tax” (in general, a personal labour income withholding tax available in NCD)
or directly provided by some Member States. In the latter case, the Member States
concerned give a breakdown of taxes paid by the individuals into tax revenues from
dependent labour and tax revenues from other production factors. As a consequence,
the definition of the so-called implicit tax rates on employed labour
16 clearly diverges
from MRT’s tl in (1), where the term =th*W is substituted by a direct measure of tax
revenues from personal taxes on labour income. The numerator only includes social
security contributions on employed labour (excludes those paid by the self-
employed). In accordance, the denominator consists of the compensation of
employees (from NCD), which include the social security contributions on employed
labour.
The second relevant difference concerns the tax rate on capital. EC2000 actually
publishes the so-called implicit tax rate on “other production factors”, which includes
not only the self-employed and properly speaking capital incomes –as MRT does- but
some relatively minor energy and environmental taxes
17. Although the denominator is
also the net operating surplus, as we shall show latter, there are significant differences
with respect to the rates calculated àl aMRT. The major explanation for such
differences, as in the case of the tax rates of employed labour, lies in the way
households’ capital income taxes are calculated and, to a lesser extent, in the inclusion
of some energy and environmental taxes.
Finally, where consumption taxes are concerned, the differences between EC2000 and
MRT/OECD are apparently important. They not only concern the tax items included
in the numerator, which exclude some relatively minor energy and environmental
taxes, but also the way the tax base is defined. Although, as in MRT, government
wage spending is excluded, EC2000 defines the tax base in after-tax terms or, in other
words, tax revenues are not deducted from the final value of (taxable) consumption.
However, while the inclusion or exclusion of certain tax items may have an impact on
the structure of the series, measuring the tax base in after-tax or in before-tax terms
only generates a scale effect, which leaves unaltered the evolution of the rates within
each country, as well as comparisons across countries (see sections 6 and 9 below).
Albeit the divergences in criteria between EC2000 and MRT/OECD are definitely
significant, aggregate results for the EU as a whole published in European
Commission (2000c) seem to suggest that, leaving aside unsurprising differences in
terms of levels, the general evolution of implicit tax rates is quite comparable to that
obtained by MRT and the OECD. This is particularly true in the case of labour and
16 Unlikely the OECD, EC2000 follows MRT in considering the whole income of the self-employed as
capital income.
17 As shown in EC2000, such taxes may vary from one country to another.13
consumption taxes. The implicit tax rates on labour exhibit a clear upwards trend,
while consumption implicit tax rates have remained rather stable. However, although
for the whole period 1970-1997 the implicit tax rates on “other production factors”
have not changed in a significant way, when it comes to analyse the period 1980-
1997, the reported trend is slightly but unambiguously decreasing. All in all, on the
basis of results published in EC2000, one should conclude that labour has not only
borne the increase in the overall tax burden, but that, albeit limited, a real tax shift
away from other factors of production to labour has taken place in most EU countries.
2.4. The ECFIN approach. An overview
As far back as 1997, in a note to the Economic Policy Committee (see European
Commission, 1997), DG ECFIN services also applied the MRT method. Although by
that time the indicators in EC2000 were already available, the need to carry out
comparisons of tax burdens between EU and non-EU countries determined the
approach of DG ECFIN on effective taxation with a view to complementing the
information in EC2000. With some modifications -in some cases similar to those
proposed later by Carey and Tchiliguirian (2000)-, European Commission (1997)
updated MRT indicators until 1995 and covered 22 OECD countries, including, of
course, the 15 Member States and the EU-15 averages. For comparability reasons, the
statistical sources used were the same as in MRT, namely OECDRS, NAMA and
NADT.
Such an initial work evolved in time in order to comply with various ECFIN-specific
analytical needs. Without entering now into discussing about the relative
appropriateness and accuracy of the different methods reviewed above, all of them
present a common drawback, which precludes the possibility of carrying out early
assessments of policy reforms in the framework of multilateral surveillance processes.
MRT, OECD, EC2000 and European Commission (1997) apply more or less rigorous
definitions of effective or implicit tax rates, which need detailed macroeconomic data
(from NADT or NCD). As a result, there is a 2 to 3-year lag in the production of the
tax rates. At the time of writing this paper (Summer 2000) the indicators in the OECD
and in EC2000 are only available until 1997. 1998 figures will be published by the
end of the year. However, Member States’ policy proposals in the framework of the
different multilateral surveillance processes (Stability or Convergence Programmes,
National Action Plans for Employment, Progress Reports on Economic Reform, etc.)
refer to plans for the current and future years. Therefore, possible impacts of planned
reforms on the different tax burdens do not show up in EC2000 or OECD tax rates,
such as they are available to the general public
18.
In addition, tax reforms in Member States are not usually formulated in terms of the
total tax burdens on labour and capital, but in terms of their components. In particular,
governments’ plans refer to reforms of social security contributions, personal income
taxes, corporate taxes, and so on. Consequently, it is necessary to gauge the evolution
of non-wage labour costs and the personal income taxes
19 in order to determine the
source of the changes in the total burdens on labour and capital.
18 As mentioned before, a non-published update until 2001 exists of the rates published in EC2000.
19 The update of EC2000 does not give this possibility.14
To fulfil such requirements ECFIN services launched a research programme
20 in order
to adapt effective taxation methods to the input data available in AMECO. This is an
ECFIN macroeconomic databank fed on the basis of standardised information
provided by Member States, and also collected for some non-EU countries, notably
the US and Japan. The advantage of using such a databank is that its series are
updated twice a year in the framework of the Spring and Autumn Commission
Forecast exercises. As a consequence, at the end of each year (Autumn) the series
include projected data on two years beyond the current one. The version of AMECO
used in this paper covers the period 1970-2001, and corresponds to the 2000 Spring
Forecast. In addition, using AMECO data allows for disentangling the two major
components of the tax burden on labour, namely non-wage labour costs and personal
income taxes. Moreover, in order to carry out sensitivity analyses, the structure of
AMECO also allows for calculating the tax burdens on labour, capital and
consumption under different assumptions without significant additional costs.
Although the ECFIN method is explained in detail in sections 3 to 8, it is worth
pointing out here that its criteria try to get a right balance between accuracy of
indicators and feasibility of obtaining projections of tax rates coherent with the
Commission Forecasts of Spring and Autumn. To that end, two major limitations of
AMECO need to be tackled. First, the information provided by AMECO on tax
revenues is relatively poor. Total tax revenues are broken down into only three items:
social security contributions, taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes), and indirect
taxes
21. Therefore, only the tax revenue from consumption, and part of the taxes on
labour, namely social security contributions, are singled out. However, taxes on
income and wealth need to be decomposed further into revenues from direct taxes on
labour and revenues from direct taxes on capital. As shown below, under the
appropriate set of conventions, such a decomposition can be carried out by using
complementary information available from the OECDRS. The second major
limitation is that AMECO does not provide a proxy to household income as accurate
as that used by MRT or the OECD, so that the denominator of (2) has to be proxied
by a more or less exact measure of the personal income.
On this basis, and leaving aside the appropriateness of the criteria, one has to
recognise that ECFIN estimates of effective tax rates represent, in conceptual terms, a
second-best solution compared to the information provided in the OECD or in
EC2000. Such weaknesses are compensated by timeliness, which is a desirable
principle to be fulfilled by the indicators used in current multilateral surveillance and
policy assessment processes in the Community and, namely, in the follow up of
Lisbon. More important, as shown at the end of this paper, ECFIN indicators are quite
comparable, in informative terms, to those produced by other institutions. This is
particularly true in the case of the whole OECD databank, as well as in the case of tax
rates for labour and consumption, where comparisons with EC2000 are concerned.
20 See Martinez-Mongay and Fernandez-Bayón (1999) and Martinez-Mongay (1999).
21 ESA95 system includes a finer breakdown (viz. capital taxes are singled out), but the series are very
short or unavailable in some countries, and cannot be linked with the existing ESA79. See Box 3.1 on
the link between ESA79 and ESA95 series.15
3. NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS EFFECTIVE TAX RATE
3. 1. Non-wage labour costs on total employment
Properly speaking, non-wage labour costs include social security contributions (SSC)
and taxes on payroll and workforce (TPRWF)
22, with the latter (see table BII.5 in
appendix B.II) being actually non-existent or negligible in most countries, so that SSC
is a good proxy to non-wage labour costs
23. The non-wage labour costs effective rate
(NWLC) can be calculated as the ratio of non-wage labour costs to total labour costs.
This is a measure of the wedge between the nominal wage paid by the producer and
the nominal wage received by the worker before paying personal income taxes.
AMECO provides directly the series on total social security contributions as ratios to
each country’s GDP (NWRV). On the other hand, the series for the total
compensation of employees can also be obtained from AMECO in percentage of GDP
(COEL)
24.
Box 3.1. Statistical problems. From ESA79 to ESA95 and the German case
The changeover to ESA95 has affected AMECO series on public finances and, indeed, the components
of the total tax burden. Where social security contributions are concerned, the ESA95 system considers
three different items (“SSC received”, “Actual SSC” and “Imputed SSC”), so that a choice has to be
taken. Analogously, the ESA95 system includes information on capital taxes, which are not available in
ESA79. The problem with using ESA95 data is that, although all the series currently stop in 2001, the
starting year varies from one country to another and there is no data before the nineties for most of
them. In addition, the ESA79 series, which start in 1970 for all the countries, stop in 1995 in most
cases. Consequently, in order to obtain a set of series for all the countries over the period 1970-2001 it
has been necessary to link the ESA95 series with their counterparts in the ESA79 system. Since the
main purpose of the AMECO databank on effective taxation is to carry out early assessments of tax
reforms (from 1999 onwards), we have kept the ESA95 original series for the available years and
reconstructed them backwards on the basis of the observed growth rates in the corresponding ESA79
series. In the case of social security contributions, the choice of the ESA95 series, “Social security
contributions received; general government” (AMECO code UTSG) has been determined by its unique
counterpart in ESA79, “Social security contributions received; general government” (AMECO code
UTSGF). The same applies to other series used in the calculations displayed in this paper (see appendix
AI for a detailed description of the series used).
In the case of Germany the need of linking ESA79 and ESA95 figures overlaps with the break imposed
on the series by German Unification. Series for the unified Germany are only available for 1991
onwards, while those for the former West Germany only run until 1997/98. Unlikely in the case of the
changeover to ESA95, since the former and the unified Germany may be two very different economic
entities, reconstructing backwards the series for Germany on the basis of the growth rates for West
Germany may be controversial. Therefore, we have opted by linking both types of series directly. As a
result, a structural break usually appears in 1991 in the series in levels, which, indeed, does not affect
within and across-country assessments in the 90’s and 2000’s.
22 Appendix AI gives detailed account of the statistical sources of the input series. Appendix AII
provides synthetic definitions and formula of transformed variables and tax rates developed in this
paper.
23 Moreover, as shown in sections 9 and 10, disregarding or not TPRWF does not make a real
difference in terms of within-country evolutions or across-country comparisons. See also Box 3.2 in
section 3.2.
24 Note that COEL includes social security contributions paid by both the employers and the
employees16
The problem with NWRV and COEL is that they refer to two different categories of
labour. NWRV includes the social security contributions paid by the self-employed,
while COEL only includes the total cost of the employees (thus only including SSC
on dependent labour). This points to the possibility of calculating two different
indicators of NWLC. First, the fact that the self-employed pay social security
contributions suggests that a part of their income is treated as labour income, while, at
the same time, they are meant to receive some income as owners of capital. Although
such an income cannot be directly observed, it is possible to obtain a proxy for the
labour income of the self-employed which is consistent with theoretical models of
firm behaviour. The opportunity cost of being self-employed is the wage that this
category of workers would have earned had they been working as employees. Such an
opportunity cost can be proxied by the average wage of employees. This hypothesis is
of general use for estimating the labour share on the basis of the compensation of
employees in macroeconomic and growth models, and has been adopted to calculate
the effective tax rate of labour by the OECD
25. If OCCP is the occupied population or,
in other words, total employment (National Accounts) and EMPL stands for
employees (wage and salary earners), both measured in persons and available in
AMECO, the labour share including the opportunity cost of the self-employed –
LETB, which is coincidental with the labour effective tax base- can be calculated as
LETB = COEL*OCCP/EMPL (5)
Then, the effective average non-wage labour costs for total employment can be
obtained as:
NWLC = NWRV/LETB (6)
In short, the effective rate of non-wage labour costs (NWLC) is the ratio of total
social security contributions (NWRV) to total labour costs (LETB). The rate includes
the imputed wage of the self employed, as well as the social security contributions
paid by this category of labour. At the macroeconomic level, such an imputed wage
equals the average gross wage earned by employees (wage and salary earners).
Therefore, the total cost of labour can be calculated as the total compensation of
employees multiplied by the ratio of occupied population to wage and salary
earners
26.
Table 1 reports the evolution of NWLC (in percent) between 1970 and 2001. The
long-run trend has been unambiguously positive over the whole period. The trend
seems to have reversed after the early nineties crisis. Such a recent evolution is very
much in line with successive recommendations of the Commission’s Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (see European Commission, 2000b) and the Lisbon Conclusions.
The observed fall seems to be related to efforts to reduce taxation on labour through
cuts in SSC.
25 See Gordon and Tchilinguirian (1998) and Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). Martinez-Mongay
(1998) also suggested this solution.
26 Of course, the total operating surplus of the economy should be then reduced by an amount equal to
the average gross wage times the number of the self-employed.17
Despite this, however, the effective NWLC rate remains still much higher in the Euro
area (28%) and the EU as a whole (25%) than in the US (12%) or Japan (17%). The
exceptions to this rule are the UK, Ireland and Denmark. At 12%, non-wage labour
costs in the two first countries are comparable to the US’, while, in Denmark, the
figure is below 6%. In this latter case, as will be shown below, there is a clear
compensation through very high personal income taxes on labour income. According
to PFR2000, the evolution of NWLC is driven by insurance principles, thus closely
linked to the evolution of welfare spending. In the case of Denmark, however, such
insurance principle determines the personal income tax rather than non-wage labour
costs.
NWLC are declining and/or practically stagnating in most Member States. According
to the 2000 Spring forecast of the Commission, NWLC will decrease by more than
half a point of labour costs in both the euro area and the EU-15 until 2001. Within the
euro area, noticeable falls will take place in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the
Netherlands, while an increase of more than 0.5% is projected in Portugal. However,
non-wage labour costs are expected to increase outside the euro area except in the
UK. Particularly in Sweden, the projected change amounts to 3 percentage points of
the wage bill.
Table 1. Non-wage labour costs; total employment (NWLC)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999 2000 2001 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01
B 18.3 19.8 25.4 26.6 26.5 25.9 25.5 1.6 6.1 1.2 -1.0
D 19.4 25.1 27.4 32.2 31.8 31.5 31.1 5.8 2.5 4.8 -0.7
E 10.5 17.2 19.9 21.7 21.9 21.9 21.9 6.3 2.6 1.8 0.0
F 21.9 28.2 33.8 31.4 32.1 31.8 31.9 5.5 5.6 -2.4 -0.2
IRL 4.8 9.0 11.8 11.3 12.2 11.3 11.2 3.7 2.7 -0.5 -1.0
I 17.6 19.6 22.8 23.3 23.0 23.0 23.1 1.5 3.0 0.5 0.1
L 16.5 20.0 21.2 21.4 20.9 21.0 20.9 3.1 1.9 0.1 0.0
NL 18.3 23.3 25.0 27.4 28.4 28.1 25.0 4.5 4.2 2.5 -3.4
A 17.6 21.5 22.7 26.5 26.2 26.2 26.2 3.2 1.5 3.7 0.0
P 6.6 9.5 14.0 17.7 19.9 20.3 20.5 2.5 4.3 3.6 0.6
FIN 9.0 17.0 20.3 23.9 23.6 23.3 23.4 7.7 1.6 3.6 -0.2
EUR-11 18.5 23.4 26.3 28.1 28.1 27.9 27.5 4.6 3.1 1.8 -0.6
DK 3.4 2.5 3.8 4.5 5.7 6.1 6.1 -1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4
GR 11.4 14.7 17.5 22.0 22.9 23.2 23.5 2.4 2.1 4.5 0.6
S 14.5 23.8 25.7 26.9 25.4 28.0 28.4 8.4 1.6 1.2 3.0
UK 9.6 11.4 11.3 12.3 12.0 11.9 11.9 1.6 0.5 1.0 -0.1
EU-15 16.4 21.0 23.5 24.9 24.8 24.4 24.2 4.4 2.6 1.4 -0.6
US 6.9 9.3 11.2 11.5 11.6 11.4 11.3 2.5 2.0 0.2 -0.2
JP 6.6 9.9 13.6 16.0 16.5 17.1 17.4 3.1 2.5 2.4 0.9
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and own calculations18
3. 2. Non-wage labour costs on employed labour
A se x p l a i n e di ns e c t i o n2 ,b o t hM R Ta n dEC2000 assume that all income earned by
the self-employed is capital income, so that employees are the only production factor
obtaining labour income. Although less straightforwardly, the non-wage labour costs
effective tax rate on employed labour can be calculated by combining the OECDRS
databank with AMECO.
In the OECD, item RS2000 -total social security contributions- is decomposed into
SSC paid by the employees (RS2100 -SSCEM), SCC paid by the employers (RS2200
-SSCER), SSC paid by the self-employed (RS2300 -SSCSE), and SSC not allocable
between SSCER, SSCEM and SSCSE (RS2400 -SSCOT). Furthermore, item RS3000
includes taxes on payroll and workforce (TPRWF). Since non-wage labour costs on
employed labour consist of SSCER, SSCEM and TPRWF, by calculating
27
SELR = (SSCER+SSCEM+TPRWF)/( SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)
(7)
it is possible to estimate the part of NWRV, as published in AMECO, attributable to
employed labour
28 (see box 3.1)
ELRV = NWRV*SELR (8)
Box 3.1. The treatment of taxes on payroll and workforce
Expression (8) is just a convention, which does not take into account that NWRV in AMECO only
includes the equivalent to RS2000 in OECDRS. Two other alternatives are equally possible. The first
one is to “inflate” NWRV in AMECO using OECDRS data to estimate SSC plus TPWRF. In other
words, to recalculate NWRV in AMECO by multiplying it by the factor [(RS2000+RS3000)/RS2000].
The second alternative is to ignore RS3000 altogether. We have not opted for the first alternative
because one of the goals of the ECFIN databank on effective taxation is to rely as much as possible on
AMECO data. It is clear that expression (6) in section 3.1 only needs AMECO data, while, had the first
alternative been taken, we would have needed to estimate the non-wage labour costs effective rate for
total employment also on the basis of OECDRS. Where the second alternative is concerned, ignoring
RS3000 does not make much of a difference in most countries. As shown in table BII.5 of appendix
B.II, the share of RS3000 in (RS2000+RS3000) is zero in most Member States, as well as in the US
and Japan. This is particularly true since the mid-eighties, where it is only significant in Denmark,
Ireland, Austria and Sweden. Moreover in the former country, it is negligible in absolute terms, since
(see table 1) total non-wage labour costs in Denmark are a very small fraction of total labour costs. In
addition, as shown below in section 9 and, to a lesser extent, in section 10, alternative indicators or
labour tax rates (for total or employed labour) are statistically equivalent even for those countries
(Ireland, Austria and Sweden) where RS3000 is sizeable. In consequence, from our point of view, the
way such tax item is treated to obtain the non-wage labour costs effective rate is not a relevant issue,
while being able to calculate NWLC in (6) just on the basis of AMECO data is a clear advantage.
Then, the effective non-wage labour cost rate on employed labour is:
27 The series SSCER, SSCEM, SSCSE, SSCOT, TPRWF as a percentage of
SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF -see (7)- can be found in appendix B.II.
28 Table BII.6 in appendix B.II presents the series SELR from 1970 to 1997/98.19
NWEL = ELRV/COEL (9)
29
Since the latest year available in the OECDRS is currently 1997 or 1998, depending
on countries, NWEL is extrapolated until 2001 by assuming that the latest observed
value of SELR holds between 1997/98 and 2001. The series SELR evolve in a very
smooth way
30, which suggests that this hypothesis may be acceptable as a general
rule, unless drastic reforms of social security contributions have induced significant
structural changes in the composition of the denominator in (7). In such
circumstances, NWEL will not be able to reflect such changes after 1997/98. Yet, as
shown in section 9, NWEL and NWLC are statistically equivalent, while the 1997/98-
2001 figures of the latter series are not based on extrapolating hypotheses.
In sum, if the whole income of the self-employed is treated as capital income, the
non-wage labour costs of employed labour (NWEL) can be defined as the ratio of
SSC paid by the employees plus SSC paid by the employers plus taxes on payroll and
workforce to the total compensation of employees, thus excluding the gross wage
income of the self-employed. As shown in table BI.2 of appendix B.I, the exclusion of
the imputed wage of the self-employed from the total income of labour does not
change very much the conclusions about the past evolution of non-wage labour costs.
Neither does it change the projection until 2001 in a significant way. The only
remarkable difference is a generalised increase of NWEL compared with NWLC. It is
obviously due to the fact that the imputed gross wages of the self-employed are much
less taxed than the average wage of the employees. As a consequence, compared with
NWLC, the rate of non-wage labour costs in 1999 increases by at around 2 percentage
points of the wage bill in both the euro zone (from 28% to 30%) and the EU-15 (from
25% to 27%). However, in the case of the US, the differences are almost negligible.
Indeed, this is due to a low share of the self-employed in the occupied population. As
a matter of fact, where the Member States are concerned, the largest discrepancies
between both rates are found in Greece (from 23% to 41%) and Portugal (from 20%
to 26%), where the primary sector and, thus, self-employment is relatively important.
3. 3. Non-wage labour costs paid by the employers
Leaving aside TPRWF (RS3000), non-wage labour costs for employed labour have
two components, namely SSC paid by the employers (SSCER) and that paid by the
employees (SSCEM). There is some conventional wisdom that such components do
not have an equal potential impact on employment performance. In particular, it is
argued that SSCER may have a direct negative impact on the demand for labour
(Liebfritz, Thornton and Bibbee, 1997, Hamermesh, 1993) and defendants of tax cuts
to boost employment as, for instance, Dreze and Sneessens (1996) also put strong
emphasis on the reduction of SSCER. The part of the NWEL paid directly by the
employers can be computed in the following manner. First, on the basis of the
OECDRS, we compute the share of SSCER on total non-wage labour costs
SERR = SSCER/( SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF) (10)
29 As shown below, COEL is conceptually equivalent to the tax base used in European Commission
(2000c) to calculate the so-called implicit tax rate of labour.
30 The most outstanding exceptions to this rule in the nineties are Belgium (1993), Greece (1991-
1993), Italy (1992, 1993, 1996) and, to a lesser extent, Portugal (1993-1996).20
then, we estimate the part of NWRV (in AMECO) paid by the employers
31
ERRV = NWRV*SERR (11)
Finally, we define
NWER = ERRV/COEL (12)
Again, the series can be calculated until 1997/98 and then extrapolated to 1998/99-
2001 by assuming that the share SERR observed in 1997/98 holds from 1998/99 to
2001.
Table 2 shows the evolution and differences across countries of the ratio of SSC paid
the employers to the total wage bill of employed labour, as defined in (12). Overall,
SSC paid the employers account for at around 20% of gross wages, and long-run
changes of NWER amount for half the changes in NWLC during the seventies and the
eighties. In the nineties, however, NWER has increased by much less than NWLC or,
even, has followed a negative path. This suggests that a number of countries have
proceed to reduce non-wage labour costs mainly through cutting the contributions of
the employers.
Table 2. Non-wage labour costs paid by the employers (NWER)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999* 2000* 2001* 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01*
B 14.5 15.1 19.8 19.9 19.8 19.3 19.0 0.7 4.3 0.2 -0.8
D 12.1 15.2 15.6 18.0 17.8 17.6 17.4 3.0 0.5 2.5 -0.4
E 12.1 17.6 17.8 18.0 18.0 17.8 17.7 5.4 0.2 0.2 -0.3
F 19.6 21.3 23.1 22.5 22.9 22.5 22.5 1.5 1.9 -0.6 -0.4
IRL 3.7 7.5 8.5 7.7 8.3 7.7 7.7 3.5 0.8 -0.8 -0.7
I 19.3 19.4 22.3 22.9 22.4 22.4 22.4 -3.1 2.6 0.6 0.0
L 10.7 12.5 11.4 10.1 9.9 9.9 9.8 1.5 -0.6 -1.3 -0.1
NL 10.6 13.0 5.9 5.8 6.0 5.9 5.2 1.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.8
A 9.0 11.4 12.1 13.4 13.2 13.2 13.2 2.1 0.9 1.3 0.0
P 5.9 7.6 11.9 13.6 15.1 15.4 15.5 1.8 4.1 1.7 0.4
FIN 7.1 19.3 22.1 21.1 20.8 20.6 20.7 11.3 1.1 -0.9 -0.1
EUR-11 15.0 17.3 18.5 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.5 1.6 1.5 0.4 -0.4
DK 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.1
GR 10.6 12.3 16.2 17.8 18.2 18.1 18.1 1.4 3.2 1.6 -0.2
S 11.6 22.2 23.5 19.1 18.1 19.9 20.2 9.8 1.0 -4.4 2.1
UK 4.1 6.1 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.1 1.9 1.6 -0.3 -0.1
EU-15 12.8 15.4 16.7 16.6 16.5 16.2 16.1 2.1 1.5 -0.1 -0.4
US 3.9 5.5 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.3 1.7 0.9 0.1 -0.1
JP 5.1 6.9 8.8 9.7 10.0 10.3 10.4 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.4
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD Revenue Statistics
* Estimates on the basis of 1997/98 data
31 Table BII.1 in appendix B.II presents the series SERR in %.21
Some differences across Member States are worth highlighting. In the Netherlands,
Greece, Denmark, and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and
Portugal, SSC paid by the employers represent less than a half the non-wage labour
costs on employed labour. At the opposite extreme, in Italy and Finland, the bulk of
SSC on employed labour is financed by the employers. In any case, as already noted
for the non-wage labour costs on total employment, in terms of gross wages, the part
of SSC directly paid by the employers is much higher in the EU than in the US or
Japan. In the case of the euro zone, the figure is three times that of the US, and the
gap is even larger if we compare the US with some Member States, such as France,
Italy or Finland. However, the rates in the Netherlands and the UK are similar to those
observed at the other side of the Atlantic. Indeed, in Denmark, SSC paid by the
employer account for a negligible amount of gross wages. Finally, leaving aside
Sweden and, to a much lesser extent, Portugal, the part of SSC paid by the employers
is projected to decrease or remain unchanged in the EU Member States between 1999
and 2001.
4. THE PERSONAL INCOME EFFECTIVE TAX RATE
Once non-wage labour costs have been deducted from gross wages, workers pay
personal income taxes on their remaining labour income. Analogously, once capital
incomes have been adjusted for corporate income taxes and those on property and
wealth, the remaining capital income received by households is also taxed through the
same personal income tax. As explained in section 2, the effective taxation on labour
must include non-wage labour costs and personal income taxes paid by labour
income. Mutatis mutandis, the effective taxation on capital should include not only
the corporate income tax and taxes on property and wealth but also that part of the
personal income tax paid by capital incomes. Therefore, to obtain such effective tax
rates on labour and capital income it is necessary to split personal income taxes
between the two production factors.
4.1. The ECFIN approach
Such a split is not directly available either from AMECO or from the OECDRS.
AMECO only provides the aggregate series on direct taxes on income and wealth
(DTRV). Such series actually include four categories of taxes: taxes on personal
income from labour, taxes on personal income from capital, taxes on corporate
income and taxes on property and wealth. Property taxes could reasonably be imputed
to capital income, since they are taxes on the capital stock of the economy regardless
of whether they are paid by individuals or by firms. Consequently, only the first
component includes taxes on labour income.
Where the OECDRS databank is concerned, it provides a more detailed, but still
insufficient, breakdown of direct taxes. OECDRS distinguishes between “Taxes on
income, profits and capital gains of individuals” (item RS1100 –TRII hereafter),
“Corporate taxes on income, profits and capital gains” (item RS1200 -TRCI), and
“Revenues from any kind of property taxes” (RS4000 -PROP). TRCI and PROP are
exclusively capital taxes, while TRII includes direct taxes on both labour and capital.22
Based on this breakdown of direct taxes, it is possible to decompose DTRV from
AMECO into the same three categories of direct taxes. First, we calculate the
following ratios from the OECDRS:
TRIIR = TRII/(TRII+TRCI+PROP) (13)
TRCIR = TRCI/(TRII+TRCI+PROP) (14)
PROPR = PROP/(TRII+TRCI+PROP) (15)
Then, as we have done with SSC, we decompose DTRV from AMECO in the
following way:
PIRV = DTRV*TRIIR (16)
CORV = DTRV*TRCIR (17)
PWRV = DTRV*PROPR (18)
Again, since the series in OECDRS only provide coverage up to 1997/98, the values
of the series on PIRV, CIRV and PRIRV for 1998/99 to 2001 have been obtained by
assuming that the values of TRIIR, TRCIR and PROPR observed in 1997/98 hold in
the 1998/99-2001 period
32.
Once PIRV, CORV and PWRV have been singled out, the problem is to split PIRV
into household tax revenues from labour and capital income. In order to do that, we
follow MRT and assume that any unit of a household income pays the same average
tax rate regardless of the source of such income, whether labour or capital. Strictly
speaking, we apply here a modified version of the MRT approach. As in Carey and
Tchilinguirian (2000), we assume that only the net wage (take-home pay) is subject to
the personal income tax. However, we apply a rather broad definition of personal
income from capital. Instead of using, OSPUE (less the imputed wage income of the
self-employed) plus PEI, we define the household income from capital as the net
operating surplus of the economy (NOS), which is available in AMECO (code
UOND), minus the imputed labour income of the self-employed minus other direct
taxes on capital, namely the corporate income tax and taxes on property and wealth.
The personal income tax base is
PITB = LETB – NWRV + NOS – (LETB – COEL) – CORV – PWRV (19)
where LETB is defined in (5) and CIRV and PIRV have been calculated in (17) and
(18), respectively. A more condensed expression of (19) is:
P I T B=C O E L+N O S–N W R V–C O R V–P W R V (20)
Then, the effective tax rate on personal income is:
32 Tables BII.9 to BII.13 in appendix B.II show the series per country corresponding to expressions
(13) to (18) over the period 1970-1997/98.23
PITR = PIRV/PITB (21)
Summarising, the total personal income effective tax rate is calculated as the ratio of
tax revenues from income taxes paid by individuals to the total income received by
them, a part of which is revenues from capital. Such personal income is the sum of
total labour costs, including the imputed wages of the self-employed and excluding
social security contributions, and the net operating surplus of the economy, adjusted
for the imputed wages of the self-employed and excluding taxes on corporate income
and on property and wealth. As shown in sections 5 and 8, tax revenues from both
sources, labour and capital, can be straightforwardly singled out on the basis of PITR.
Table 3. Personal income tax rates (PITR)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999* 2000* 2001* 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01*
B 12.2 22.7 22.1 25.2 25.0 24.8 24.2 11.2 -1.6 3.0 -0.8
D 12.4 17.3 15.1 17.0 17.8 17.7 15.9 4.1 0.0 1.9 -1.9
E 1.8 6.0 10.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 3.2 4.4 0.1 0.2
F 6.0 8.8 8.8 14.4 15.4 14.6 14.5 2.0 0.0 5.6 -0.9
IRL 5.2 12.7 14.6 13.4 13.7 13.0 12.8 4.7 2.2 -1.2 -0.8
I 3.7 10.1 16.9 15.6 16.4 15.7 15.7 5.1 6.5 -1.3 -0.8
L 7.2 15.7 15.3 13.1 12.8 12.5 12.0 7.9 -1.7 -2.2 -0.7
NL 14.2 18.9 18.1 11.6 12.0 11.3 10.6 4.6 -2.8 -6.4 -1.3
A 10.8 14.8 15.6 19.8 19.5 18.3 17.8 3.5 -0.2 4.2 -1.8
P 5.0 6.4 7.0 8.7 9.8 10.0 10.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 0.5
FIN 15.7 20.5 27.3 26.1 25.8 25.8 25.3 4.5 4.9 -1.2 -0.5
EUR-11 8.4 13.1 14.2 15.6 16.3 15.8 15.1 4.1 1.4 1.4 -1.2
DK 27.5 33.1 38.5 40.0 41.0 39.8 39.3 3.9 7.7 1.5 -1.6
GR 2.0 4.1 4.8 8.6 8.3 7.8 7.6 1.3 0.0 3.8 -0.7
S 26.3 32.3 36.6 34.2 34.7 32.3 31.0 6.8 6.1 -2.4 -3.7
UK 15.6 15.3 16.2 15.0 15.0 14.8 14.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -0.5
EU-15 10.7 14.5 15.6 16.4 17.0 16.5 15.9 3.2 1.3 0.8 -1.1
US 10.6 12.5 11.9 13.7 14.1 14.0 14.1 1.7 -0.4 1.9 0.0
JP 4.4 7.1 10.2 5.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 2.0 2.0 -4.4 0.1
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD Revenue Statistics
* Estimates on the basis of 1997/98 data
The effective rate of personal income taxes (PITR) in the euro zone was about 16% in
1999 (17% in the EU-15 –see table 3). This is quite comparable with the figure in the
US (14%). Overall, the way the personal income is taxed largely varies across
Member States. While in some Mediterranean countries, such as Spain, Portugal or
Greece, the effective rate is below or close to 10%, in the Nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland and Sweden) as well as in Belgium, governments take more than 25% of the
personal income tax base in the form of taxes on households. High taxation in
Denmark (more than 40%) is, at least, partially explained by very low social security
contributions, so that the welfare state there is mainly financed through general taxes.24
Over the whole period 1970-1999, the personal income effective tax rate increased by
almost 100% in the euro zone. However, the bulk of the change took place during the
seventies, while in the eighties and the nineties such a positive trend slowed down.
The reforms applied or planned in most Member States in the short to medium term
will reverse the path in the coming years. Portugal is the only country where, on the
basis of Commission’s 2000 Spring Forecast, an increase of the tax rates on personal
income (half a point) is predicted. All in all, comparing the changes in table 3 for the
period 1999-2001 with the corresponding figures in table 1, it seems that Member
States prefer to lower taxation on personal income as a strategy to reduce taxation on
labour, rather than to lower social security contributions (see PFR2000). As a result,
as shown below, the effective tax rates of labour and capital are expected to decrease
in the early 2000’s.
4.2. ECFIN versus MRT, OECD and EC2000 approaches
Expression (21) compared with (2) reveals that there are two major differences
between the ECFIN definition of the personal income tax rate and that of MRT in its
Carey-Tchilinguirian version. Expression (21) is based on a rather rough
approximation to the personal, taxable income. We include enterprises’ (both
corporate and incorporate, but especially the former
33) net savings in the personal
income tax base, thus wrongly assuming that profits are fully distributed
34. This
means that the tax base is overestimated if such net savings are positive and
underestimated when they are negative. In addition, unlikely MRT and the OECD, we
use a rather broad definition of property taxes, which covers the whole item RS4000
in OECDRS, while MRT only include RS4100 and RS4400. The advantage in
approximating the personal income in this way is that we can use variables, such as
the compensation of employees and the net operating surplus, which are updated and
projected twice a year in the framework of Commission’s Spring and Autumn
Forecast, while OSPUE and PEI in (2) are available with a 2 or 3-year lag. Moreover,
as a general rule, there is no a big quantitative difference between using RS4000 and
RS4100+RS4400, while, in some cases, aggregate items in the OECDRS, such as
RS4000, are more updated than their components.
Overall, one could argue that the criteria proposed here may be as good or as bad as
any other applied in the relevant literature on effective taxation. The criteria applied
by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) or Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), as well as
those of EC2000 in European Commission (2000c), also lead to more or less rough
approximations to the “true” personal income tax revenues from labour income.
Where the MRT method is concerned, one has to conclude that, in the end, the range
of alternatives to define the personal income tax base is rather wide. For instance,
Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) have proposed a number of modifications of the
33 Once the imputed wage of the self-employed is deducted from OSPUE, profits (and savings) of
unincorporated enterprises are a rather small fraction of GDP.
34 AMECO includes series on net savings for both corporate enterprises and for households (including
net savings from incorporated enterprises), which could be used to obtain a better proxy of the personal
income tax base. However, the series of net saving of corporations are not available in some countries
and they are very short in most of them, while the series of net savings from incorporated enterprises
cannot be singled out from total household savings.25
MRT method. These include correcting the treatment of social security and private
employers’ contributions to pensions funds, avoiding double taxation of dividends,
considering the preferential tax treatment for pension funds and life insurance
earnings, or assuming that households do not pay taxes on capital income. In most
cases, such modifications require using costly information, which is not timely
available and/or it is totally absent in National Accounts. In addition, when comparing
different alternatives, the conclusion seems to be that such modifications induce more
or less large changes in levels and affect some countries more than others. However,
their impacts in terms of within-country evolutions and across-country comparisons
are fairly small in most cases or even negligible in some of them
35.
The differences between ECFIN and EC2000 methods are much more important. In
EC2000 tax revenues from personal income taxes on labour income are not estimated
but directly provided by some Member States (viz. Belgium, Denmark, France,
Ireland, Italy, Finland, and Sweden) or defined as the wage tax (withholding taxes on
wages, available in NCD). As a result, the TAXUD method is not comparable at all
with those of MRT, the OECD or ECFIN because, among other things, the former
uses non-publicly available information
36. Volkerink and de Haan (1999) have
compared the MRT series for the effective tax rate on labour (see section 5 below)
with the implicit tax rate on employed labour published in EC2000. The only, and
unsurprising, conclusion is that both methods provide series largely diverging in terms
of levels and trends. However, it is not possible to find clear arguments in favour of
one or another method.
Therefore it seems that, from an empirical point of view, different methods either lead
to fairly similar tax indicators or to totally different ones, but there are not clear ex
ante arguments to take a choice. As shown in section 10, MRT, the OECD and
ECFIN approaches lead to sets of indicators with similar statistical properties.
However, in some cases the divergences with EC2000 are really important. In the end,
the different ways tax revenues from personal taxes are obtained are based on a
number of conventions, rather than on more or less indisputable theoretical or
empirical arguments. Given this, unless the OECD and/or EC2000 databanks on
effective and implicit taxation are able to fulfil the requirements of availability in a
timely fashion and of comparability across Member States, we think that the
approximation proposed here may be, at least, a transitory reasonable solution
37.
5. THE EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON LABOUR
35 Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000, §30; see also §41.
36 It is also worth noting that the EC2000 method is not internally comparable either, since it uses two
different statistical sources for the tax revenues from personal income from labour (Member States’ ad-
hoc information and New Cronos). In addition it is unclear whether the information provided by some
Member States on taxes on personal income from labour follow methods comparable across countries.
37 Moreover, this approximation will be very much improved when series of “Net saving, corporate
enterprises”, under AMECO code USNE, are completed and available for all the countries.26
The effective tax rate on labour income is the ratio of the sum of non-wage labour
costs plus the personal income tax revenues attributable to labour income to the pre-
tax labour income. The latter is, obviously, total gross wages, including gross wages
imputed to the self-employed. The second component of the tax revenues can be
estimated by multiplying PITR in (21) by the net wage, once non-wage labour costs
have been discounted. Then the effective tax rate on labour income is
LETR = (NWRV + PITR*(LETB – NWRV))/LETB (22)
If one is more concerned about the effective tax rate on the income of employed
labour, (22) a slight modification gives:
LITR = (ELRV + PITR*(COEL – ELRV))/COEL (23)
Where ELRV is defined in (8). It is worth noting that, leaving aside the way PITR is
computed, (23) is conceptually equivalent to the implicit tax rate on employed labour
as published in EC2000.
In short, the effective tax rate on labour income (LETR) can be computed as the ratio
of NWLC (SSC plus taxes on payroll and workforce) plus personal taxes on labour
income to gross wages. Analogously, the effective tax rate on employed labour will
be accordingly calculated as the ratio of NWEL (SSC paid by the employers and the
employees plus taxes on payroll and workforce) plus personal taxes on the labour
income of the wage and salary earners to COEL (compensation of employees).
The effective tax burden on labour in the euro zone was close to 40% in 1999 (table
4). This is 3 percentage points higher than in the EU-15 and 16 and 20 points higher
than in the US and Japan, respectively. By comparing, table 4 with tables 1 and 3, it
becomes clear that such large differences between the EU and its two major trade
partners is explained by the differentials in non-wage labour costs, rather than by the
existing differences in taxes on household income. Where differences across Member
States are concerned, the tax burden on labour is above 40% in Belgium, Germany,
France, Austria, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. In the latter country, the effective tax
burden on labour income (total employment) represents more than 50% of the gross
wage bill. At the opposite extreme, the tax burden on labour is relatively low and
comparable with that of the US in Ireland, the UK and, to a lesser extent in Portugal.
The effective tax rate of labour has not ceased to increase during the last thirty years
both inside and outside the EU. The only clear exception is the UK, where the rate has
remained fairly stable since 1970. As with non-wage labour costs and personal taxes,
the largest change took place during the seventies, while the trend slowed down in the
eighties and even more in the nineties. Leaving aside Portugal, on the basis of
Commission’s 2000 Spring Forecast, such trends are being reversed in most Member
States. The effective tax rate of labour is projected to decrease by 1.3 percentage
points of the wage bill between 1999 and 2001. Relatively large falls (by more than
1%) are expected in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria and
Denmark.27
Table 4. Effective tax rates on labour (LETR)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999* 2000* 2001* 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01*
B 28.3 38.0 41.9 45.1 44.9 44.2 43.6 10.4 3.6 3.2 -1.3
D 29.4 38.1 38.3 43.7 44.0 43.6 42.0 8.1 2.0 5.4 -1.9
E 12.1 22.2 27.9 29.6 29.9 29.9 30.0 8.8 6.0 1.7 0.1
F 26.6 34.6 39.7 41.3 42.6 41.8 41.8 6.6 5.1 1.6 -0.8
IRL 9.8 20.5 24.6 23.2 24.2 22.9 22.6 7.8 4.3 -1.4 -1.5
I 20.7 27.7 35.9 35.3 35.6 35.1 35.1 5.6 7.7 -0.6 -0.5
L 22.5 32.6 33.3 31.7 31.0 30.8 30.4 9.2 0.3 -1.6 -0.6
NL 29.9 37.8 38.5 35.9 37.0 36.3 32.9 7.4 1.4 -2.7 -4.0
A 26.5 33.1 34.8 41.0 40.6 39.8 39.3 5.7 1.1 6.2 -1.3
P 11.3 15.3 20.1 24.8 27.8 28.3 28.7 3.7 5.4 4.8 1.0
FIN 23.3 34.0 42.0 43.8 43.3 43.1 42.8 10.2 5.3 1.7 -0.5
EUR-11 25.3 33.4 36.9 39.3 39.8 39.2 38.5 7.4 3.9 2.4 -1.3
DK 30.0 34.8 40.9 42.7 44.3 43.4 43.0 2.9 8.1 1.9 -1.3
GR 13.1 18.2 21.4 28.7 29.3 29.2 29.3 3.5 2.1 7.3 0.0
S 37.0 48.4 52.9 51.9 51.3 51.2 50.6 11.4 5.7 -1.0 -0.7
UK 23.7 25.0 25.6 25.4 25.3 24.9 24.7 0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6
EU-15 25.5 32.5 35.7 37.3 37.6 36.9 36.2 6.4 3.3 1.6 -1.3
US 16.7 20.6 21.8 23.6 24.0 23.9 23.9 3.8 1.4 1.8 -0.2
JP 10.7 16.3 22.5 20.9 20.3 21.0 21.3 4.8 4.1 -1.6 1.0
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD Revenue Statistics
* Estimates on the basis of 1997/98 data
The exclusion of the imputed wage of the self-employed and, thus, their taxes from
the rate does not change the main conclusions suggested by data in table 4 (see table
BI.6 in appendix B.I). The only remarkable difference between LETR in (22) and
LITR in (23) is that the latter rate gives higher figures than the former one. At 41%,
the effective tax rate on employed labour in the euro zone is almost 2 points higher
than that including the self-employed as shown in table 4. The differences between
the two rates vary from one country to another according to the differences between
non-wage labour costs for employed and total labour. Indeed, such differences are
larger in countries where the share of the self-employed is larger (viz. Greece,
Portugal), while they are minor in more advanced economies such as, for instance,
Germany, France, the UK, Japan, the US or the Nordic countries. Leaving aside
differences in level, the evolution of the effective tax rate on employed almost
perfectly replicates that described in table 4 for total employment.
6. THE EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON CONSUMPTION
Following the general concept of effective taxation, the effective tax rate on
consumption should be the ratio of tax revenues from consumption taxes to the pre-
tax value of consumption. Consumption tax revenues can be accurately proxied by
indirect taxes, which are available in AMECO. On the other hand, following MRT,28
the pre-tax value of consumption can be calculated as private final consumption
(PFC), plus government final consumption (GFC), minus the compensation of
employees of general government (CEGG), minus consumption tax revenues (INVR).
CEGG is deducted from the tax base since the government pays indirect taxes on the
purchases of goods and non-factor services, while it is exempted from paying indirect
taxes on goods and services it provides (see box 6.1).
Box 6.1. The tax treatment of government wage consumption expenditures
The exclusion of CEGG from the tax base is also applied in European Commission (2000c). However,
this does not mean that there is a broad agreement as regards the treatment of such a series. For
instance, in earlier versions of EC2000 this variable was not deducted from the base. Recently, Carey
and Tchilinguirian (2000) have proposed a variant of the MRT method, where they propose to make
the tax base more comprehensive by not excluding CEGG. They argue that the fact that government
wage consumption expenditures are not subject to indirect tax “is not a compelling for using a partial
consumption tax base. Many other elements of the consumption tax base are equally not subject to
indirect taxes but remain in their base”. However, they also conclude that the inclusion/exclusion of
CEGG only changes the level of the rate without affecting very much comparisons across countries, as
well as the major features of its evolution over time or. This is the reason way we follow here both
MRT and EC2000 and exclude CEGG from the consumption tax base.
Calculated in this way, it can be shown straightforwardly that the effective tax rate on
consumption is the difference between the consumer price (a post-tax price) and the
producer price (a pre-tax price) expressed as a percentage of the latter. In other words,
the effective tax rate on consumption is the wedge between consumer and producer
prices.
cetr = (Pc –P p)/Pp (24)
where Pc and Pp are the consumer and the producer prices respectively. Multiplying
by the volume of the output consumed, we obtain the macroeconomic counterpart of
(24):
CETR = INRV/(PFC + GFC – CEGG – INRV) (25)
An equivalent definition of effective tax rate on consumption is applied in EC2000,a s
well as by ECFIN in PFR2000 where the wedge is expressed in terms of consumer
prices. As shown below, this rate has the advantage of being explicitly included in the
formulae of the tax wedge on labour. It is called the consumption implicit tax rate and
its expression is:
citr = (Pc –P p)/Pc (26)
Both (24) and (26) have the same informative power since
citr = cetr/(1+cetr) (27)
In macroeconomic terms, the consumption implicit tax rate can be calculated as
CITR = INRV/(PFC + GFC– CEGG) (28)29
Having made clear that CETR and CITR are equivalent, we focus here on CITR since
it is the rate used in EC2000 and provides a straightforward way to obtain the labour
tax wedge. However, CETR is also available in the ECFIN databank on effective
taxation (see table BI.7 of appendix B.I).
One of the most distinguishing features of tax systems in the EU, as compared with
the US or Japan, is the tax burden on consumption (table 5). Overall, at 21%, indirect
taxes in the EU, expressed in terms of the value of final consumption, are twice that of
the US. Indirect taxes represent 25% or more of the (inclusive of taxes) value of final
consumption in France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. At the
opposite extreme, in Germany, Spain, and the UK, the figure is clearly below the EU
average, but always bigger than in the US or Japan.
Table 5. Tax rates on consumption (CITR)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999 2000 2001 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01
B 23.2 17.8 18.3 20.4 20.4 20.6 20.8 -3.9 0.1 2.1 0.4
D 19.2 17.7 17.8 17.0 17.9 18.0 18.4 -1.1 -0.2 -0.7 0.6
E 11.6 9.1 15.2 16.8 17.7 18.1 18.3 -2.5 6.3 1.6 0.6
F 23.6 23.3 23.1 24.8 24.7 24.1 23.9 -0.1 -0.2 1.8 -0.7
IRL 20.6 18.4 22.1 24.0 24.8 25.0 24.7 -3.4 4.3 1.9 -0.1
I 16.4 14.2 16.9 23.2 22.9 23.0 22.9 -2.9 2.2 6.3 0.0
L 12.2 14.8 19.5 25.3 25.7 26.1 26.7 1.9 5.1 5.9 1.0
NL 15.9 15.6 16.7 18.6 19.4 19.5 20.2 0.2 1.2 2.0 0.9
A 26.2 25.2 24.7 23.2 23.4 23.9 24.1 -0.8 -0.3 -1.5 0.7
P 15.6 19.0 21.1 22.0 22.7 23.4 23.8 0.5 2.4 0.9 1.1
FIN 22.0 22.8 26.7 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.9 0.7 5.3 -2.4 0.4
EUR-11 19.4 18.1 19.1 20.6 20.9 21.0 21.2 -1.3 1.0 1.6 0.2
DK 28.0 28.1 29.3 30.4 30.2 29.6 29.6 0.9 2.0 1.1 -0.6
GR 17.1 14.4 17.8 19.3 20.0 20.5 20.8 -0.3 1.5 1.4 0.8
S 20.6 22.2 28.6 25.8 28.0 24.5 24.2 1.0 4.8 -2.8 -3.8
UK 21.6 19.7 17.5 18.1 18.1 18.2 18.4 -3.1 -1.7 0.7 0.4
EU-15 20.0 18.6 19.4 20.5 20.8 20.7 20.9 -1.4 0.7 1.2 0.1
US 11.9 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.1 -2.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
JP 13.2 12.2 13.7 13.8 13.6 13.5 13.8 -1.1 1.1 0.1 0.2
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and own calculations
The tax burden on consumption records a slightly positive evolution in industrial
countries. During the last thirty years, the effective tax rate on consumption has
increased by just 1 percentage point in the euro area, but has remained almost
unchanged in the EU as a whole. The rate fell in most countries during in the
seventies, likely due to a generalised fall in tariffs. In the eighties, average rates in the
EU rose more than 1 percentage point. This is likely due to the introduction of VAT
regime in countries such as, for instance, Spain or Portugal. In addition, VAT
harmonisation at the late eighties, as well as the introduction of energy and
environmental taxes could also have played a role. Such a trend continued and
accelerated in nineties, when budgetary consolidation strategies in many Member
States consisted, at least in a first phase, of increasing taxation (see PFR2000).30
Commission’s 2000 Spring Forecast point to a relatively small change in the
consumption effective tax rate between 1999 and 2001. This is due to compensatory
effects of falling taxes countries such as France, Denmark or Sweden, while, in the
rest of Member States, consumption rates are expected to rise by at around 1
percentage point. Yet, the main cause of such increases seems to be of a cyclical
nature, since, according to PFR2000, no significant reforms of indirect taxation are
planned in most countries.
Finally, the definition of the consumption tax wedge in terms of producer prices,
instead of consumer prices, does not change such conclusions about the evolution
over time or the comparison between countries. The only effect of considering the
value of final consumption net of indirect taxes is a generalised increase of the tax
rate. In the case of the euro area and the EU-15 the difference is of 5 to 6 percentage
points.
7.T HE EFFECTIVE LABOUR TAX WEDGE
Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, page 209), the total wage wedge “is
the gap between the real labour costs of the firm, on the one hand, and the real, post-
tax consumption wage of the worker, on the other”. Disregarding the effects of the
real price of imports
38, the tax wedge arises because labour income is first taxed
through social security contributions; then, workers have to pay income taxes on the
remaining income, which in turn, once direct taxes have been deducted, will be
subject to indirect taxes when consumed. In other terms, the tax wedge on labour is
the difference between the gross wage deflated by the producer's price (real producer
wage -wp) and the gross wage net of social security contributions and personal income
taxes on labour income deflated by the consumer's price (the real consumer wage -
wc). Therefore, we can define:
wedg = (wp-wc)/wp (29)
If Pp and Pc are respectively the producer price and the consumer price, and tc is the
consumption tax rate
39, the following relationships can obtained:
wp =W p/Pp (30)
wc =W c/Pc (31)
and
1–t c =P p/Pc (32)
38 Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) define the wedge as non-wage labour costs plus personal
income taxes plus the difference between the consumer and the producer prices. This latter difference
depends not only consumption taxes but also on the real price of imports times the share of imports.
We focus here on the tax components of the wedge and exclude external effects.
39 The consumption tax rate is calculated here as the difference between the consumer price and the
producer price expressed in terms of the former.31
The relationship between the nominal gross wage (Wp) and the nominal consumer
wage (Wc)i s :
Wc = (1-ti)( W p – ssc) (33)
ti being the personal income tax, and ssc being the total of social security
contributions paid per unit of labour. Since ssc can be expressed in terms of the
nominal gross wage as -see (6)-
nwlc = ssc/Wp (34)
the tax wedge can be calculated as:
w e d g e=1–( 1–n w l c ) ( 1–t i)( 1–t c) (35)
The macroeconomic counterpart of (35), i.e. in terms of effective tax rates, can be
calculated as
WEDG = 1 – (1-NWLC)(1 – PITR)(1 – CITR) (36)
NWLC, PITR and CITR have been defined in (6), (21) and (27) respectively. If one
considers that the whole income of the self-employed is a capital income, so that
wage income is only the income of the employed, the tax wedge for employed labour
can be calculated as:
T W E L=1–( 1 - N W E L )( 1–P I T R ) ( 1–C I T R ) (37)
where NWEL is defined in (9).
When a part of the income of the self-employed (the imputed wage) is considered as
labour income, total taxes on labour, thus including the incidence of indirect taxes,
represent more than half the gross wage in both the euro area and the EU (table 6).
This strongly contrasts with the figures for our main trade partners, where the tax
wedge on labour in 1999 was slightly higher than 30%. The total burden on labour
income in the Member States is not lower than in the US. In the UK, and, to a lesser
extent, in Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, the figure is well below the EU
average. However, in Denmark and Sweden, the tax wedge represents more than 60%
of the gross wage bill. Relatively high taxes (50-60%) are also borne by labour in
Belgium, France, Austria, and Finland.
Indeed, the evolution of the tax wedge in the last three decades is the mirror image of
that of its components. Overall, consumption taxes have contributed by little, while
the changes observed in the tax wedge have been driven by changes in non-wage
labour costs and in personal income taxes. In the seventies and the nineties, both rates
contributed by comparable amounts. However, the bulk of the increase recorded by
the tax wedge was due to the surge in social security contributions. According to
Commission’s 2000 Spring Forecast, the labour tax wedge is projected to fall by 1
percentage point in both the euro area and the EU. As shown in PFR2000 such a fall
is due to tax reform in the field of personal income taxes rather than to cuts in non-
wage labour costs or in consumption taxes. The only country where a significant
increase in the tax wedge is anticipated for the 1999-2001 period is Portugal (1.5%),
where both the effective tax rate on labour and the effective tax rate on consumption32
are projected to increase by 1 percentage point. At the opposite extreme, albeit for
different reasons, the tax wedge is expected to fall by more than 2 percentage points
in the Netherlands and Sweden. In the latter country, significant reductions in indirect
and personal income taxes will be partially offset by the rise in non-wage labour
costs. However, in the Netherlands the fall in the tax wedge is explained by a
simultaneous reduction in social security contributions and in personal taxes.
Germany, France, Ireland and Denmark are also countries where the tax wedge is
projected to decrease significantly (by more than 1%) between 1999 and 2001.
Table 6. Total tax wedge on labour (WEDG)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999* 2000* 2001* 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01*
B 44.9 49.0 52.5 56.3 56.1 55.8 55.3 5.6 3.0 3.8 -0.8
D 42.9 49.0 49.3 53.3 54.0 53.8 52.7 5.9 1.6 4.0 -1.3
E 22.3 29.3 38.9 41.5 42.3 42.6 42.8 5.8 9.9 2.6 0.5
F 43.9 49.8 53.6 55.9 56.8 55.8 55.7 5.0 3.8 2.3 -1.0
IRL 28.4 35.1 41.3 41.6 43.0 42.1 41.7 3.4 6.7 0.3 -1.2
I 33.7 38.0 46.7 50.3 50.3 50.0 50.0 2.5 8.1 3.6 -0.3
L 31.9 42.6 46.3 49.0 48.8 48.9 49.0 9.4 3.7 2.7 0.2
NL 41.1 47.5 48.8 47.8 49.2 48.7 46.5 6.3 1.9 -1.0 -2.7
A 45.8 50.0 50.9 54.7 54.5 54.2 54.0 3.6 0.6 3.8 -0.6
P 25.1 31.4 36.9 41.4 44.1 45.1 45.7 3.6 6.3 4.5 1.5
FIN 40.2 49.1 57.5 57.4 57.2 57.1 57.0 8.5 7.3 -0.1 -0.2
EUR-11 39.7 45.3 48.8 51.8 52.4 52.0 51.5 5.0 3.9 3.0 -0.9
DK 49.6 53.1 58.2 60.1 61.1 60.2 59.9 2.7 7.0 2.0 -1.2
GR 28.0 30.0 35.4 42.4 43.5 43.7 44.1 2.6 3.0 7.0 0.6
S 50.0 59.9 66.4 64.3 64.9 63.2 62.5 9.6 6.6 -2.0 -2.4
UK 40.2 39.8 38.6 39.0 38.7 38.6 38.6 -1.8 -1.7 0.3 -0.2
EU-15 40.3 45.0 48.0 50.1 50.5 49.9 49.5 4.1 3.1 2.1 -1.0
US 26.7 28.2 29.2 30.8 31.1 30.9 30.8 1.5 1.1 1.7 -0.3
JP 22.5 26.5 33.1 31.8 31.1 31.6 32.1 3.2 4.5 -1.3 1.0
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD Revenue Statistics
* Estimates on the basis of 1997/98 data
The exclusion of the imputed wage of the self-employed from the tax base does not
change the conclusions above (see table BI.10).
8. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CAPITAL INCOME
A proxy to tax revenues obtained by governments from capital income can be
calculated in the following way. Total taxes on capital income should include taxes on
personal income from capital, taxes on corporate income and property taxes. Property
taxes being a tax on the capital (wealth) stock of the economy can be considered as
taxes on capital income, regardless whether they are paid by households or by
business. Expressions (17) –CORV- and (18) –PWRV- respectively give the tax33
revenues from corporate and property taxes consistent with AMECO data and
calculated on the basis of the OECDRS. The tax revenues from taxes on personal
income from capital can be obtained on the basis of (19) by multiplying PITR in (21)
by the capital income of households, which is the net operating surplus of the
economy after deducting taxes on corporate and property incomes and, eventually,
excluding the imputed wage income of the self-employed.
The inclusion or exclusion of the imputed wage income of the self-employed partially
determines the way the capital tax base is calculated. For instance, MRT and EC2000
assume that the whole income of the self-employed is capital income, so that the tax
base is the total, unadjusted operating surplus of the total economy. Accordingly, the
effective tax rate on labour should coincide with LITR in (23). However, Carey and
Tchilinguirian (2000) and PFR2000 consider, as explained in the calculation of
NWLC in (6), that a part of the income of the self-employed is wage income. In this
case, the operating surplus of the economy, as calculated in the National Accounts,
should be adjusted by such an imputed wage income of the self-employed.
A second issue concerning the capital tax base is whether the capital income should
include or exclude depreciation or, in other words, whether one should use the net or
the gross operating surplus. MRT and EC2000 rightly argue that no capital taxes are
levied on depreciation of fixed assets, so that the capital tax base should be calculated
in net terms (excluding depreciation). However, Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000)
argue that capital effective tax rates based on the net operating surplus depend on
charges for depreciation, which vary a great deal from one country to another, mainly
according to assumed differences in services lives, which are often based on relatively
old information of tax lives. In other words, if the net operating surplus is used,
differences in capital taxation across countries may be due to differences in assumed
services lives of fixed assets rather than in any real difference in tax laws. On this
basis, these authors suggest using the gross operating surplus as the tax base of
capital. The gross operating surplus has also been used to obtain the capital effective
tax rates in PFR2000.
It could also be argued that using the gross operating surplus seems to be coherent
with the way the labour effective tax base is defined either in (22) –LETR- or in (23)
–LITR-. In neither case, workers’ expenditures to maintain, renovate and increase the
stock of human capital is not deducted from the tax base. Yet, many (personal) tax
laws do not foresee levying taxes on such expenditures. They usually establish
(minimum) income thresholds and other deductible spending (viz. education,
training), which are not taken into account to obtain the tax rates on labour income.
Finally, it could also be argued that the net operating surplus exhibits more volatility
over the cycle than the gross operating surplus, which may make it difficult to assess
short to medium-term changes in the rates.
Leaving aside the discrepancies in the way the personal income tax is estimated, the
consideration of the wage income of the self employed together with the way of
treating charges for depreciation lead to four alternative definitions of the capital
effective tax rate.
The first one, which coincides with PFR2000 and Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000),
assumes that the imputed wage income of the self-employed is not a capital income,
while, in order to improve comparability across countries and reduce cyclical34
fluctuations, it includes the gross operating surplus in the tax base. The capital
effective tax rate is then:
KETG = (CORV + PWRV + PITR*(NOSA – CORV – PWRV))/GOSA (34)
Where GOSA is the gross operating surplus adjusted for the imputed wage income of
the self-employed -see (5)-
GOSA = GOS – (LETB - COEL) (35)
and NOSA is the net operating surplus adjusted for the wage income of the self-
employed:
NOSA = NOS – (LETB – COEL ) (36)
Expression (34) will be used here as a benchmark against other definitions of the
capital rate discussed below. For instance, following Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000),
if the imputed wage of the self-employed is not treated as a capital income, but one
considers that depreciation should be excluded from the base, the capital effective tax
rate becomes:
KETN = (CORV + PWRV + PITR*(NOSA – CORV – PWRV))/NOSA (37)
However, if the whole income of the self-employed is considered as capital income,
the effective tax rate on capital income unadjusted for the imputed labour income of
the self-employed would be:
KITG = (CORV + PWRV + (NWRV – ELRV) +
+ PITR*(NOS – (NWRV – ELRV) - CORV – PWRV))/GOS (38)
when depreciation is not excluded from the base, and
KITN = (CORV + PWRV + (NWRV – ELRV) +
+ PITR*(NOS – (NWRV – ELRV) – - CORV – PWRV))/NOS (39)
if only the net operating surplus is included in the base
40.
Table 7 shows synthetic data on the benchmark effective tax rate of capital, KETG, in
(34). At 21%, the tax rate on capital income in the euro zone is lower than in both the
EU-15 (24%) and the US (23%). Although it is still higher than in Japan (19%), it is
worth highlighting that, as shown in more detail below, the differences between
European countries and their main trade partners are much smaller for capital taxes
than for labour taxes. Where Member States are concerned, Luxembourg and the UK
set the highest tax burden on capital income (34-35%)
41. Other countries with
relatively high capital taxes are Italy, Denmark and Sweden. At the low end of the
40 We use the letter “I” from “implicit” as a quick reference to the fact the KITG and KITN have been
calculated by assuming that the whole income of the self-employed is considered capital income as in
EC2000.
41 Note that such a high effective tax rate of capital in Luxembourg does not take account of special
fiscal treatment of capital income of non-residents.35
rate scale, in Germany, Spain, Austria and Greece, the capital effective tax rate is
lower than in the euro zone.
Compared with the tax rates on labour, those on capital have remained fairly stable
during the last thirty years. In the early 2000’s, the fall in personal income taxes, as
well as fiscal incentives for risk and venture capital, are inducing generalised cuts in
capital taxes. Indeed, as mentioned in PFR2000, a part of such reductions might be
due to cyclical factors rather than to discretionary reforms. Anyway, on the basis of
KETG, it is difficult to conclude that potential capital tax competition is lowering the
tax burden on capital income. However, on the same grounds, it also seems evident
that labour income, and not capital income, has been bearing the bulk of the additional
tax burden generated since 1970.
Table 7. Effective tax rates on capital (adjusted gross OS -KETG)
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999* 2000* 2001* 70-79 80-89 90-98 99-01*
B 16.0 21.3 20.1 23.8 23.4 23.7 23.5 6.4 -0.3 3.7 0.1
D 18.3 19.0 16.2 15.4 15.9 16.0 14.8 1.3 -0.9 -0.8 -1.2
E 8.9 11.6 19.9 18.5 18.5 18.4 18.5 2.2 7.5 -1.4 -0.1
F 15.5 17.7 17.9 21.6 22.8 22.0 21.8 0.5 0.4 3.7 -1.0
IRL 26.9 18.5 18.9 20.5 20.8 19.8 19.5 -9.9 -0.5 1.6 -1.2
I 11.9 15.8 22.7 25.5 26.5 25.6 25.4 2.6 6.3 2.8 -1.1
L 13.7 27.4 31.0 34.3 34.0 33.4 32.2 14.3 2.2 3.4 -1.7
NL 19.5 22.5 21.5 24.3 24.9 24.0 23.3 2.5 -2.0 2.8 -1.6
A 15.5 16.9 17.5 19.2 18.8 17.9 17.3 1.8 0.6 1.7 -1.5
P 9.2 8.2 18.0 22.1 24.6 25.4 26.0 -1.3 7.0 4.0 1.4
FIN 14.6 13.2 15.2 24.3 24.2 24.4 24.3 -1.2 3.0 9.1 0.1
EUR-11 15.5 17.5 18.8 20.2 20.9 20.6 20.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 -0.9
DK 23.3 20.9 23.1 28.4 29.0 28.8 29.0 -1.2 3.7 5.2 0.0
GR 9.2 8.6 12.4 20.3 19.5 18.5 17.8 -0.6 0.9 7.8 -1.7
S 20.1 17.8 22.4 28.5 27.9 27.5 27.3 -1.4 7.5 6.1 -0.6
UK 35.2 31.8 34.4 34.1 35.0 34.5 34.0 -7.3 6.2 -0.2 -1.0
EU-15 19.0 19.7 21.3 22.9 23.7 23.5 23.0 -0.3 2.6 1.7 -0.7
US 26.3 22.4 19.9 22.3 22.8 22.7 22.9 -3.0 -2.0 2.5 0.2
JP 19.0 30.1 29.5 23.5 18.7 17.9 17.6 9.9 1.7 -6.0 -1.1
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD Revenue Statistics
* Estimates on the basis of 1997/98 data
Assuming that the whole income of the self-employed comes from capital does not
change the main conclusions drawn on the basis of the KETG. This not only applies
to the evolution of the rates but also to their levels. For instance, for the EU as a
whole KITG in (38) is 24.3% in 1999, which compares with the figure of 23.7% in
table 7. Finally, leaving aside a generalised increase of the rates, KITN in (39),
compared with the benchmarks in table 7, does not alter the main conclusions either.
Therefore, at first glance, we can conclude that KETG and KITG are almost36
equivalent, while the major differences between KETG and KITN concern the levels
rather than the evolution of the rates.
9. COMPARING ALTERNATIVE TAX RATES INAMECO
Comparisons on the basis of synthetic tables in previous sections seem to suggest that
alternative ways to calculate the tax rates on labour, capital and consumption on the
basis of AMECO data lead to quite similar conclusions. Alternative criteria produce
indicators differing in levels, while the differences are small or even negligible in
terms of their evolution over time or in terms of the relative position of countries. This
section presents more detailed analyses supporting this view.
For each tax base (labour capital and consumption), we compare the corresponding
alternative indicators discussed in sections 3 to 8. For labour taxes we compare LETR
in (18) with LITR in (19). In the case of consumption, we compare CETR in (21) and
CITR in (24). Finally, where capital taxes are concerned, we carry out pair-wise
comparisons of the four alternative indicators defined in section 8: KETG in (34),
KETN in (37), KITG in (38) and KITN in (39). Indeed, since LETR and LITR have
been obtained on the basis of the same personal income tax rate -PITR in (17)-, they
only differ in the indicator of non-wage labour costs. Therefore, comparing LETR and
LITR is equivalent to compare NWLC in (2) and NWEL in (5). Analogously,
comparing LETR and LITR is also equivalent to compare WEDG in (32) and TWEL
in (33), since the latter two wedges only differ in the indicators of non-wage labour
costs. The evidence we provide is based on both across and within-country
comparisons, and it is complemented by means of tax convergence analyses.
9.1. Across-country comparisons
A quite direct way to compare alternative indicators of effective taxation is to look at
their levels and changes across the country sample. Table 8 shows the cross-country
correlation coefficients between levels of alternative indicators for labour,
consumption and capital effective tax rates over the 1970-1999 period
42.I no r d e rt o
avoid superfluous noise coming from cyclical fluctuations, we have compared five-
year averages (70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-94 and 95-99).
Table 8. Cross-country correlations for five-year averages and rank correlations.
LETR/
LITR
CITR/
CETR
KETG/
KETN
KETG/
KITG
KETG/
KITN
KETN/
KITG
KETN/
KITN
KITG/
KITN
70-74 0.954
(0.968)
0.998
(1.000)
0.944
(0.947)
0.883
(0.831)
0.832
(0.761)
0.858
(0.875)
0.832
(0.802)
0.988
(0.964)
42 We also calculated trend values obtained on the basis of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The results are
not shown here, since they are almost identical to the ones obtained on the basis of cyclically
unadjusted series.37
75-79 0.970
(0.919)
0.998
(1.000)
0.845
(0.757)
0.828
(0.840)
0.751
(0.721)
0.768
(0.804)
0.758
(0.761)
0.967
(0.951)
80-84 0.957
(0.949)
0.998
(1.000)
0.892
(0.787)
0.883
(0.914)
0.809
(0.835)
0.853
(0.864)
0.814
(0.826)
0.970
(0.944)
85-89 0.947
(0.954)
0.997
(0.998)
0.877
(0.789)
0.904
(0.916)
0.802
(0.802)
0.882
(0.842)
0.881
(0.884)
0.953
(0.912)
90-94 0.908
(0.933)
0.997
(1.000)
0.617
(0.568)
0.841
(0.832)
0.644
(0.591)
0.729
(0.689)
0.847
(0.895)
0.899
(0.805)
95-99 0.908
(0.907)
0.997
(1.000)
0.756
(0.788)
0.858
(0.821)
0.744
(0.814)
0.787
(0.788)
0.854
(0.911)
0.945
(0.939)
Where labour taxes are concerned, correlation coefficients between the five-year
average levels of LETR and LITR range from 91% in the nineties to 97% in the late
seventies. This means that across-country differences in levels are equally reflected by
both indicators and that, on this basis, the inclusion or exclusion of the imputed wage
income of the self-employed does not make much of a difference as regards the
relative tax burden on labour across countries. However, it could be argued that even
small differences in levels between LETR and LITR may imply large differences in
the ordering of countries in terms of the tax burden borne by labour. This could
happen when the dispersion of the rates either in LETR and/or LITR were low. To test
such a possibility we have calculated the Spearman rank correlation coefficients,
which are shown between brackets in table 8. It is quite clear that rank correlations
reproduce quite closely the standard correlation coefficients. It turns therefore out
that, when using AMECO data, the treatment of the income of the self-employed does
not basically alter the ordering of countries on the basis of their tax burdens on labour
income.
The same conclusions are reached regarding consumption taxes. The only difference
is that the results are even less ambiguous in this case. As suggested by (23), at two-
digit precision, CITR and CETR are exactly the same variable (both correlation
coefficients are equal to 1). In other words, calculating the tax rate on the basis of the
pre-tax (21) or the after-tax (24) base only changes the level but not the relative tax
burdens on consumption. Neither does it change the ordering of countries in terms of
such burdens.
As expected, more divergences are found when comparing alternative indicators for
the tax burden on capital income. However, such divergences are not large in some
cases. For instance (last column of table 8), it seems that if the whole income of the
self-employed is considered an income from capital, the inclusion (KITG) or
exclusion (KITN) of depreciation from the tax base does not alter the relative tax
burden across countries and the ordering in a significant way. Analogously (4
th
column of table 8), if the tax base is calculated on the basis of the gross operating
surplus, the consideration of the income of the self-employed only partially (KETG)
or totally (KITG) as capital income does not either induce substantial changes in the
conclusions regarding tax burdens and their orderings across countries.38
All in all, figures in table 8 seem to suggest that using alternative tax rate indicators
calculated on the basis of AMECO data does not lead to significant differences in the
relative tax burdens across countries or in their ordering. This is particularly true for
labour and consumption taxes
43.
If the major goal of computing effective tax rates is to contribute to the assessment of
tax reforms, one should not care very much about levels, but rather about changes in
time. Table 9 shows the correlation coefficients between the changes in alternative tax
indicators. Growth rates have been calculated by comparing five-year averages and
are expressed in percentages of the observed rate in the base period
44. Correlations
displayed in table 9 reinforce the conclusions reached on the basis of table 8. LETR
and LITR, on the one hand, and CITR and CETR, on the other hand, are, statistically
speaking, the same series, with correlation coefficients close to 1. This applies to
changes in the long run (the late nineties over the early seventies and the early
eighties), as well as to changes in the short run (2001 over 1999). More significant
differences are found between some alternative indicators of capital tax rates (viz.
KETN versus KITG, KETN versus KITN in the long run, as well as KETG versus
KITN, KETG versus KETN, and KETN versus KITG in the short run). Yet, in all the
cases, correlations coefficients are significant and positive, which means that overall
trends are well reflected by any of the four capital tax rate indicators.
Table 9. Cross-country correlations for long and short-run changes.
LETR/
LITR
CITR/
CETR
KETG/
KETN
KETG/
KITG
KETG/
KITN
KETN/
KITG
KETN/
KITN
KITG/
KITN
70-74/
93-97
0.961 0.999 0.857 0.863 0.824 0.709 0.700 0.987
80-84/
93-97
0.943 0.999 0.928 0.841 0.816 0.699 0.739 0.963
1999/
2001
0.988 0.999 0.751 0.926 0.652 0.743 0.860 0.812
Where the capital tax rate is concerned, we can conclude that a choice needs to be
made as regards the treatment of the income of the self-employed or, alternatively, on
the way to consider depreciation. If the operating surplus is computed in gross terms,
adjusting it or not for the imputed wage of the self-employed (KETG versus KITG)
does not seem to have implications for across-country comparisons. Analogously,
once the analyst has decided to consider the whole income of the self-employed as
capital income, calculating the (unadjusted) operating surplus in gross (KITG) or net
(KITN) terms has not consequences either.
43 Thus for non-wage labour costs and labour tax wedges.
44 In doing so, we avoid scale effects, which could arise if we compare changes in terms of first
differences directly.39
9.2. Within-country comparisons
Albeit very common, cross-country comparisons may not be the only goal of
measuring and analysing effective taxation. The concern may also be the evolution of
tax rates within a particular country. We start by within-country comparisons between
the alternative indicators of the effective tax rates of labour, consumption and capital
in levels. Table 10 shows simple correlation coefficients between the series (LETR
versus LITR, CETR versus CITR, KETG versus KETN, etc.) for each individual
country, the euro area and the EU as a whole.
Table 10. Within-country correlations
LETR/
LITR
CITR/C
ETR
KETG/
KETN
KETG/
KITG
KETG/
KITN
KETN/
KITG
KETN/
KITN
KITG/
KITN
B 0.997 0.999 0.850 0.931 0.913 0.862 0.916 0.987
DK 0.999 0.999 -0.000 0.960 0.500 0.234 0.751 0.709
D 0.991 0.999 0.754 0.724 0.041 0.616 0.426 0.626
GR 0.986 0.999 0.958 0.780 0.775 0.858 0.865 0.997
E 0.982 0.999 0.935 0.973 0.967 0.901 0.906 0.999
F 0.999 0.999 0.683 0.933 0.924 0.556 0.706 0.976
IRL 0.998 0.999 0.847 0.133 0.080 -0.171 -0.129 0.979
I 0.991 0.999 0.949 0.980 0.973 0.947 0.959 0.998
L 0.942 0.999 0.609 0.981 0.952 0.505 0.735 0.944
NL 0.954 0.999 0.630 0.574 0.530 0.198 0.363 0.960
A 0.999 0.999 0.364 0.769 0.683 0.469 0.493 0.988
P 0.999 0.999 0.836 0.777 0.792 0.962 0.967 0.999
FIN 0.998 0.999 -0.181 0.799 0.193 0.277 0.767 0.717
S 0.999 0.999 0.553 0.974 0.566 0.666 0.992 0.683
UK 0.982 0.999 0.742 0.954 0.746 0.714 0.899 0.836
US 0.999 0.999 0.957 0.990 0.949 0.943 0.974 0.965
JAP 0.999 0.999 0.873 0.673 0.447 0.288 0.515 0.948
EUR-11 0.999 0.998 0.566 0.954 0.918 0.556 0.687 0.980
EU-15 0.999 0.999 0.573 0.922 0.851 0.554 0.764 0.950
It seems quite clear that LETR and LITR, for labour, and CITR and CETR, for
consumption, have basically the same informative content in all cases. KITG and
KITN are also quite similar in most countries with correlation coefficients close to 1.
The exceptions are DK, D, FIN and S, where the correlation coefficients are lower
than 80%, but always significant, positive and higher than 60%. It also seems that
KETG and KITG follow the same evolution in most Member States. The most
outstanding exceptions are Ireland, where the coefficient is non significant, and the
Netherlands and Japan, where correlations are relatively low. The rest of pair-wise
comparisons provide more ambiguous results. Low correlation coefficients for the40
EUR-11 and the EU-15 in KETG versus KETN, KITN versus KITG and KETN
versus KITN are particularly revealing.
Table 10 broadly supports the conclusions reached on the basis of cross-country
comparisons. LETR and LITR, on the one hand, and CITR and CETR, on the other
hand, are basically the same variable. Where capital rates are concerned a decision
has to be made about the way the operating surplus is measured. If the capital tax base
is measured in gross terms, considering the income of the self-employed totally
(KITG) or partially (KETG) as capital income does not make any significant
difference in most countries. Alternatively, if the whole income of the self-employed
is considered as capital, measuring the tax base including (KITG) or excluding
(KITN) depreciation does not lead to series statistically different.
However, it could be argued that such correlations may be spurious and simply reflect
the fact that the series follow positive paths in most cases. In order to avoid this
problem, we have calculated simple correlations for the cyclical component of the
series (table 11) and for annual growth rates (table 12). The cyclical component has
been calculated as the difference between the actual and the cyclically adjusted series
expressed in percentage points of the latter, which have been obtained by using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Table 11. Within-country correlations. Cyclical components
LETR/
LITR
CITR/C
ETR
KETG/
KETN
KETG/
KITG
KETG/
KITN
KETN/
KITG
KETN/
KITN
KITG/
KITN
B 0.992 0.999 0.531 0.891 0.745 0.745 0.907 0.940
DK 0.999 0.999 0.071 0.956 0.409 0.297 0.910 0.625
D 0.990 0.999 0.316 0.953 0.637 0.352 0.842 0.743
GR 0.871 0.999 0.923 0.660 0.656 0.643 0.661 0.997
E 0.941 0.999 0.821 0.829 0.778 0.625 0.672 0.981
F 0.992 0.999 0.683 0.939 0.813 0.732 0.931 0.913
IRL 0.986 0.999 0.916 0.937 0.911 0.839 0.925 0.958
I 0.783 0.999 0.791 0.768 0.762 0.515 0.632 0.978
L 0.978 0.999 0.634 0.679 0.786 0.641 0.942 0.819
NL 0.978 0.999 0.818 0.781 0.709 0.824 0.910 0.937
A 0.987 0.999 0.425 0.837 0.669 0.609 0.786 0.934
P 0.966 0.999 0.540 0.499 0.580 0.888 0.898 0.994
FIN 0.997 0.999 -0.195 0.824 0.071 0.244 0.883 0.576
S 0.999 0.999 0.203 0.941 0.277 0.472 0.989 0.546
UK 0.997 0.999 0.803 0.990 0.903 0.792 0.959 0.912
US 0.996 0.999 0.837 0.996 0.894 0.854 0.986 0.916
JAP 0.981 0.999 0.711 0.889 0.852 0.405 0.502 0.959
EUR-11 0.960 0.999 0.146 0.887 0.456 0.003 0.731 0.559
EU-15 0.982 0.999 0.526 0.949 0.743 0.399 0.878 0.732
At a first glance, tables 11 and 12 lead to the same conclusions as tables 8, 9 and 10.
This is pretty obvious for labour (LETR versus LITR)
45 and consumption (CETR
versus CITR) tax rates. It is also clear for the two alternative tax rates using the gross
operating surplus (KETG and KITG) and, to a lesser extent, for the two tax rates
45 Note that Italy is to some extent an exception in the case of labour taxes, especially where the growth
rates are concerned.41
considering the whole income of the self-employed as capital income (KITG and
KITN). In addition, while tables 8 to 10 indicated that KITG and KITN were similar,
tables 11 and 12 reveal noticeable differences in some countries, including the EUR-
11 and EU-15 aggregates.
Table 12. Within-country correlations. Growth rates
LETR/
LITR
CITR/C
ETR
KETG/
KETN
KETG/
KITG
KETG/
KITN
KETN/
KITG
KETN/
KITN
KITG/
KITN
B 0.991 0.999 0.639 0.885 0.734 0.807 0.932 0.937
DK 0.999 0.999 0.014 0.925 0.303 0.327 0.931 0.606
D 0.990 0.999 0.648 0.970 0.787 0.698 0.946 0.853
GR 0.840 0.999 0.970 0.850 0.851 0.802 0.813 0.999
E 0.939 0.999 0.872 0.810 0.791 0.722 0.772 0.990
F 0.993 0.999 0.726 0.956 0.839 0.757 0.939 0.915
IRL 0.992 0.999 0.916 0.919 0.902 0.839 0.913 0.969
I 0.575 0.999 0.807 0.528 0.554 0.353 0.505 0.973
L 0.986 0.999 0.592 0.978 0.723 0.651 0.967 0.781
NL 0.980 0.999 0.774 0.798 0.728 0.822 0.924 0.949
A 0.983 0.999 0.425 0.875 0.733 0.633 0.830 0.934
P 0.967 0.999 0.384 0.487 0.591 0.843 0.843 0.990
FIN 0.995 0.999 -0.224 0.792 0.130 0.227 0.801 0.668
S 0.998 0.999 0.104 0.945 0.207 0.355 0.982 0.464
UK 0.997 0.999 0.849 0.987 0.924 0.821 0.968 0.921
US 0.997 0.999 0.853 0.995 0.901 0.867 0.987 0.920
JAP 0.983 0.999 0.815 0.956 0.949 0.672 0.746 0.980
EUR-11 0.934 0.998 0.310 0.845 0.584 0.204 0.718 0.754
EU-15 0.965 0.998 0.504 0.897 0.664 0.397 0.874 0.726
Consequently, while one can still maintain that, once the tax base is measured on the
basis of the gross operating surplus, including or excluding the imputed wage income
of the self-employed does not make any significant difference, the treatment of
depreciation may induce important divergences between alternative capital tax rates
(see also Carey and Tchilinguirian, 2000).
9.3. Convergence analyses
In PFR2000 a convergence analysis is carried out on the basis of three of the
indicators of effective taxation defined above. The indicators used there are LETR in
(18), CITR in (24) and KETG in (34) for, respectively, labour consumption and
capital. Convergence is measured through the ratio between the standard deviation
and the mean, and is expressed in percentage points. The conclusions can be
summarised as follows
46:
· The tax burden has been converging both within and outside the EU. Yet,
dispersion is lower among Member States. In addition, the bulk of the
convergence process took place during the seventies and the early eighties, when
46 See European Commission (2000a) Part IV, chapter 3 (graph IV.5).42
the dispersion coefficient fell from 35 to 25% in the EU (from 38% to 29% among
the MS, the US and Japan);
· The tax burden on consumption has also been converging since the seventies. The
process is much more notorious within than outside the EU. As a matter of fact,
the process has clearly accelerated in the EU since the late eighties. Between 1988
and 1999 the dispersion coefficient fell from 24% to 16%; and
· Where capital taxes are concerned, leaving aside the effects of cyclical
fluctuations, the tax burden has been steadily decreasing since the seventies both
in the EU and in other industrial countries. In addition, dispersion coefficients are
broadly similar outside and inside the Union. Overall, the dispersion coefficient
fell from 43% in the early seventies to 22% in the late nineties.
Graph 1 displays the evolution of dispersion coefficients of LETR and LITR among
EU Member States (first panel) and among the whole sample, thus including the US
and Japan (second panel).
The conclusion seems to be fairly clear. Not only do the dispersion coefficients LETR
and LITR present quite similar profiles, both outside and within the EU, but the
differences are fading out with time. In the late nineties, dispersion coefficients for
LETR and LITR are broadly similar. This provides further evidence that, where the
tax burden on labour is concerned, including or excluding the imputed wage income
of the self-employed does not make much of a difference.
Graph 2 is the counterpart of graph 1 for consumption taxes. Regardless whether we
use CETR or CITR we observe the same profile in both the EU and the whole sample.
The only difference is that the dispersion coefficients are overall lower for CITR than
for CETR. Leaving aside this fact, it is clear that both indicators record the same type
of changes, especially the acceleration of the convergence process in the late eighties
in accordance with VAT harmonisation. However, both CETR and CITR show a
stagnation of the dispersion coefficients in the nineties, while, indeed, dispersion for
both CETR and CITR is much lower in the EU than in the whole sample.43
Graph 1. Dispersion coefficients for tax rates on labour, 1970-2001.
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Graph 2. Dispersion coefficients for tax rates on consumption, 1970-2001.
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Finally, graph 3 displays the evolution of the dispersion coefficients for KETG,
KETN, KITG and KITN. Leaving aside differences in levels, as well as the magnitude
of cyclical swings, the four indicators are witness of the same type of convergence.
On the one hand, the process is very strong with drastic reductions of dispersion
coefficients over the last three decades. On the other hand, there are no noticeable
differences between the EU (first panel) and the whole (second panel) samples.
Capital tax convergence, unlikely consumption, is driven by international factors
going beyond the processes of economic integration in the EU.45
Graph 3. Dispersion coefficients for tax rates on capital, 1970-2001.
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However, some differences between the four indicators are worth mentioning. First,
while the evolution of dispersion coefficients for KETG, KITG and KITN is rather
smooth, that of KETN is subject to strong cyclical fluctuations. In other words,
cyclical swings are amplified when excluding the imputed wage income of the self-
employed from the net operating surplus. Overall, the net surplus as a capital tax base
leads to higher dispersion than the gross operating surplus. This is in agreement with
findings by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). Nevertheless, interestingly, once the
analyst has made a decision concerning the treatment of depreciation (viz. using
KITN/KETN or KITG/KETG), the way the imputed wage income of the self-
employed is considered, whether labour or capital income, has no impact on
convergence analyses. Leaving aside cyclical fluctuations, the dispersion coefficients46
of KETN and KITN, on the one hand, and of KETG and KITG, on the other hand are
almost identical. This is especially evident in the cases of KETG and KITG, once the
early seventies are excluded from the sample.
9.4. Wrapping up
Overall, the analysis in this section seems to support the choice taken in PFR2000,
where, leaving aside PITR, the focus was on LETR (then on NWLC and WEDG),
CITR and KETG. More particularly:
1. Including or not the imputed wage income of the self-employed in the calculations
for the tax burden on labour does not alter at all the conclusions.
2. Defining the consumption tax wedge in terms of producer (CETR) or consumer
(CITR) prices leads to indicators with exactly the same informative content from a
statistical point of view.
3. Where capital taxes are concerned, the analyst needs to make a decision either
concerning the tax treatment of depreciation or the treatment of the imputed wage
income of the self-employed. In more concrete terms, we have seen that:
· If the whole income of the self-employed is considered as a capital income,
defining the tax base including (KITG) or excluding (KITN) depreciation
does not make much of a difference for across-country comparisons both in
terms of levels, ranks or short and long-run changes. It does not make a big
difference either when the goal is to analyse tax convergence. However, if
the interest of the researcher is centred on within-country analyses, then
relatively significant differences may arise between KITG and KITN in some
countries (and EU aggregates) both in terms of levels, cyclical components
and, especially, growth rates.
· On the contrary, if the analyst opts for defining the operating surplus in gross
terms, the consideration of the imputed wage income of the self-employed as
labour (KETG) or as capital income (KITG) does not lead to large
differences in within-country analyses, while it does not alter either the
conclusions about across-country comparisons and tax convergence. Overall,
and more important, in terms of the cyclical component, as well as in terms
of growth rates, both capital tax rates are also identical in all the countries,
except in Portugal and, to a lesser extent, in Greece. These are the two
countries where the share of the self-employed is the largest in the sample
due to the relative importance of the primary sector in the total economy.
10. COMPARISONS BETWEENAMECO AND OTHER DATABANKS
As shown in sections 2 to 8, the differences between ECFIN/PFR2000 (European
Commission 2000a), EC2000 (European Commission, 2000c) and OECD (Carey and
Tchilinguirian, 2000) databanks on effective (implicit) taxation consist of both the47
criteria applied to define particular rates and the input data used to obtain the tax
revenues and bases. Given such differences, one should expect a low degree of
similarity between comparable rates in the three databanks. Yet, as shown below, the
differences are much smaller than expected in a number of relevant cases, especially
where labour and consumption taxes are concerned.
10.1. Comparing ECFIN and the OECD
The OECD calculates an indicator of the effective tax burden on labour (LTRO
hereafter), which resembles very much LETR in (22). Both LETR and LTRO
consider that a part of the income of the self-employed (the imputed wage) is labour
income. However, leaving aside differences in data sources
47, the most important
difference between both rates is the way the personal income tax rate (PITR) is
calculated. The OECD uses the MRT definition, while ECFIN uses the approximation
explained in section 4.
The first column of table 13 shows the across-country correlation coefficients
between LETR and LTRO for the average levels in 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-
1993 and 1994-1997, as well as for the change (in percentage of the base period) in
the five-year average levels between the early eighties (80-84) and the late nineties
(93-97). The periods and countries have been chosen in function of data availability in
the paper by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), which only includes data between1980
and 1997. Rank correlation coefficients are shown between brackets.
Table 13. Comparing AMECO and OECD. Cross-country correlations
LETR/
LTRO
CETR/
CT2O
KETG/
KTGO
KETN/
KTNO
AV80-84 0.965
(0.937)
0.931
(0.909)
0.948
(0.923)
0.963
(0.266)
AV85-89 0.967
(0.937)
0.913
(0.909)
0.946
(0.895)
0.785
(0.566)
AV90-93 0.971
(0.921)
0.923
(0.941)
0.683
(0.561)
0.813
(0.764)
AV94-97 0.968
(0.921)
0.933
(0.897)
0.743
(0.697)
0.821
(0.850)
Growth
80-84/
93-97
0.928
(0.874)
0.893
(0.734)
0.848
(0.734)
0.726
(0.811)
47 LETR is based on AMECO data and on some series of the OECD Revenue Statistics, while LTRO
is calculated from data of OECD National Accounts, main aggregates and detailed tables, and from
OECD Revenue Statistics.48
Where five-year average levels are concerned, both tax rates are almost identical, with
rather time-stable correlation coefficients of at around 97%. In addition, albeit
somewhat lower, both labour tax rates lead to quite similar conclusions regarding
comparisons of growth rates across countries between the early eighties and the mid
nineties. Finally, rank correlations overall support the conclusion that once personal
income taxes on labour income are calculated àl aMRT, using different proxies of
household income and different macroeconomic databanks does not make much of a
difference when assessing the level and evolution of the effective tax burden on
labour across OECD countries.
Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) consider two alternative ways of calculating the
effective tax burden on consumption. The first one, CT1O, does not deduct wages
paid by general government, while the second one, CT2O, does. Both rates use a
measure of tax revenues -items RS5110, RS5121, RS5123, RS5126, RS5128 and
RS5200 of the OECDRS databank-, which is quite close to the AMECO concept of
indirect taxes. In addition, also in both cases, tax revenues are excluded from the tax
base. On this basis, table 13 compares ECFIN’s CETR in (25) with CT2O of the
OECD. Overall, CT2O and CETR seem to be broadly similar.
Finally, where capital taxes are concerned, Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) calculate
two rates. Both exclude the imputed wage income of the self-employed from the tax
base. One of them, KTGO, defines the tax base in terms of the gross operating surplus
and is conceptually equivalent to KETG in (34), while the other, KTNO, is calculated
on the basis of the net operating surplus and is comparable to KETN in (37). As
shown in table 13, while correlation coefficients are relatively stable for labour and
consumption rates, in the case of capital, similarities between AMECO and OECD
very much depend on the period considered. When defining the tax base in terms of
the gross operating surplus, AMECO and OECD lead to quite similar results in levels
during the eighties. However, differences between both rates, KETG and KTGO, are
larger during the nineties. If the tax base is calculated on the basis of the net operating
surplus, the degree of similarity is slightly higher in the nineties than in the late
eighties.
All in all, where across-country comparisons are concerned, table 13 seems to suggest
that ECFIN and OECD effective tax rates present a rather high degree of similarity.
This is particularly true in the case of labour and consumption taxes. Evidence for
capital rates is more ambiguous, but leaving aside periods including large cyclical
swings, such as 1990-1993, ECFIN and OECD capital rates lead to broadly equivalent
conclusions when the tax base is calculated by using the gross operating surplus
(KETG and KTGO).
Within-country correlations very much support such conclusions. Table 14 gives the
correlation coefficients for the series expressed in annual growth rates (in %). Taking
into account that correlations concern growth rates instead of levels, figures in the
table can be assessed as overall high. However, the degree of similarity varies across
countries and types of rates. Italy and, to a lesser extent, Germany (labour), Finland
(capital with gross operating surplus) and Japan (consumption) are the countries
where the discrepancies between ECFIN and OECD databanks are the largest.
Moreover, it is worth highlighting that low or non-significant correlation coefficients
are the exception rather than the rule. For most countries, ECFIN and OECD
databanks provide comparable indicators. This suggests that differences between both49
databanks might be attributable to differences in the input series rather than to
differences in the criteria applied to calculate the tax rates.
Table 14. Comparing AMECO and OECD. Time-series analyses in growth rates
LETR/
LTRO
CETR/
CT2O
KETG/
KTGO
KETN/
KTNO
B 0.737 0.786 0.633 0.727
D 0.535 0.715 0.514 0.814
E 0.744 0.886 0.829 0.821
F 0.948 0.904 0.733 0.909
IRL 0.935 0.936 0.701 0.796
I 0.685 0.517 0.663 0.788
NL 0.914 0.758 0.954 0.982
A 0.904 0.766 0.936 0.812
FIN 0.931 0.693 0.208 0.958
S 0.642 0.723 0.444 0.876
UK 0.563 0.883 0.905 0.952
US 0.852 0.734 0.730 0.724
JAP 0.875 0.086 0.854 0.881
10.2. Comparing AMECO and EC2000
EC2000 (European Commission, 2000c) publishes the so-called implicit tax rates on
employed labour, consumption and other production factors. EC2000 publishes two
alternative tax rates on employed labour, which diverge in the way the tax base is
defined. The first one (LT1T hereafter) defines the tax base on the basis of the
compensation of employees paid on the economic territory, while the second one
(LT2T) calculates the tax base as the compensation of resident employees. As
explained above, the major difference between ECFIN and EC2000 rates on
employed labour consists of the way the personal tax revenues from labour are
calculated. Leaving aside this fact, the clearest counterpart to LT1T and LT2T in
AMECO is LITR in (23), since the rates in EC2000 classify the whole income of the
self-employed as capital income.
The first two columns of table 15 give the cross-country correlations (rank
correlations between brackets) for five-year average levels and long-run growth rates.
The figures in the table seem to suggest that ECFIN and EC2000 tax rates are broadly
similar with correlation coefficients in levels at around 90%. Moreover, although
classical correlations for growth rates are only 75%, rank correlations reveal that the
ordering of countries is overall comparable in both databanks. In addition, it seems
that LT1T and LT2T are, from a statistical point of view, the same indicators, since
their correlations with LITR are almost identical.
The major difference between the implicit tax rate on consumption as calculated in
European Commission (2000c) –CTRT- and its counterpart in AMECO -CITR in
(28)- seems to be the definition of consumption taxes. EC2000 excludes a number of
(rather marginal) energy and ecological taxes, which are considered as taxes on other50
production factors, while such taxes are treated by indirect taxes in the ECFIN
databank. The third column of table 15 indicates that such differences in criteria have
not a big overall impact in terms of levels. However, in terms of growth rates, the
differences are striking.
Table 15. Comparing AMECO and EC2000. Cross-country correlations
LITR/
LT1T
LITR/
LT2T
CITR/
CTRT
KITN/
KT1T
KITN/
KT2T
AV80-84 0.842
(0.836)
0.836
(0.846)
0.813
(0.814)
0.632
(0.664)
0.573
(0.636)
AV85-89 0.909
(0.854)
0.902
(0.857)
0.880
(0.835)
0.689
(0.657)
0.580
(0.604)
AV90-93 0.912
(0.890)
0.914
(0.886)
0.871
(0.818)
0.477
(0.353)
0.426
(0.346)
AV94-97 0.911
(0.807)
0.913
(0.811)
0.868
(0.753)
0.586
(0.475)
0.563
(0.418)
Growth
80-84/
93-97
0.752
(0.900)
0.736
(0.907)
0.520
(0.539)
0.596
(0.653)
0.572
(0.700)
Finally, EC2000 provides two alternative implicit tax rates on capital. The first one,
KT1T, excludes interest paid by governments, while the second one, KT2T, includes
such payments. In both rates, the tax base is calculated on the basis of the net
operating surplus and, also in both cases, the whole income of the self-employed is
considered as capital income. In addition, as mentioned in the paragraph above, the
rates in EC2000 are not exclusively rates on capital, but on “other production factors”.
These include some energy and environmental taxes, which vary from one country to
another and can be marginal in some cases. On the basis of the way the operating
surplus is measured and the income of the self-employed is treated, KITN in (39)
might be the best proxy to EC2000 rates. The correlations exhibited in the last two
columns of table 15, albeit positive and significant, are relatively low. We think that
the major source of discrepancies may be the differences in the way personal income
tax revenues from capital are calculated.
As shown in table 16, the divergences between both tax databanks seem to vary
strongly from one Member State to another. If we establish 70% as a benchmark for
the time series correlation coefficients of the series in growth rates, we have to
conclude that very large divergences between EC2000 and ECFIN databanks only
appear in Greece, Luxembourg and the UK. In addition, the EC2000 and ECFIN
series of tax rates on labour are also quite different in Denmark, Portugal and Sweden,
while in this latter country, as well as in Germany
48, divergences also affect
consumption tax rates. Yet, it is worth noting that leaving aside Greece and to a much
48 Note that correlation coefficients for capital taxes in Germany are numerically lower than our 70%
benchmark. However, at 68%, they are not statistically different from that benchmark.51
lesser extent Luxembourg, the coefficients in table 16 are positive and statistically
significant.
Table 16. Comparing AMECO and EC2000. Time-series analyses in growth
rates
LETR/
LT1T
LETR/
LT2T
CITR/
CTRT
KITN/
KT1T
KITN/
KT2T
B 0.717 0.716 0.729 0.722 0.701
DK 0.500 0.472 0.928 0.940 0.888
D 0.725 0.717 0.532 0.680 0.682
GR -0.051 -0.045 0.536 0.133 0.147
E 0.699 0.699 0.958 0.715 0.716
F 0.902 0.909 0.902 0.851 0.890
IRL 0.912 0.916 0.943 0.786 0.765
I 0.714 0.723 0.740 0.792 0.773
L 0.209 0.286 0.408 0.307 0.305
NL 0.861 0.862 0.931 0.850 0.799
A 0.834 0.843 0.813 0.818 0.827
P 0.525 0.515 0.753 0.825 0.845
FIN 0.890 0.891 0.836 0.868 0.875
S 0.655 0.661 0.540 0.868 0.870
UK 0.452 0.454 0.507 0.661 0.611
Overall, we can conclude that the differences in criteria and data sources between
EC2000 and ECFIN lead to lower than expected differences in the series of tax rates.
This is particularly true in the case of the ordering of countries in terms of the tax
burdens on labour and on consumption.
11. COMPARING EFFICIENCY AND GROWTH EFFECTS
The interest in producing aggregate tax rates may go beyond mechanical comparisons
across countries and the assessments of the impact of tax reforms on tax burdens. For
instance, the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council requested the
Council and the Commission to assess “the contribution of public finances to growth
and employment”. In the framework of taxation, such a request implies determining
the (distortionary) effects of the tax burden and its components on economic
efficiency (investment, and employment) and growth. From an economic policy
viewpoint, the issue at stake is the effectiveness of tax reform as an instrument to
enhance long-run growth and job creation.
The academic literature is rich in papers and monographs with theoretical and
empirical evidence on the impacts of taxes on growth and employment. Taxation
affects the functioning of the economy in different ways. Taxes interfere with the52
incentives to invest, save and work and have sizeable welfare effects
49. Capital taxes
reduce the after-tax rate of return on physical capital, thus lowering capital
accumulation. Capital taxes may also create disincentives to save over the life-cycle.
On the other hand, labour taxes, when coupled with rigid labour markets and generous
benefit systems, increase the cost of labour, reduce employment and increase
unemployment
50. Therefore, tax systems may be a key factor to determine the overall
efficiency of the economy.
However, such a body of literature is far from generating unanimity about the
capacity of taxes to influence long-run growth in a significant way. Where growth
effects are concerned, and although economic models predict that changes in tax rates
affect growth in the long run
51, as far back as in 1964, Harberger
52 conjectured that in
practice tax policy is not effective in influencing growth. Since then, a debate exists in
the empirical literature about the size and statistical significance of the effects of taxes
on growth. All in all, while taxes and, particularly, capital taxes seem to have a
sizeable and unambiguous negative effect on private investment, the effects on long-
run growth, measured through the real GDP or the per capita GDP, may be
statistically non-significant, or negative but small (Mendoza, Milessi-Ferretti and
Asea, 1997). Moreover, it seems that estimates of such growth effects very much
depend on the country sample and the period covered. They are also very sensitive to
the inclusion or exclusion of other variables in the models, to the instruments used to
avoid endogeneity biases, and to the estimation methods applied (see, for example,
Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson, 1997, Folster and Henrekson, 1999, and Agell, Lindh and
Ohlsson, 1999).
Where the effects of taxation on employment and unemployment are concerned, a
body of economic literature argues that the tax burden on labour will be passed on to
labour itself, at least in the long-run (see, for instance, Nickell, 1997). Such theoretical
arguments have found support in a number of empirical analyses such as, for instance,
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) or, Nickell and Layard (1999), which found
rather small negative effects of taxes on (un)employment performance. However,
other empirical analysis, such as, Elmeskov et al (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers
(1999) or Daveri and Tabellini (2000), which deal with the interplay of taxes with
benefits and other labour and product market institutions, suggest that such negative
effects may be sizeable. Moreover, simulation experiments on the basis of general
equilibrium models published in PFR2000 (see European Commission, 2000a)
suggest that a reduction in the tax burden of 1% of GDP could increase employment
by 0.5 to 1% in the long run (10 years) depending on the characteristics of the tax
reform (across-the-board tax cuts, targeted to labour)
53.
49 See, among many others, de la Fuente (1997), Mendoza et al (1997), Leibfritz, Thornton and Bibbee
(1997) and Pissarides (1998).
50 See, Nickell (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Elmeskov et al (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers
(1999).
51 This particularly applies to endogenous growth models that take account of the whole structure of
expenditures and taxes. For instance, Barro (1990) predicts that the impact of fiscal policy on growth
depends on the structure of the budget. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) present very interesting
empirical evidence in this line. They have shown that, once the government budget constraint is
adequately specified, the effects of tax reform on long-run growth depend on how it is financed.
52 See Harberger (1964).
53 Where comparisons with results presented below are concerned, it is worth bearing in mind that
such an accumulated impact on employment implies a very low additional annual growth rate of
employment with respect to the baseline.53
It is worth clarifying at the outset that the purpose of this section is not to contribute
to the debate of the effects of taxes on economic efficiency and long-run growth. This
is, for obvious reasons, beyond the scope of this paper. Within a much modest scope,
this section only tries to see to what extent the estimated effects of taxes on
investment, employment and long-run growth are sensitive to alternative criteria of
calculating effective tax rates.
Table 17 shows the results of simple regressions between ECFIN tax rates, on the one
hand, and the private investment rate, the employment rate, the unemployment rate
and the real GDP growth rate for a panel data involving the 15 Member States, the US
and Japan over the 1970-1997 period
54.
Table 17. Investment, growth and (un)employment effects. ECFIN tax rates,
1970-1997.
Investment
rate
Growth
rate
Employment
rate
Unemployment
rate
Coef.
(t-ratio) R²
Coef.
(t-ratio) R²
Coef.
(t-ratio) R²
Coef.
(t-ratio) R²
LETR -0.13
(-4.95)* 0.20
-0.07
(-4.89)* 0.19
0.05
(0.52) 0.00
0.05
(1.17) 0.01
LITR -0.12
(-4.05)* 0.14
-0.08
(-5.35)* 0.22
-0.09
(-0.98) 0.01
0.06
(0.06) 0.02
CETR -0.06
(-1.57) 0.02
-0.02
(-1.03) 0.01
CITR -0.09
(-1.56) 0.02
-0.03
(-0.99) 0.01
KETG -0.24
(-5.82)* 0.25
-0.00
(-0.22) 0.00
KETN -0.05
(-3.23)* 0.09
-0.02
(-2.45)* 0.06
KITG -0.27
(-7.51)* 0.36
-0.05
(-1.83) 0.03
KITN -0.12
(-6.39)* 0.29
-0.03
(-2.81)* 0.07
* Significant at 5%
In order to capture long-run or trend effects, we have eliminated cyclical fluctuations
by taking five-year averages over the period 1970-1994 (1970-1974, 1975-1979,
1980-1984, 1985-1989 and 1990-1994) plus the three-year averages for the period
1995-1997. The table only shows the estimate (and the t-ratio) of the coefficient of the
tax rate in row in the regression of the indicator in column. The R² of the regression is
displayed in bold. Econometric results in the table are very much in line with the
literature mentioned above.
54 We have stopped in 1997 to allow for comparisons with the EC2000 and OECD databanks.54
· First, labour and capital taxes negatively affect the private investment rate in the
long run. However, consumption taxes seem to be rather neutral with respect to
investment
55. Leaving aside KETN, the explicative power of capital taxes is larger
than that of labour taxes. All in all, an increase of 1 percentage point in capital tax
rates may reduce the investment rate by a quarter of point. The same increase in
labour taxes leads to half such a reduction in the investment rate (slightly more
than a tenth of a percentage point).
· Second, taxes are overall negatively correlated with growth. However, their
effects on growth are lower than those on investment. In the case of labour taxes,
an increase of a percentage point in the effective tax rate on labour reduces growth
in the long run by less than 0.1%. In the case of capital taxes, the effects on
growth are negligible when compared with those on investment. In some cases,
such effects are statistically non-significant
56.
· Finally, and unsurprisingly, since our “models” do not take account of the
interplay of labour taxes with benefits and other market institutions, there are no
significant effects of taxes on the employment and the unemployment rates
57.
Overall, when excluding any other potential explicative variable, labour tax rates
seem to be neutral with respect to employment performance.
There is a question now to ask whether such conclusions are supported by the tax
rates calculated by the OECD or by EC2000. Table 18 compares the investment,
growth and employment effects of changes in the tax rates in ECFIN and in EC2000.
Table 18. Comparing investment, growth and (un)employment effects of ECFIN
and EC2000 tax rates
Investment
rate
Growth
rate
Employment
rate
Unemployment
rate
Coef. R² Coef. R² Coef. R² Coef. R²
LITR -0.09* 0.08 -0.08* 0.16 0.16 0.03 -0.03 0.00
LT1T -0.09* 0.11 -0.05* 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.00
LT2T -0.09* 0.12 -0.05* 0.07 0.22* 0.06 0.01 0.00
CITR -0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00
CTRT -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03
KITN -0.09* 0.23 -0.01 0.01
KT1T -0.06* 0.13 -0.02 0.04
KT2T -0.08* 0.11 -0.02 0.01
* Significant at 5%
55 Mendoza et al (1997) also found zero correlation between consumption taxes and investment.
56 See Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) for an interpretation of this result, which would be due to
absence of the government budget constraint in the model.
57 Therefore, the results in this section are not comparable with simulations in, for instance, European
Commission (2000a). Models in table 17 represent, by definition, partial analyses, while simulation
experiments in “Public Finances in EMU –2000” give general equilibrium effects, which take account
of the interplay of taxes with other key variables in the economy.55
In particular, we compare effects of the two labour implicit tax rates published in
European Commission (2000c) with their best counterpart in the ECFIN databank –
LITR-. In the case of consumption, we compare the EC2000 CTRT with CITR in
(28). Finally, we compare the EC2000 capital rates KT1T and KT2T with the ECFIN
rate KITN as defined in (39). It is worth keeping in mind that regression results in
table 18 may not be comparable with those in table 17; the reason being that the
sample of countries and the periods are different in both sets of regressions. Since
EC2000 only includes the 15 Member States, samples in table 18 exclude the US and
Japan. Moreover, unlikely in table 17, the period for some countries is 1980-1997
instead of 1970-1997. The main conclusions can be summarised as follows:
· First, where investment effects of taxation are concerned, both ECFIN and
EC2000 tax rates lead to almost exactly the same results. Overall, an increase of 1
percentage point in labour or capital tax rates would reduce the private investment
rate by a (statistically significant) figure slightly lower than a tenth of a percentage
point. However, ECFIN and EC2000 consumption tax rates are neutral with
respect to investment.
· Second, capital and consumption taxes seem to be neutral with respect to long-run
growth. As in table 17, the effects of capital taxes on growth are negligible and, in
any case, much lower than those on investment. In accordance with table 17, the
effects of labour taxes on growth seem to be significant, although lower than those
on investment. The explicative power of ECFIN’s LITR is slightly higher than
that of its counterparts in EC2000, LT1T and LT2T.
· Finally, leaving aside LT2T in the regression for the employment rate, which
exhibits a (wrong) positive sign, likely due to specification errors, the effects of
labour taxes on employment and unemployment are statistically insignificant.
Consequently, such results seem to suggest that when it comes to analyse growth and
employment effects of taxation, ECFIN and EC2000 databanks lead to comparable
conclusions.56
Table 19 is the equivalent to table 18 for the comparisons between ECFIN and OECD
tax rates.
Table 19. Comparing investment, growth and (un)employment effects of ECFIN
and OECD tax rates
Investment
rate
Growth
Rate
Employment
rate
Unemployment
rate
Coef. R² Coef. R² Coef. R² Coef. R²
LETR -0.05 0.04 -0.05* 0.11 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00
LTRO -0.04 0.03 -0.04* 0.07 0.17 0.03 -0.04 0.01
CETR -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.00
CT1O -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00
CT2O -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
KETG -0.11 0.05 0.05 0.03
KTGO -0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.01
KETN 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03
KTNO 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02
* Significant at 5%
Again, the results in table 19 are not comparable with those in tables 17 and 18. On
the one hand, the country sample is different since Luxembourg is not included in it,
but the US and Japan are in the sample. On the other hand, the time span only starts in
1980 and there are no data for some countries during the eighties.
Overall, results in the table indicate that ECFIN and OECD tax rates lead to the same
type of efficiency and growth effects.
· No tax rate has significant effects on the investment rate. Yet, tax rates of capital,
measured on the basis of the gross operating surplus, seem to have larger (and
negative) effects than those calculated on the basis of the net operating surplus.
· Albeit rather small, labour taxes have negative effects on long-run growth. An
increase of 1 percentage point in the effective tax rate reduce growth in the long
run by only 0.05%. In the sample of table 19, consumption and capital taxes do
not affect long-run growth.
· Finally, the employment and the unemployment rates are invariant with respect to
the labour effective tax rates produced by both ECFIN and OECD.
12. CONCLUSIONS
This paper explains and discusses in detail the method and information sources used
by DG ECFIN services to obtain the effective tax rates on labour, capital and
consumption. The paper also compares the informative content of ECFIN indicators
with that of tax rates calculated by the OECD and by European Commission’s57
Structures of the taxation systems in the European Union. Tax rates have been
calculated for the 15 Member States, the US, Japan, EUR-11 and EU-15 between
1970 and 2001.
It has been explained that the goal of DG ECFIN in working on this databank on
effective taxation is to supplement the information in other databanks (EC2000,
OECD), which are published with a 2 to 3-year lags, and/or only include too broad
indicators of the tax burdens, and/or do not allow for comparisons between EU and
non-EU countries. The goal of the ECFIN databank on effective taxation is to carry
out early, transparent and detailed assessments of tax reforms in Member States, as
requested in the conclusions of the Council of Lisbon. Such assessments can be
conducted by adapting effective tax methods to the information available in AMECO.
This paper has shown that applying alternative criteria to the same input data does not
make much of a difference. It has also been shown that the OECD and ECFIN
methods result in quite comparable sets of indicators. However, in some cases the
divergences with EC2000 may be significant, especially in the case of capital/“other
production factors” taxes. Differences in the ECFIN-versus-OECD case arise because
of using different input data, rather than because of applying different criteria. Where
divergences between ECFIN and EC2000 are concerned, the reasons have to be found
on significant differences in the criteria. Yet, as a general rule, we can conclude that
leaving aside capital taxes, divergences between the labour and consumption rates
produced in the three databanks analysed here -ECFIN, OECD and EC2000-a r e
either negligible or relatively small and, in any case, much smaller than a priori
expected.
Such similarities apply to a wide range of statistical properties of the tax rates. These
include across-country relative levels of the tax burdens, their changes, as well as the
relative position of countries in orderings obtained on the basis of tax rates. They also
include within-country comparisons on the basis of time series analyses, where the
series of tax rates are expressed in growth rates. Finally, comparisons of the
relationships between tax rates and investment, growth and (un)employment
performance also suggest that ECFIN rates reproduce the same effects that those of
the OECD and European Commission.
Given this, we think that the approximation proposed by DG ECFIN may be, at least,
a good complement for a common set of indicators of effective taxation transparent,
replicable, and comparable internationally.58
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APPENDIXA. I. STATISTICAL SOURCES
Series from OECD (Revenue Statistics -OECDRS)
58
PROP Taxes on property. National currency, current prices. OECD Classification:
item 4000.
SSCEM Social security contributions paid by the employees. National currency,
current prices. OECD Classification: item 2100.
SSCERSocial security contributions paid by the employers. National currency, current prices.
OECD Classification: item 2200.
SSCOT Other social security contributions (non-allocable between 2100, 2200,
2300). National currency, current prices. OECD Classification: item 2400.
SSCSE Social security contributions paid by the self-employed. National currency, current
prices. OECD Classification: item 2300.
TPRWF Taxes on payroll and workforce. National currency, current prices. OECD
Classification: item 3000.
TRCI Corporate tax revenues from income, profits and capital gains. National
currency, current prices. OECD Classification: item 1200.
TRII Tax revenues from income, profits and capital gains of individuals. National
currency, current prices. OECD Classification: item 1100.
Input series from AMECO
59
CEGG Compensation of employees; general government. % of GDP (gross domestic
product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UWCG-ESA95/1 0 310 0 UWCGF-Old
definition.
COEL Compensation of employees; total economy. % of GDP (gross domestic
product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UWCD.
DTRV Taxes on income and wealth (Direct taxes); general government. % of GDP
(gross domestic product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UTYG-ESA95/1 0 310 0
UTYGF-Old definition.
EMPL Employees, persons; total economy (National accounts). 1000 persons.
A M E C OC o d e :1000N W T D .
GDPN Nominal Gross Domestic Product at market prices. Common currency, Mrd.
current euro. AMECO Code: 1 0 92 0 UVGD
GFC Final consumption expenditure of general government at current prices. % of
GDP (gross domestic product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UCTG.
58 In alphabetical order.
59 In alphabetical order.61
GOS Gross operating surplus; total economy. % of GDP (gross domestic product
at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UOGD.
INRV Taxes linked to imports and production (Indirect taxes); general government.
% of GDP (gross domestic product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UTVG-
ESA95/1 0 310 0 UTVGF-Old definition.
NOS Net operating surplus. % of GDP (gross domestic product at market prices).
AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UOND.
NWRVSocial contributions received; general government. % of GDP (gross domestic
product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UTSG-ESA95/1 0 310 0 UTSGF-Old
definition.
OCCP Employment, persons; total economy (National accounts). 1000 persons.
A M E C OC o d e :1000N E T D .
PFC Private final consumption expenditure at current prices. % of GDP (gross
domestic product at market prices). AMECO Code: 1 0 310 0 UCPH.
APPENDIXA. II. TRANSFORMED SERIES
CETR The consumption effective tax rate (in % of the pre-tax value of final
consumption). It is defined in expression (25) [CETR=INRV/(PFC+GFC–CEGG–INRV)].
The complete series can be found in table BI.7 of appendix B.I.
CITR The consumption “implicit” tax rate (in % of the post-tax value of final
consumption). It is defined in expression (28) [CETR=INRV/(PFC+GFC–CEGG)]. The
complete series can be found in table BI.8 of appendix B.I.
CORV Corporate income tax revenues in % of GDP. It is defined in expression (17)
[CORV=DTRV*TRCIR]. The complete series can be found in table BII.13 of appendix B.II.
ELRV Non-wage labour costs (in % of GDP) attributable to employed labour. It is
defined in expression (8) [ELRV=NWRV*SELR]. The complete series can be found in table
BII.7 of appendix B.II.
ERRV SSC paid by the employers (in % of GDP). It is defined in expression (11)
[ERRV=NWRV*SERR]. The complete series can be found in table BII.8 of appendix B.II.
GOSA Gross operating surplus adjusted for the wage income of the self-employed
(% of GDP). It is defined in expression (35) [GOSA=GOS–(LETB-COEL)].
KETG Capital effective tax rate in % of the gross operating surplus excluding the
wage income of the self-employed (GOSA). It is defined in expression (34)
[KETG=(CORV+PWRV+PITR*(NOSA–CORV–PWRV))/GOSA]. The complete series can be
found in table BI.11 of appendix B.I.
KETN Capital effective tax rate in % of the net operating surplus excluding the wage
income of the self-employed (NOSA). It is defined in expression (37)
[KETN=(CORV+PWRV+PITR*(NOSA–CORV–PWRV))/NOSA]. The complete series can be
found in table BI.12 of appendix B.I.62
KITG Capital “implicit” tax rate in % of the gross operating surplus including the
wage income of the self-employed (GOS). It is defined in expression (38)
[KITG=(CORV+PWRV+(NWRV–ELRV)+PITR*(NOS–(NWRV–ELRV)-CORV–
PWRV))/GOS]. The complete series can be found in table BI.13 of appendix B.I.
KITN Capital “implicit” tax rate in % of the net operating surplus including the
wage income of the self-employed (NOS). It is defined in expression (39)
[KITN=(CORV+PWRV+(NWRV–ELRV)+PITR*(NOS–(NWRV–ELRV)–CORV–
PWRV))/NOS]. The complete series can be found in table BI.14 of appendix B.I.
LETB Labour effective tax base (in % of GDP). It is defined in expression (5)
[LETB = COEL*OCCP/EMPL].
LETR Labour effective tax rate (in % of total labour costs). It is defined in
expression (22) [LETR=(NWRV+PITR*(LETB–NWRV))/LETB]. The complete series can be
found in table BI.5 of appendix B.I.
LITR The effective tax rate of employed labour (in % of the compensation of
employees). It is defined in expression (23) [LITR=(ELRV+PITR*(LITB–ELRV))/LITB]. The
complete series can be found in table BI.6 of appendix B.I.
NOSA Net operating surplus adjusted for the wage income of the self-employed (%
of GDP). It is defined in expression (36) [NOSA=NOS–(LETB–COEL)]
NWEL Non-wage labour costs effective rate on employed labour (% of compensation of
employees). It is defined in expression (9) [NWEL=ELRV/COEL]. The complete series can be
found in table BI.2 of appendix B.I.
NWEREffective rate of non-wage labour costs paid by the employers (% of compensation of
employees). It is defined in expression (12) [NWER=ERRV/COEL]. The complete series can
be found in table BI.3 of appendix B.I.
NWLCNon-wage labour costs effective rate on total employment (% of total labour costs). It
is defined in expression (6) [NWLC=NWRV/LETB]. The complete series can be found in table
BI.1 of appendix B.I.
PIRV Personal income tax revenues in % of GDP. It is defined in expression (16)
[PIRV=DTRV*TRIIR]. The complete series can be found in table BII.12 of appendix B.II.
PITB Personal income tax base in % of GDP¨. It is defined in expressions (19) and
(20) [PITB=COEL+NOS–NWRV–CORV–PWRV].
PITR Personal income tax rate (% of personal income). It is defined in expression
(21) [PITR=PIRV/PITB]. The complete series can be found in table BI.4 of appendix B.I.
PROPR Tax revenues from taxes on property in percentage of total direct taxes
(OECDRS). The series is defined in expression (15) [TRIIR=PROP/(TRII+TRCI+PROP)].
The complete series can be found in table BII.11 of appendix B.II.
PWRV Property tax revenues in % of GDP. It is defined in expression (18)
[PWRV=DTRV*PROPR]. The complete series can be found in table BII.14 of appendix B.II.
SELR Non-wage labour costs of employed labour as percentage of total non-wage
labour costs (OECDRS). The series is defined in expression (7)63
[SELR=(SSCER+SSCEM+TPRWF)/(SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)]. The
complete series can be found in table BII.6 of appendix B.II.
SEMR SSC paid by the employees as percentage of total non-wage labour costs
(OECDRS). [SEMR=SSCEM/(SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)]. The complete
series can be found in table BII.2 of appendix B.II.
SERR SSC paid by the employers as percentage of total non-wage labour costs
(OECDRS). The series is defined in expression (10)
[SERR=SSCER/(SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)]. The complete series can be
found in table BII.1 of appendix B.II.
SOTR Other SSC as percentage of total non-wage labour costs (OECDRS).
[SOTR=SSCOT/(SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)]. The complete series can be
found in table BII.4 of appendix B.II.
SSER SSC paid by the self-employed as percentage of total non-wage labour costs
(OECDRS). [SSER=SSCSE/(SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)]. The complete
series can be found in table BII.3 of appendix B.II.
TRCIRTax revenues from corporate income taxes in percentage of total direct taxes
(OECDRS). The series is defined in expression (14) [TRCIR=TRCI/(TRII+TRCI+PROP)].
The complete series can be found in table BII.10 of appendix B.II.
TRIIR Tax revenues from personal income taxes in percentage of total direct taxes
(OECDRS). The series is defined in expression (13) [TRIIR=TRII/(TRII+TRCI+PROP)]. The
complete series can be found in table BII.9 of appendix B.II.
TWEL The tax wedge on employed labour in % of the producer wage of the employees. It is
defined in expression (37) [TWEL=1–(1-NWEL)(1–PITR)(1–CITR)]. The complete series can
be found in table BI.10 of appendix B.I.
TWFR Taxes on payroll and workforce as percentage of total non-wage labour costs
(OECDRS). [TWFR=TPRWF/(SSCER+SSCEM+SSCSE+SSCOT+TPRWF)]. The complete
series can be found in table BII.5 of appendix B.II.
WEDGThe total tax wedge on labour (in % of the real producer wage). It is defined in
expression (36) [WEDG=1–(1-NWLC)(1–PITR)(1–CITR)]. The complete series can be found
in table BI.9 of appendix B.I.64
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Table BI. 1. NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS ON TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 18.3 3.4 19.4 11.4 10.5 21.9 4.8 17.6 16.5 18.3 17.6 6.6 9.0 14.5 9.6 6.9 6.6 18.5 16.4
1971 18.6 3.4 20.0 11.7 11.5 22.2 5.0 17.6 16.3 19.0 17.8 7.0 9.4 15.3 9.4 7.1 6.7 18.9 16.8
1972 18.7 3.5 20.9 12.0 11.8 22.7 5.4 17.7 16.4 19.4 18.0 7.5 9.4 16.2 9.9 7.4 6.8 19.4 17.3
1973 19.0 2.4 21.9 12.0 11.9 22.8 5.6 17.8 16.9 20.8 18.2 8.1 10.1 15.9 10.0 8.5 6.6 19.9 17.9
1974 19.1 2.0 22.3 12.3 12.1 22.9 6.8 17.9 17.1 21.6 18.6 7.4 10.6 15.8 10.7 8.7 6.9 20.0 18.1
1975 20.0 2.1 23.9 12.7 13.4 24.1 8.0 18.2 18.2 21.6 19.0 8.5 15.4 16.4 11.3 8.6 8.3 21.2 19.1
1976 19.7 2.0 25.1 13.3 14.0 24.9 8.7 18.6 19.9 21.8 19.3 8.4 16.3 19.6 12.1 8.8 8.3 22.0 20.0
1977 19.9 2.2 25.1 13.6 15.2 25.7 8.8 18.2 19.8 21.7 20.0 8.9 17.5 21.3 12.3 8.8 8.9 22.3 20.4
1978 19.8 2.2 25.1 13.8 16.1 26.1 8.7 18.4 19.8 22.1 20.5 9.1 16.6 22.6 11.5 9.1 9.0 22.5 20.5
1979 19.9 2.2 25.2 13.8 16.7 27.5 8.5 19.1 19.6 22.8 20.9 9.2 16.7 22.9 11.2 9.4 9.6 23.1 20.8
1980 19.8 2.5 25.1 14.7 17.2 28.2 9.0 19.6 20.0 23.3 21.5 9.5 17.0 23.8 11.4 9.3 9.9 23.4 21.0
1981 20.4 2.8 25.9 14.1 17.5 28.1 9.3 19.2 20.1 24.6 21.3 9.9 17.0 24.5 12.1 9.8 10.6 23.5 21.1
1982 21.2 3.3 26.6 15.6 17.8 28.9 10.9 20.5 20.3 26.1 21.5 10.9 16.5 24.4 12.7 10.0 10.9 24.3 21.9
1983 22.3 4.0 26.6 16.0 18.4 29.9 11.1 20.9 20.1 29.8 21.8 11.4 16.2 24.8 13.4 10.2 11.0 25.0 22.6
1984 23.5 4.1 26.9 17.0 18.4 31.0 11.4 20.8 20.6 29.6 22.1 11.7 16.6 24.6 13.3 10.4 11.3 25.3 22.8
1985 24.5 4.1 27.4 16.9 18.9 31.5 11.6 20.8 20.4 29.6 22.5 11.3 17.8 24.1 13.2 10.6 11.8 25.7 23.0
1986 25.0 3.7 27.3 17.4 19.3 32.0 11.4 21.9 20.3 28.0 22.5 13.6 17.8 24.4 13.2 10.9 12.0 26.0 23.5
1987 25.8 4.2 27.3 17.9 19.3 32.7 11.3 21.9 20.3 28.6 22.5 13.9 17.9 23.7 12.7 10.8 12.4 26.2 23.6
1988 25.7 3.5 27.6 16.9 19.0 33.1 11.6 22.0 21.3 29.0 22.8 13.8 18.4 24.2 12.5 11.1 12.5 26.3 23.5
1989 25.9 3.6 27.5 16.9 19.8 33.9 11.7 22.6 21.9 27.5 22.9 13.8 18.6 25.5 11.9 11.3 12.4 26.5 23.6
1990 25.4 3.8 27.4 17.5 19.9 33.8 11.8 22.8 21.2 25.0 22.7 14.0 20.3 25.7 11.3 11.2 13.6 26.3 23.5
1991 25.8 3.8 27.8 18.5 20.1 33.9 12.2 23.2 21.1 26.3 22.7 13.9 20.5 25.8 11.5 11.5 13.4 26.6 23.9
1992 25.9 4.0 28.0 18.7 21.3 34.2 12.3 23.8 21.7 26.6 23.5 14.3 22.4 24.9 11.6 11.6 13.8 27.1 24.4
1993 26.5 4.1 29.0 20.5 21.7 34.4 12.4 25.0 22.1 26.6 24.3 15.5 24.8 24.5 11.7 11.6 14.1 28.0 25.2
1994 26.5 4.8 30.2 21.0 22.0 34.7 12.3 24.8 21.7 28.0 25.4 15.7 27.0 25.1 11.9 11.7 14.1 28.7 25.7
1995 26.2 4.5 30.5 21.1 21.2 34.8 11.9 25.4 21.6 28.3 25.7 16.1 26.1 26.4 12.1 11.8 15.2 28.9 26.0
1996 26.4 4.5 31.6 22.0 21.6 35.2 11.4 25.8 21.3 27.4 26.4 16.7 25.0 27.1 12.1 11.7 15.3 29.3 26.3
1997 26.7 4.5 32.5 21.9 21.7 34.6 11.3 26.5 21.4 27.6 26.7 17.0 24.1 27.0 12.1 11.6 15.5 29.5 26.0
1998 26.6 4.5 32.2 22.0 21.7 31.4 11.3 23.3 21.4 27.4 26.5 17.7 23.9 26.9 12.3 11.5 16.0 28.1 24.9
1999 26.5 5.7 31.8 22.9 21.9 32.1 12.2 23.0 20.9 28.4 26.2 19.9 23.6 25.4 12.0 11.6 16.5 28.1 24.8
2000 25.9 6.1 31.5 23.2 21.9 31.8 11.3 23.0 21.0 28.1 26.2 20.3 23.3 28.0 11.9 11.4 17.1 27.9 24.4
2001 25.5 6.1 31.1 23.5 21.9 31.9 11.2 23.1 20.9 25.0 26.2 20.5 23.4 28.4 11.9 11.3 17.4 27.5 24.266
Table BI.2. NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS ON EMPLOYED LABOUR –NWLC-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 21.1 4.1 22.8 23.1 15.1 25.6 6.8 23.9 19.3 20.3 23.5 9.9 11.4 14.6 10.2 7.1 8.9 22.5 19.8
1971 21.3 4.0 23.3 23.0 16.3 25.7 7.0 23.7 19.1 21.0 23.4 10.3 11.8 15.7 10.0 7.5 8.8 22.8 20.0
1972 21.2 4.2 24.2 23.3 16.3 26.1 7.4 23.4 19.0 21.3 23.3 11.1 11.6 16.7 10.5 7.8 8.9 23.1 20.5
1973 21.4 2.8 25.1 23.0 16.3 26.1 7.7 23.6 19.5 22.9 23.2 11.9 12.3 16.5 10.6 8.9 8.5 23.6 21.0
1974 21.4 2.3 25.4 23.2 16.3 26.2 9.2 23.7 19.5 23.5 23.4 10.7 12.7 16.2 11.3 9.1 8.8 23.6 21.2
1975 22.2 2.5 27.1 23.0 17.8 27.5 10.8 24.2 20.4 23.2 23.9 12.3 18.9 16.6 12.0 9.0 10.4 24.9 22.3
1976 21.9 2.3 28.4 23.8 18.5 28.2 11.7 23.5 22.1 23.4 24.1 12.3 19.9 20.0 13.0 9.2 10.3 25.5 23.1
1977 22.1 2.5 28.2 24.2 19.9 28.9 11.8 23.0 21.9 23.0 24.7 13.3 21.2 21.8 13.2 9.2 10.8 25.7 23.4
1978 21.7 2.5 28.1 24.8 21.1 29.1 11.5 23.3 21.8 23.3 25.0 13.4 20.1 23.0 12.3 9.5 10.9 25.9 23.5
1979 21.9 2.5 28.1 24.8 22.0 30.4 11.1 20.4 21.5 23.9 25.4 13.4 20.1 23.3 12.1 9.8 11.5 25.9 23.3
1980 21.8 2.8 27.9 26.2 22.7 31.2 11.5 24.6 21.9 24.4 26.0 13.6 19.6 24.4 12.4 9.7 11.6 26.7 23.9
1981 22.3 3.2 28.7 25.8 23.1 30.9 11.8 24.3 21.8 25.4 25.9 14.1 19.2 25.1 13.2 10.4 12.3 26.9 24.1
1982 23.3 3.8 29.6 27.0 23.5 31.6 13.9 25.5 20.4 26.6 26.1 15.1 18.8 25.0 13.9 10.5 12.5 27.7 24.8
1983 24.7 4.5 29.3 27.9 22.9 32.6 14.4 26.5 19.7 29.7 26.4 15.6 18.4 25.4 14.7 10.8 12.5 28.3 25.5
1984 26.3 4.6 29.3 30.1 22.7 33.7 14.7 26.3 20.2 29.1 26.7 16.1 18.9 25.0 14.7 11.0 12.7 28.5 25.7
1985 27.2 4.6 29.4 29.7 23.2 34.1 14.9 26.2 19.9 29.9 27.1 15.8 20.1 24.4 14.7 11.1 13.1 28.8 25.8
1986 27.9 4.1 29.2 30.7 22.1 34.5 14.5 27.5 19.8 28.5 27.0 18.6 19.9 24.8 15.1 11.4 13.5 28.9 26.2
1987 29.0 4.6 29.0 31.9 22.0 35.1 14.4 27.3 19.6 28.4 26.9 19.1 19.8 24.0 14.3 11.2 13.9 29.0 26.2
1988 28.7 3.9 29.2 30.0 21.7 35.4 14.7 27.6 20.5 28.4 27.2 18.8 20.4 24.5 14.1 11.5 13.9 29.1 26.0
1989 29.2 3.9 29.1 29.8 21.9 36.0 14.5 28.5 21.1 27.1 27.3 18.7 20.5 25.6 13.5 11.6 13.8 29.2 26.1
1990 29.0 4.1 28.8 33.2 21.8 35.9 14.7 28.6 20.4 24.1 27.0 19.1 22.1 25.8 12.8 11.5 15.2 29.0 26.0
1991 29.3 4.2 29.2 34.6 21.7 35.7 14.9 28.8 20.2 25.3 26.9 19.0 22.4 26.2 13.0 11.7 14.9 29.1 26.3
1992 29.2 4.4 29.5 35.3 23.0 36.2 15.1 29.3 20.7 25.7 27.7 19.5 24.5 25.6 13.0 11.8 15.2 29.6 26.8
1993 30.0 4.6 30.4 38.4 23.1 36.4 15.1 29.8 20.9 25.4 28.6 20.9 27.3 25.3 13.1 12.0 15.3 30.3 27.4
1994 29.9 5.3 31.8 39.1 23.4 36.6 14.8 29.7 20.3 26.4 29.7 21.1 29.9 26.0 13.4 12.1 15.2 31.0 28.0
1995 29.5 4.9 32.0 39.0 22.4 36.6 14.2 30.2 20.2 26.7 30.0 21.6 28.7 27.4 13.6 12.1 16.4 31.0 28.2
1996 29.6 4.9 33.0 40.4 23.0 36.8 13.4 31.5 20.0 26.2 30.6 22.2 27.4 28.3 13.5 12.1 16.4 31.6 28.6
1997 29.9 4.9 34.1 40.1 22.9 36.1 13.1 32.5 20.1 26.2 30.6 22.4 26.5 28.1 13.4 11.9 16.7 31.9 28.4
1998 29.6 4.9 33.8 40.0 22.4 33.2 13.2 29.2 20.0 25.3 30.2 23.2 25.9 28.1 13.6 11.7 17.1 30.4 27.2
1999 29.5 6.1 33.4 41.0 22.5 33.7 14.2 28.6 19.5 26.0 29.9 25.8 25.5 26.5 13.2 11.8 17.6 30.3 27.0
2000 28.7 6.5 33.1 40.7 22.2 33.2 13.2 28.6 19.5 25.7 29.9 26.3 25.3 29.2 13.1 11.6 18.1 30.0 26.5
2001 28.3 6.6 32.7 40.5 22.0 33.1 13.1 28.6 19.4 22.8 29.8 26.5 25.4 29.6 13.1 11.5 18.3 29.6 26.267
Table BI.3. NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS PAID BY THE EMPLOYERS –NWEL-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 14.5 1.0 12.1 10.6 12.1 19.6 3.7 19.3 10.7 10.6 9.0 5.9 7.1 11.6 4.1 3.9 5.1 15.0 12.8
1971 14.8 0.9 12.3 10.7 12.8 19.6 3.6 19.1 10.6 10.9 9.0 6.1 9.3 11.9 4.5 4.1 5.1 15.1 12.9
1972 14.9 1.1 12.8 11.0 12.9 19.6 3.7 18.9 10.5 10.8 8.9 6.7 9.4 12.5 5.0 4.3 5.1 15.2 13.2
1973 14.9 1.3 13.4 11.0 13.0 19.3 4.2 19.0 10.8 11.9 8.8 7.2 10.4 11.0 5.8 5.0 4.9 15.4 13.5
1974 14.9 1.4 13.6 11.1 13.1 19.4 5.3 19.1 10.9 12.3 9.1 6.4 10.6 11.1 6.6 5.1 5.1 15.5 13.7
1975 15.4 1.3 14.6 11.1 14.4 20.2 6.5 19.4 11.6 12.0 9.8 7.0 15.8 13.4 7.4 5.0 6.1 16.4 14.6
1976 15.2 1.1 15.3 11.6 15.1 20.4 7.2 19.5 12.5 12.1 9.8 6.9 16.4 16.5 8.0 5.1 6.0 16.7 15.1
1977 15.3 1.1 15.1 12.1 16.0 20.8 7.3 19.0 12.4 12.0 10.2 7.6 17.8 17.9 7.5 5.2 6.3 16.7 15.2
1978 15.2 1.0 15.1 12.5 16.9 20.7 7.3 19.2 12.3 12.0 10.9 7.7 16.8 20.4 6.6 5.5 6.4 16.8 15.2
1979 15.2 0.9 15.1 12.0 17.6 21.1 7.2 16.2 12.1 12.4 11.1 7.7 18.4 21.3 6.0 5.6 6.7 16.6 14.9
1980 15.1 1.1 15.2 12.3 17.6 21.3 7.5 19.4 12.5 13.0 11.4 7.6 19.3 22.2 6.1 5.5 6.9 17.3 15.4
1981 14.9 1.6 15.7 12.1 18.3 21.2 7.8 19.1 12.2 13.2 11.7 8.0 19.1 23.0 6.2 5.8 7.3 17.5 15.5
1982 14.6 1.8 16.2 12.5 18.0 21.5 8.5 19.7 11.3 13.2 11.8 8.5 18.7 22.9 6.2 5.8 7.4 17.8 15.7
1983 15.2 2.2 16.0 12.9 18.0 22.0 8.0 20.3 10.8 14.1 12.0 8.6 18.3 21.9 7.2 6.1 7.4 18.1 16.0
1984 16.3 2.1 16.0 14.0 18.5 22.3 8.0 20.1 11.3 14.0 12.3 8.6 18.5 21.3 7.7 6.3 7.5 18.2 16.3
1985 17.6 1.8 16.0 13.8 18.8 22.9 8.2 20.2 11.1 14.1 12.4 8.5 19.4 21.0 7.7 6.3 7.7 18.5 16.4
1986 18.4 1.4 15.8 14.0 17.7 22.9 8.3 21.2 11.0 13.9 12.2 12.7 19.9 21.2 7.9 6.3 7.9 18.6 16.7
1987 19.1 1.9 15.8 14.9 17.9 23.0 8.4 21.0 11.1 13.5 12.1 12.5 19.7 20.6 7.7 6.3 8.2 18.6 16.7
1988 19.2 0.8 15.8 14.4 17.7 23.2 8.2 21.1 11.6 13.3 12.3 12.0 20.3 22.0 7.7 6.3 8.2 18.7 16.7
1989 19.3 0.7 15.7 15.5 17.9 23.2 8.3 22.0 11.9 12.5 12.3 11.7 20.4 23.2 7.7 6.4 8.2 18.9 16.9
1990 19.8 0.8 15.6 16.2 17.8 23.1 8.5 22.3 11.4 5.9 12.1 11.9 22.1 23.5 7.7 6.3 8.8 18.5 16.7
1991 20.3 0.7 15.8 17.0 17.7 23.0 8.7 22.2 11.2 6.1 12.1 11.7 22.3 23.3 7.9 6.4 8.6 18.4 16.7
1992 20.1 0.7 15.8 17.3 18.9 23.3 8.6 22.5 11.5 6.0 12.5 12.0 24.5 23.0 7.9 6.5 8.7 18.6 16.9
1993 20.3 0.7 16.4 18.6 18.5 23.2 8.5 22.4 11.6 5.8 12.9 12.9 24.4 23.1 8.0 6.6 8.8 18.6 16.9
1994 20.2 0.9 17.2 18.6 18.7 23.1 8.3 22.3 11.0 4.8 13.0 12.7 25.3 23.0 7.7 6.7 8.7 18.7 17.0
1995 19.9 0.9 17.3 18.3 18.0 22.9 8.5 22.7 10.8 5.4 13.4 13.0 24.0 22.2 7.7 6.6 9.3 18.7 17.0
1996 19.8 0.9 17.7 18.9 18.5 22.8 7.9 24.4 10.6 5.4 13.7 13.3 22.7 22.2 7.7 6.6 9.3 19.2 17.4
1997 20.1 0.9 18.3 17.9 18.6 22.8 8.1 25.2 10.5 5.0 13.8 13.5 21.8 20.9 7.5 6.5 9.4 19.6 17.3
1998 19.9 0.8 18.0 17.8 18.0 22.5 7.7 22.9 10.1 5.8 13.4 13.6 21.1 19.1 7.4 6.4 9.7 18.9 16.6
1999 19.8 1.1 17.8 18.2 18.0 22.9 8.3 22.4 9.9 6.0 13.2 15.1 20.8 18.1 7.2 6.4 10.0 18.8 16.5
2000 19.3 1.1 17.6 18.1 17.8 22.5 7.7 22.4 9.9 5.9 13.2 15.4 20.6 19.9 7.1 6.3 10.3 18.6 16.2
2001 19.0 1.1 17.4 18.1 17.7 22.5 7.7 22.4 9.8 5.2 13.2 15.5 20.7 20.2 7.1 6.3 10.4 18.5 16.168
Table BI.4. PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES –NWER-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 12.2 27.5 12.4 2.0 1.8 6.0 5.2 3.7 7.2 14.2 10.8 5.0 15.7 26.3 15.6 10.6 4.4 8.4 10.7
1971 13.1 30.1 13.7 2.2 2.1 5.6 6.8 3.9 9.8 15.9 11.3 4.4 17.5 27.3 15.5 9.9 5.2 9.1 11.3
1972 13.9 29.0 13.8 1.7 2.0 5.8 6.4 4.4 9.4 16.8 12.1 4.1 17.7 27.1 13.7 10.5 5.3 9.3 11.1
1973 14.9 29.1 16.0 1.7 2.2 5.7 6.8 4.4 9.3 16.8 12.6 4.0 18.8 24.7 13.5 10.4 5.8 10.2 11.6
1974 16.5 33.2 17.0 2.7 2.2 6.2 7.2 5.2 9.6 17.6 13.4 4.2 19.1 27.8 16.8 11.2 6.2 11.0 12.9
1975 19.7 30.7 16.1 1.8 2.9 6.8 8.1 5.7 15.3 18.5 12.3 4.7 22.5 28.3 19.0 10.0 6.0 11.1 13.2
1976 19.2 29.7 17.1 2.5 3.2 7.6 9.9 7.0 13.3 18.2 12.2 5.4 26.6 31.8 18.8 10.7 5.7 12.0 14.1
1977 21.5 29.6 18.3 2.2 3.6 7.9 9.7 8.1 16.7 18.0 12.8 5.8 25.9 34.0 16.8 11.0 5.7 12.9 14.5
1978 23.1 30.5 17.0 2.4 4.4 7.8 9.5 8.8 16.6 18.1 14.8 5.8 22.1 33.9 15.7 11.5 5.4 12.7 14.1
1979 23.4 31.4 16.5 3.3 5.0 7.9 9.9 8.8 15.0 18.8 14.3 6.5 20.1 33.1 14.8 12.3 6.4 12.5 13.8
1980 22.7 33.1 17.3 4.1 6.0 8.8 12.7 10.1 15.7 18.9 14.8 6.4 20.5 32.3 15.3 12.5 7.1 13.1 14.5
1981 23.1 33.7 17.0 3.5 6.4 9.1 13.2 12.1 16.3 18.0 16.0 7.5 22.9 32.0 16.2 13.0 7.8 13.5 14.9
1982 24.7 32.9 17.1 4.4 6.2 9.4 14.0 13.3 15.7 18.1 15.5 8.3 22.3 32.0 16.4 12.6 8.0 13.8 15.1
1983 25.1 34.4 16.5 4.5 7.4 10.1 15.0 14.3 17.1 17.1 15.1 9.4 22.2 32.3 15.9 12.0 8.2 14.2 15.3
1984 25.8 35.3 16.7 5.3 8.0 10.4 16.1 14.1 16.9 15.7 16.3 9.2 23.1 31.4 15.5 11.3 7.9 14.3 15.4
1985 25.8 37.2 17.2 4.8 8.0 9.8 15.4 14.9 17.1 14.4 17.3 9.3 24.6 30.9 15.1 11.6 8.2 14.4 15.5
1986 25.1 37.9 16.5 4.9 7.5 9.5 16.5 14.3 15.1 15.2 17.3 7.2 26.5 31.6 15.2 11.6 8.3 14.0 15.3
1987 25.1 39.6 17.1 4.8 9.2 9.7 17.0 14.9 14.7 16.1 16.6 6.3 23.4 33.8 14.2 12.3 8.4 14.5 15.6
1988 23.8 41.6 16.6 5.2 9.3 9.0 17.9 15.5 14.2 16.9 16.6 8.0 25.9 35.4 14.2 11.7 8.1 14.4 15.5
1989 21.1 40.8 17.3 4.1 10.5 8.8 14.8 16.7 14.1 16.0 14.6 8.1 25.3 38.4 14.2 12.1 9.1 14.6 15.8
1990 22.1 38.5 15.1 4.8 10.1 8.8 14.6 16.9 15.3 18.1 15.6 7.0 27.3 36.6 16.2 11.9 10.2 14.2 15.6
1991 21.7 38.9 15.9 5.1 10.8 10.2 15.3 17.4 14.5 20.5 16.4 8.0 28.6 30.0 16.0 11.4 10.4 15.1 16.1
1992 21.3 39.4 16.9 4.5 11.8 9.2 15.6 17.2 16.1 19.7 17.1 10.0 27.9 30.3 15.3 11.1 9.8 15.2 16.0
1993 23.0 40.5 16.8 4.7 11.4 9.5 15.9 19.4 18.1 20.9 18.0 9.2 27.8 29.8 13.2 11.2 9.2 15.7 16.1
1994 23.6 41.6 16.5 5.8 11.0 9.8 16.3 17.3 16.3 16.0 16.5 8.9 30.4 28.3 13.5 11.5 7.9 15.0 15.6
1995 23.8 41.1 17.1 6.4 10.8 9.6 14.1 17.1 15.7 14.6 17.5 8.8 27.8 28.4 13.9 11.9 7.3 15.0 15.7
1996 24.0 41.3 16.9 6.3 10.8 10.4 14.2 17.5 16.4 13.8 18.7 9.2 29.1 31.5 13.2 12.6 6.9 15.3 15.9
1997 24.6 41.3 16.5 7.2 10.4 10.9 14.2 19.0 14.4 12.1 19.8 8.9 26.4 32.0 12.8 13.3 7.2 15.4 15.9
1998 25.2 40.0 17.0 8.6 10.1 14.4 13.4 15.6 13.1 11.6 19.8 8.7 26.1 34.2 15.0 13.7 5.8 15.6 16.4
1999 25.0 41.0 17.8 8.3 10.2 15.4 13.7 16.4 12.8 12.0 19.5 9.8 25.8 34.7 15.0 14.1 4.6 16.3 17.0
2000 24.8 39.8 17.7 7.8 10.3 14.6 13.0 15.7 12.5 11.3 18.3 10.0 25.8 32.3 14.8 14.0 4.6 15.8 16.5
2001 24.2 39.3 15.9 7.6 10.4 14.5 12.8 15.7 12.0 10.6 17.8 10.3 25.3 31.0 14.5 14.1 4.7 15.1 15.969
Table BI.5. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON LABOUR –LETR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 28.3 30.0 29.4 13.1 12.1 26.6 9.8 20.7 22.5 29.9 26.5 11.3 23.3 37.0 23.7 16.7 10.7 25.3 25.5
1971 29.3 32.5 31.0 13.6 13.3 26.5 11.5 20.9 24.6 31.9 27.1 11.1 25.3 38.4 23.4 16.3 11.5 26.2 26.2
1972 30.0 31.5 31.8 13.5 13.6 27.2 11.4 21.3 24.2 33.0 27.9 11.4 25.4 38.9 22.2 17.2 11.8 26.9 26.6
1973 31.1 30.8 34.4 13.5 13.9 27.2 12.1 21.4 24.7 34.2 28.5 11.8 27.0 36.7 22.2 18.1 12.0 28.0 27.4
1974 32.4 34.6 35.5 14.7 14.0 27.7 13.6 22.2 25.1 35.4 29.5 11.2 27.6 39.2 25.7 19.0 12.7 28.8 28.7
1975 35.8 32.1 36.2 14.3 15.9 29.3 15.4 22.9 30.8 36.2 29.0 12.8 34.4 40.1 28.1 17.8 13.8 29.9 29.9
1976 35.1 31.1 37.9 15.4 16.8 30.7 17.7 24.2 30.5 36.0 29.1 13.3 38.6 45.1 28.6 18.6 13.5 31.3 31.4
1977 37.2 31.1 38.9 15.5 18.2 31.6 17.7 24.9 33.1 35.8 30.3 14.2 38.9 48.1 27.0 18.8 14.0 32.3 32.0
1978 38.3 32.0 37.8 15.8 19.7 31.8 17.3 25.5 33.1 36.3 32.3 14.4 35.1 48.8 25.4 19.6 13.9 32.3 31.8
1979 38.7 32.9 37.5 16.6 20.9 33.2 17.6 26.2 31.7 37.3 32.2 15.0 33.5 48.4 24.3 20.5 15.4 32.6 31.8
1980 38.0 34.8 38.1 18.2 22.2 34.6 20.5 27.7 32.6 37.8 33.1 15.3 34.0 48.4 25.0 20.6 16.3 33.4 32.5
1981 38.7 35.6 38.5 17.0 22.8 34.7 21.3 28.9 33.1 38.2 33.9 16.6 36.0 48.6 26.3 21.6 17.6 33.9 33.0
1982 40.7 35.2 39.1 19.4 22.9 35.6 23.4 31.1 32.8 39.5 33.7 18.3 35.1 48.6 27.0 21.3 18.0 34.8 33.8
1983 41.8 37.0 38.7 19.8 24.4 37.0 24.5 32.2 33.8 41.8 33.6 19.7 34.8 49.1 27.1 21.0 18.4 35.7 34.5
1984 43.2 37.9 39.1 21.4 24.8 38.2 25.6 31.9 34.0 40.7 34.8 19.8 35.9 48.2 26.7 20.6 18.3 36.0 34.8
1985 43.9 39.7 39.8 20.9 25.4 38.3 25.2 32.6 34.0 39.8 35.9 19.5 38.0 47.5 26.3 21.0 19.0 36.4 35.0
1986 43.8 40.2 39.3 21.4 25.4 38.5 26.0 33.0 32.3 39.0 36.0 19.8 39.5 48.3 26.4 21.2 19.3 36.4 35.3
1987 44.4 42.1 39.8 21.9 26.7 39.2 26.4 33.5 32.0 40.1 35.4 19.3 37.1 49.5 25.1 21.8 19.7 36.9 35.6
1988 43.4 43.7 39.6 21.3 26.5 39.2 27.5 34.1 32.5 41.0 35.6 20.7 39.5 51.0 24.9 21.5 19.6 37.0 35.5
1989 41.5 42.9 40.1 20.3 28.1 39.7 24.8 35.5 32.9 39.1 34.2 20.7 39.3 54.1 24.5 22.0 20.3 37.3 35.8
1990 41.9 40.9 38.3 21.4 27.9 39.7 24.6 35.9 33.3 38.5 34.8 20.1 42.0 52.9 25.6 21.8 22.5 36.9 35.7
1991 41.9 41.3 39.3 22.6 28.7 40.6 25.6 36.5 32.6 41.5 35.4 20.8 43.2 48.1 25.6 21.6 22.5 37.8 36.2
1992 41.7 41.8 40.2 22.3 30.6 40.3 26.0 36.9 34.3 41.1 36.6 22.9 44.1 47.7 25.1 21.4 22.3 38.3 36.7
1993 43.4 43.0 40.9 24.2 30.6 40.6 26.3 39.5 36.2 41.9 38.0 23.3 45.7 47.0 23.4 21.5 22.0 39.4 37.3
1994 43.8 44.5 41.7 25.5 30.6 41.1 26.6 37.9 34.4 39.5 37.7 23.2 49.2 46.3 23.8 21.8 20.9 39.5 37.4
1995 43.8 43.8 42.4 26.2 29.7 41.0 24.3 38.2 33.9 38.8 38.8 23.5 46.7 47.3 24.3 22.2 21.3 39.7 37.8
1996 44.0 44.0 43.1 26.9 30.1 42.0 23.9 38.8 34.2 37.4 40.2 24.4 46.8 50.1 23.7 22.8 21.1 40.1 38.1
1997 44.7 44.0 43.6 27.6 29.9 41.7 23.9 40.4 32.7 36.4 41.2 24.4 44.2 50.4 23.3 23.4 21.6 40.4 37.8
1998 45.1 42.7 43.7 28.7 29.6 41.3 23.2 35.3 31.7 35.9 41.0 24.8 43.8 51.9 25.4 23.6 20.9 39.3 37.3
1999 44.9 44.3 44.0 29.3 29.9 42.6 24.2 35.6 31.0 37.0 40.6 27.8 43.3 51.3 25.3 24.0 20.3 39.8 37.6
2000 44.2 43.4 43.6 29.2 29.9 41.8 22.9 35.1 30.8 36.3 39.8 28.3 43.1 51.2 24.9 23.9 21.0 39.2 36.9
2001 43.6 43.0 42.0 29.3 30.0 41.8 22.6 35.1 30.4 32.9 39.3 28.7 42.8 50.6 24.7 23.9 21.3 38.5 36.270
Table BI.6. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON EMPLOYED LABOUR –LITR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 30.8 30.5 32.4 24.6 16.7 30.0 11.7 26.8 25.1 31.7 31.8 14.4 25.3 37.1 24.2 17.0 12.9 29.0 28.6
1971 31.6 32.9 33.9 24.7 18.0 29.9 13.4 26.7 27.0 33.5 32.0 14.3 27.3 38.8 23.9 16.6 13.6 29.8 29.2
1972 32.2 32.0 34.6 24.6 18.0 30.4 13.3 26.8 26.7 34.5 32.6 14.8 27.3 39.3 22.8 17.5 13.7 30.3 29.5
1973 33.1 31.1 37.1 24.3 18.2 30.3 14.0 26.9 27.0 35.9 32.9 15.4 28.8 37.1 22.6 18.4 13.8 31.4 30.3
1974 34.4 34.8 38.1 25.3 18.2 30.7 15.8 27.7 27.3 37.0 33.6 14.5 29.4 39.5 26.2 19.3 14.4 32.0 31.5
1975 37.5 32.4 38.9 24.4 20.2 32.4 18.0 28.5 32.6 37.4 33.2 16.5 37.1 40.2 28.8 18.1 15.8 33.2 32.8
1976 36.9 31.4 40.7 25.7 21.1 33.7 20.4 28.8 32.5 37.3 33.4 17.0 41.3 45.4 29.3 18.9 15.4 34.4 34.1
1977 38.9 31.4 41.4 25.8 22.8 34.5 20.3 29.3 34.9 36.8 34.4 18.3 41.7 48.3 27.7 19.1 15.9 35.2 34.6
1978 39.8 32.2 40.3 26.6 24.5 34.7 19.8 30.1 34.8 37.2 36.2 18.5 37.8 49.1 26.1 20.0 15.7 35.3 34.4
1979 40.2 33.1 39.9 27.3 25.9 36.0 20.0 27.4 33.3 38.2 36.1 19.0 36.2 48.7 25.1 20.9 17.1 35.1 34.1
1980 39.5 35.0 40.4 29.2 27.3 37.3 22.7 32.2 34.2 38.7 37.0 19.2 36.1 48.8 25.9 21.0 17.9 36.4 35.1
1981 40.2 35.8 40.9 28.3 28.0 37.2 23.5 33.4 34.5 38.9 37.8 20.6 37.7 49.0 27.3 22.1 19.2 36.8 35.5
1982 42.3 35.5 41.6 30.2 28.3 38.1 26.0 35.4 32.8 39.9 37.6 22.1 36.9 49.0 28.1 21.8 19.4 37.7 36.4
1983 43.6 37.4 40.9 31.2 28.6 39.4 27.3 37.0 33.5 41.7 37.6 23.5 36.5 49.5 28.2 21.5 19.7 38.5 37.0
1984 45.3 38.3 41.1 33.8 28.8 40.6 28.4 36.7 33.7 40.2 38.6 23.8 37.6 48.6 28.0 21.1 19.6 38.7 37.3
1985 45.9 40.1 41.5 33.1 29.4 40.6 28.0 37.2 33.6 40.0 39.7 23.6 39.7 47.8 27.5 21.4 20.3 39.1 37.5
1986 45.9 40.4 40.9 34.1 28.0 40.8 28.6 37.8 31.9 39.4 39.7 24.4 41.1 48.6 28.0 21.6 20.7 39.0 37.7
1987 46.8 42.4 41.2 35.2 29.2 41.4 29.0 38.1 31.4 39.9 39.1 24.2 38.6 49.7 26.5 22.1 21.1 39.3 37.9
1988 45.7 43.9 40.9 33.7 28.9 41.3 30.0 38.8 31.8 40.6 39.3 25.3 41.0 51.2 26.3 21.8 20.9 39.3 37.7
1989 44.1 43.1 41.4 32.7 30.1 41.6 27.2 40.4 32.2 38.8 37.9 25.2 40.6 54.2 25.8 22.3 21.7 39.6 38.0
1990 44.7 41.1 39.5 36.4 29.7 41.5 27.1 40.7 32.6 37.8 38.4 24.8 43.4 53.0 26.9 22.0 23.9 39.1 37.8
1991 44.7 41.5 40.5 37.9 30.1 42.3 27.9 41.2 31.8 40.7 38.9 25.5 44.6 48.4 26.9 21.8 23.8 39.9 38.3
1992 44.3 42.0 41.3 38.2 32.1 42.0 28.4 41.4 33.4 40.3 40.1 27.6 45.6 48.1 26.3 21.6 23.5 40.4 38.7
1993 46.1 43.2 42.1 41.2 31.9 42.4 28.6 43.4 35.2 40.9 41.5 28.1 47.5 47.6 24.6 21.9 23.0 41.3 39.2
1994 46.4 44.7 43.0 42.6 31.8 42.8 28.7 41.9 33.3 38.2 41.4 28.1 51.2 46.9 25.1 22.1 21.9 41.4 39.4
1995 46.2 44.0 43.6 42.9 30.8 42.7 26.3 42.2 32.7 37.4 42.3 28.4 48.5 48.0 25.6 22.5 22.5 41.4 39.6
1996 46.5 44.2 44.3 44.1 31.4 43.4 25.7 43.5 33.2 36.3 43.6 29.4 48.6 50.9 24.9 23.1 22.2 42.1 40.1
1997 47.1 44.2 45.0 44.5 30.9 43.0 25.5 45.3 31.6 35.1 44.4 29.3 45.9 51.1 24.5 23.6 22.7 42.3 39.8
1998 47.4 42.9 45.1 45.1 30.3 42.8 24.8 40.3 30.5 34.0 44.0 29.9 45.3 52.7 26.6 23.8 21.9 41.2 39.2
1999 47.1 44.6 45.3 45.9 30.4 43.9 25.9 40.3 29.8 34.9 43.6 33.1 44.8 52.0 26.3 24.2 21.4 41.6 39.4
2000 46.4 43.7 45.0 45.3 30.2 43.0 24.5 39.8 29.6 34.2 42.7 33.7 44.6 52.1 25.9 24.0 21.9 41.0 38.7
2001 45.7 43.3 43.4 45.1 30.2 42.8 24.3 39.8 29.1 31.0 42.3 34.0 44.3 51.4 25.7 24.0 22.2 40.2 38.071
Table BI.7. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CONSUMPTION –CETR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 30.2 38.9 23.8 20.6 13.1 30.9 26.0 19.6 13.9 18.9 35.5 18.5 28.3 25.9 27.6 13.6 15.2 24.4 25.2
1971 28.5 36.8 23.5 20.6 12.5 30.4 26.3 19.1 14.2 19.1 36.2 16.4 29.6 31.8 24.7 13.9 14.7 24.0 24.7
1972 25.6 38.6 23.8 20.7 12.8 30.8 26.1 17.5 15.8 20.2 38.2 17.1 29.2 30.0 22.7 13.7 14.4 24.0 24.3
1973 25.3 36.3 23.6 20.9 13.4 30.8 25.6 16.7 17.5 20.1 40.6 16.7 28.7 30.7 20.8 13.5 14.5 23.9 24.0
1974 25.1 33.1 22.1 18.0 11.3 29.1 27.8 16.4 16.9 18.4 38.6 14.7 27.7 27.1 20.1 13.0 14.1 22.5 22.5
1975 23.2 31.1 20.8 19.9 10.9 28.7 23.9 13.8 16.1 17.8 35.1 14.6 26.2 29.5 19.4 12.7 12.7 21.3 21.6
1976 24.5 32.6 21.1 20.3 10.5 30.1 27.7 15.6 16.2 18.9 33.2 18.4 26.1 30.6 19.3 12.3 12.4 22.2 22.5
1977 25.0 35.2 21.0 20.6 10.8 28.4 25.4 17.0 16.1 19.9 34.0 19.6 28.4 31.9 20.7 12.1 13.2 22.1 22.7
1978 24.9 38.4 21.8 20.5 10.0 29.3 23.4 16.8 17.4 19.5 34.1 19.4 29.2 29.0 20.6 11.4 12.9 22.5 22.9
1979 23.9 40.5 22.1 20.1 10.1 30.7 20.9 15.6 16.5 19.2 34.0 19.2 29.5 27.6 22.8 10.7 13.7 22.5 23.1
1980 21.7 39.0 21.5 16.8 10.1 30.4 22.5 16.6 17.4 18.5 33.7 23.5 29.6 28.5 24.6 10.6 13.9 22.4 23.2
1981 21.4 38.0 20.8 16.5 11.0 29.2 23.7 15.6 16.9 17.8 33.3 23.3 30.4 29.7 25.8 11.3 14.3 21.7 23.0
1982 21.1 36.6 20.4 19.0 11.8 29.6 27.7 16.0 18.2 18.0 32.2 24.7 29.7 28.8 25.0 10.7 13.9 21.8 22.8
1983 21.7 38.3 20.7 20.0 13.2 29.7 29.4 17.3 21.8 18.2 31.4 26.9 29.7 32.9 24.5 10.8 13.3 22.3 23.3
1984 21.4 39.6 21.0 20.7 14.4 30.5 30.2 17.5 21.8 19.3 33.6 25.1 32.3 35.6 24.2 10.8 14.1 22.8 23.8
1985 20.9 40.8 20.4 21.0 15.4 30.8 28.6 16.6 21.8 19.2 33.4 26.4 32.4 37.1 23.8 10.4 14.7 22.6 23.7
1986 20.4 45.3 20.5 24.2 18.0 30.5 28.3 17.5 22.1 20.2 32.9 29.5 33.5 38.1 23.4 10.3 14.1 23.0 24.1
1987 21.0 45.3 20.3 23.3 18.1 30.5 28.6 18.1 21.4 21.0 33.6 28.6 33.7 39.0 23.1 10.4 15.4 23.1 24.2
1988 21.7 45.7 20.6 21.6 18.6 30.9 28.8 19.2 23.3 21.4 33.3 28.9 39.2 36.5 23.3 10.4 16.0 23.8 24.6
1989 21.9 43.0 21.3 18.9 18.2 30.1 29.3 19.7 24.9 20.3 33.2 27.2 39.1 37.0 22.0 10.4 15.3 23.7 24.3
1990 22.3 41.5 21.6 21.7 18.0 30.0 28.4 20.3 24.2 20.0 32.8 26.8 36.5 40.0 21.2 10.4 15.8 23.7 24.3
1991 21.8 40.1 19.9 23.1 18.1 28.8 27.0 21.2 24.6 19.9 32.8 25.7 33.5 39.9 22.8 10.9 14.7 22.8 23.7
1992 22.1 39.6 19.8 23.8 18.8 28.1 27.0 20.7 25.6 20.3 32.4 27.7 31.7 34.8 21.8 10.9 15.2 22.6 23.2
1993 23.3 39.5 20.4 22.2 17.3 28.2 26.0 23.1 30.9 20.6 32.4 24.8 31.0 32.0 20.9 10.9 14.7 23.1 23.4
1994 24.2 40.0 21.2 21.6 18.4 29.8 28.0 22.1 31.1 20.6 32.0 25.9 31.5 30.8 21.3 11.0 14.6 23.8 24.0
1995 23.8 40.1 20.3 21.2 18.1 30.6 28.6 22.7 28.7 20.8 28.6 26.9 30.2 30.1 21.5 11.0 14.9 23.6 23.8
1996 25.0 41.6 20.0 22.0 18.2 32.2 29.5 22.2 28.8 21.8 28.6 27.2 28.8 31.6 21.4 10.7 15.2 23.9 24.1
1997 25.8 42.4 20.0 23.2 18.9 32.7 30.5 23.6 32.0 22.5 29.6 27.4 32.2 32.8 22.2 10.6 14.9 24.5 24.8
1998 25.6 43.7 20.5 23.9 20.3 33.1 31.6 30.3 33.9 22.9 30.2 28.3 32.1 34.8 22.1 10.4 15.9 26.2 26.1
1999 25.7 43.2 21.7 25.0 21.5 32.8 32.9 29.7 34.6 24.0 30.6 29.3 32.3 38.9 22.0 10.3 15.7 26.7 26.5
2000 26.0 42.1 21.9 25.8 22.0 31.8 33.3 29.8 35.4 24.2 31.4 30.5 32.5 32.4 22.2 10.1 15.6 26.7 26.3
2001 26.3 42.0 22.6 26.3 22.4 31.5 32.8 29.7 36.5 25.4 31.8 31.2 33.1 31.9 22.6 10.0 16.0 27.0 26.672
Table BI.8. “IMPLICIT” TAX RATES ON CONSUMPTION –CITR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 23.2 28.0 19.2 17.1 11.6 23.6 20.6 16.4 12.2 15.9 26.2 15.6 22.0 20.6 21.6 11.9 13.2 19.4 20.0
1971 22.2 26.9 19.1 17.0 11.1 23.3 20.8 16.0 12.4 16.1 26.6 14.1 22.9 24.1 19.8 12.2 12.8 19.2 19.6
1972 20.4 27.8 19.2 17.2 11.3 23.5 20.7 14.9 13.6 16.8 27.7 14.6 22.6 23.1 18.5 12.0 12.6 19.1 19.4
1973 20.2 26.6 19.1 17.3 11.8 23.6 20.4 14.3 14.9 16.7 28.9 14.3 22.3 23.5 17.2 11.9 12.7 19.1 19.2
1974 20.1 24.9 18.1 15.3 10.2 22.6 21.8 14.1 14.5 15.6 27.9 12.8 21.7 21.3 16.7 11.5 12.3 18.1 18.2
1975 18.8 23.7 17.2 16.6 9.9 22.3 19.3 12.1 13.9 15.1 26.0 12.7 20.8 22.8 16.2 11.3 11.2 17.3 17.6
1976 19.7 24.6 17.4 16.9 9.5 23.2 21.7 13.5 13.9 15.9 24.9 15.6 20.7 23.5 16.1 10.9 11.0 18.0 18.1
1977 20.0 26.1 17.4 17.1 9.7 22.1 20.3 14.5 13.8 16.6 25.4 16.4 22.1 24.2 17.1 10.8 11.6 18.0 18.3
1978 19.9 27.8 17.9 17.0 9.1 22.7 19.0 14.4 14.8 16.4 25.4 16.3 22.6 22.5 17.1 10.2 11.4 18.2 18.4
1979 19.3 28.8 18.1 16.7 9.2 23.5 17.3 13.5 14.1 16.1 25.4 16.1 22.8 21.6 18.6 9.6 12.1 18.2 18.6
1980 17.8 28.1 17.7 14.4 9.1 23.3 18.4 14.2 14.8 15.6 25.2 19.0 22.8 22.2 19.7 9.6 12.2 18.1 18.6
1981 17.6 27.5 17.2 14.2 9.9 22.6 19.2 13.5 14.4 15.1 25.0 18.9 23.3 22.9 20.5 10.1 12.5 17.6 18.5
1982 17.4 26.8 16.9 16.0 10.5 22.9 21.7 13.8 15.4 15.3 24.4 19.8 22.9 22.4 20.0 9.7 12.2 17.7 18.4
1983 17.9 27.7 17.2 16.7 11.6 22.9 22.7 14.8 17.9 15.4 23.9 21.2 22.9 24.8 19.6 9.7 11.7 18.1 18.7
1984 17.7 28.4 17.3 17.2 12.6 23.3 23.2 14.9 17.9 16.2 25.2 20.1 24.4 26.3 19.5 9.7 12.4 18.4 19.1
1985 17.3 29.0 17.0 17.4 13.3 23.5 22.2 14.2 17.9 16.1 25.0 20.9 24.5 27.1 19.2 9.5 12.8 18.3 19.0
1986 17.0 31.2 17.0 19.5 15.3 23.4 22.1 14.9 18.1 16.8 24.8 22.8 25.1 27.6 18.9 9.4 12.4 18.5 19.2
1987 17.4 31.2 16.9 18.9 15.3 23.4 22.3 15.3 17.6 17.4 25.2 22.2 25.2 28.1 18.8 9.4 13.3 18.6 19.3
1988 17.9 31.4 17.1 17.8 15.7 23.6 22.3 16.1 18.9 17.6 25.0 22.4 28.1 26.7 18.9 9.5 13.8 19.0 19.5
1989 18.0 30.1 17.6 15.9 15.4 23.1 22.7 16.4 19.9 16.9 24.9 21.4 28.1 27.0 18.0 9.4 13.3 19.0 19.3
1990 18.3 29.3 17.8 17.8 15.2 23.1 22.1 16.9 19.5 16.7 24.7 21.1 26.7 28.6 17.5 9.5 13.7 19.1 19.4
1991 17.9 28.6 16.6 18.8 15.3 22.4 21.2 17.5 19.7 16.6 24.7 20.5 25.1 28.5 18.5 9.8 12.8 18.5 19.0
1992 18.1 28.4 16.5 19.2 15.8 22.0 21.2 17.2 20.4 16.9 24.4 21.7 24.1 25.8 17.9 9.8 13.2 18.3 18.7
1993 18.9 28.3 16.9 18.2 14.7 22.0 20.7 18.7 23.6 17.1 24.5 19.9 23.7 24.2 17.3 9.8 12.8 18.7 18.8
1994 19.5 28.6 17.5 17.8 15.6 23.0 21.9 18.1 23.7 17.1 24.3 20.6 24.0 23.5 17.5 9.9 12.7 19.2 19.2
1995 19.2 28.6 16.9 17.5 15.3 23.4 22.2 18.5 22.3 17.2 22.2 21.2 23.2 23.1 17.7 9.9 13.0 19.0 19.1
1996 20.0 29.4 16.7 18.1 15.4 24.4 22.8 18.2 22.4 17.9 22.2 21.4 22.4 24.0 17.6 9.6 13.2 19.2 19.3
1997 20.5 29.8 16.7 18.8 15.9 24.6 23.4 19.1 24.3 18.4 22.9 21.5 24.4 24.7 18.2 9.6 13.0 19.6 19.7
1998 20.4 30.4 17.0 19.3 16.8 24.8 24.0 23.2 25.3 18.6 23.2 22.0 24.3 25.8 18.1 9.4 13.8 20.6 20.5
1999 20.4 30.2 17.9 20.0 17.7 24.7 24.8 22.9 25.7 19.4 23.4 22.7 24.4 28.0 18.1 9.3 13.6 20.9 20.8
2000 20.6 29.6 18.0 20.5 18.1 24.1 25.0 23.0 26.1 19.5 23.9 23.4 24.5 24.5 18.2 9.2 13.5 21.0 20.7
2001 20.8 29.6 18.4 20.8 18.3 23.9 24.7 22.9 26.7 20.2 24.1 23.8 24.9 24.2 18.4 9.1 13.8 21.2 20.973
Table BI.9. TAX-WEDGE ON TOTAL EMPLOYMENT –WEDG-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 44.9 49.6 42.9 28.0 22.3 43.9 28.4 33.7 31.9 41.1 45.8 25.1 40.2 50.0 40.2 26.7 22.5 39.7 40.3
1971 45.0 50.6 44.2 28.4 22.9 43.7 29.9 33.5 33.9 42.8 46.5 23.6 42.4 53.3 38.6 26.5 22.9 40.3 40.6
1972 44.3 50.6 44.9 28.4 23.4 44.3 29.8 33.0 34.6 44.2 47.9 24.3 42.3 53.0 36.6 27.1 22.9 40.7 40.7
1973 45.0 49.2 46.9 28.4 24.0 44.3 30.0 32.7 35.9 45.2 49.2 24.4 43.3 51.5 35.6 27.8 23.2 41.7 41.2
1974 46.0 50.8 47.2 27.7 22.8 44.0 32.4 33.1 35.9 45.4 49.1 22.6 43.3 52.2 38.1 28.3 23.5 41.6 41.5
1975 47.9 48.2 47.2 28.5 24.2 45.0 31.7 32.3 40.4 45.8 47.4 23.9 48.0 53.7 39.8 27.0 23.5 41.9 42.1
1976 47.9 48.1 48.7 29.7 24.6 46.7 35.5 34.5 40.2 46.2 46.8 26.8 51.3 58.0 40.1 27.4 23.1 43.5 43.7
1977 49.7 49.1 49.5 29.9 26.2 46.7 34.3 35.8 42.4 46.4 48.0 28.3 52.4 60.6 39.5 27.5 24.0 44.3 44.3
1978 50.6 50.9 48.9 30.2 27.0 47.3 33.0 36.3 43.0 46.7 49.5 28.4 49.7 60.3 38.2 27.8 23.8 44.5 44.2
1979 50.5 52.2 48.8 30.6 28.2 48.9 31.8 36.2 41.3 47.4 49.4 28.7 48.6 59.6 38.4 28.1 25.7 44.7 44.4
1980 49.0 53.1 49.0 30.0 29.3 49.8 35.1 38.0 42.6 47.5 50.0 31.4 49.1 59.9 39.8 28.2 26.5 45.3 45.0
1981 49.5 53.3 49.1 28.8 30.4 49.4 36.4 38.5 42.7 47.5 50.4 32.4 50.9 60.4 41.4 29.6 27.9 45.4 45.2
1982 51.0 52.6 49.4 32.2 31.0 50.3 40.0 40.6 43.1 48.8 49.9 34.5 50.0 60.1 41.7 29.0 28.0 46.2 45.9
1983 52.2 54.5 49.2 33.2 33.2 51.4 41.6 42.3 45.6 50.8 49.5 36.7 49.7 61.7 41.4 28.7 27.9 47.2 46.7
1984 53.2 55.5 49.7 34.9 34.3 52.6 42.8 42.1 45.8 50.3 51.2 35.9 51.6 61.8 41.0 28.3 28.4 47.7 47.1
1985 53.6 57.2 50.0 34.7 35.3 52.8 41.8 42.2 45.8 49.4 52.0 36.3 53.2 61.8 40.4 28.5 29.4 48.0 47.3
1986 53.3 58.8 49.6 36.7 36.7 52.8 42.4 43.0 44.6 49.2 51.8 38.1 54.7 62.6 40.3 28.6 29.3 48.2 47.6
1987 54.1 60.2 49.9 36.6 38.0 53.4 42.8 43.7 44.0 50.5 51.6 37.3 53.0 63.7 39.2 29.2 30.4 48.6 47.9
1988 53.5 61.3 49.9 35.3 38.1 53.5 43.7 44.8 45.2 51.4 51.7 38.5 56.5 64.1 39.1 28.9 30.7 48.9 48.0
1989 52.0 60.1 50.6 32.9 39.2 53.6 41.8 46.1 46.3 49.4 50.6 37.7 56.3 66.5 38.1 29.3 30.9 49.2 48.1
1990 52.5 58.2 49.3 35.4 38.9 53.6 41.3 46.7 46.3 48.8 50.9 36.9 57.5 66.4 38.6 29.2 33.1 48.8 48.0
1991 52.3 58.1 49.4 37.1 39.7 53.9 41.4 47.6 45.9 51.2 51.4 37.0 57.5 62.9 39.4 29.3 32.4 49.2 48.3
1992 52.2 58.3 50.1 37.3 41.6 53.4 41.8 47.7 47.7 51.0 52.1 39.6 57.5 61.2 38.5 29.1 32.5 49.6 48.5
1993 54.1 59.1 50.9 38.0 40.8 53.7 41.5 50.8 51.2 51.8 53.2 38.5 58.6 59.9 36.6 29.2 32.0 50.7 49.1
1994 54.8 60.3 51.9 38.8 41.4 54.6 42.7 49.1 50.0 49.9 52.8 39.0 61.4 58.9 37.2 29.6 30.9 51.1 49.4
1995 54.6 59.9 52.1 39.1 40.5 54.9 41.2 49.6 48.6 49.3 52.4 39.7 59.0 59.5 37.7 29.9 31.5 51.1 49.6
1996 55.2 60.4 52.6 40.1 40.8 56.1 41.3 49.9 49.0 48.6 53.5 40.6 58.7 62.1 37.2 30.3 31.5 51.6 50.0
1997 56.1 60.7 53.0 41.2 41.0 56.1 41.7 51.8 49.0 48.1 54.7 40.6 57.8 62.6 37.3 30.7 31.8 52.0 50.0
1998 56.3 60.1 53.3 42.4 41.5 55.9 41.6 50.3 49.0 47.8 54.7 41.4 57.4 64.3 39.0 30.8 31.8 51.8 50.1
1999 56.1 61.1 54.0 43.5 42.3 56.8 43.0 50.3 48.8 49.2 54.5 44.1 57.2 64.9 38.7 31.1 31.1 52.4 50.5
2000 55.8 60.2 53.8 43.7 42.6 55.8 42.1 50.0 48.9 48.7 54.2 45.1 57.1 63.2 38.6 30.9 31.6 52.0 49.9
2001 55.3 59.9 52.7 44.1 42.8 55.7 41.7 50.0 49.0 46.5 54.0 45.7 57.0 62.5 38.6 30.8 32.1 51.5 49.574
Table BI.10. TOTAL TAX-WEDGE ON EMPLOYED LABOUR –TWEL-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 46.8 49.9 45.4 37.5 26.4 46.5 29.9 38.8 34.2 42.5 49.6 27.7 41.7 50.0 40.6 26.9 24.4 42.7 42.8
1971 46.8 51.0 46.5 37.6 27.1 46.2 31.4 38.4 36.1 44.2 50.1 26.4 43.9 53.6 39.0 26.8 24.7 43.2 43.0
1972 46.0 50.9 47.2 37.6 27.3 46.8 31.3 37.7 36.7 45.5 51.2 27.2 43.7 53.3 37.1 27.4 24.6 43.5 43.0
1973 46.6 49.4 49.1 37.4 27.8 46.7 31.5 37.4 37.9 46.6 52.2 27.5 44.7 51.8 35.9 28.2 24.7 44.4 43.5
1974 47.5 51.0 49.3 36.7 26.5 46.4 34.1 37.8 37.8 46.8 52.1 25.4 44.7 52.4 38.5 28.6 25.0 44.2 43.8
1975 49.3 48.4 49.4 37.0 28.1 47.5 33.8 37.2 42.0 46.9 50.6 27.1 50.2 53.9 40.3 27.3 25.2 44.7 44.5
1976 49.3 48.2 51.0 38.2 28.6 49.1 37.7 38.4 41.9 47.2 50.0 29.9 53.4 58.2 40.7 27.8 24.7 46.1 45.9
1977 51.1 49.3 51.6 38.5 30.3 49.0 36.5 39.5 43.9 47.3 51.0 31.7 54.6 60.8 40.1 27.9 25.7 46.8 46.5
1978 51.8 51.0 51.0 39.1 31.4 49.5 35.0 40.1 44.4 47.4 52.4 31.7 51.8 60.5 38.8 28.1 25.4 46.9 46.4
1979 51.7 52.4 50.8 39.5 32.7 51.0 33.8 37.2 42.7 48.1 52.3 32.1 50.7 59.8 39.0 28.5 27.2 46.7 46.2
1980 50.3 53.3 50.9 39.4 34.0 51.9 36.9 41.9 44.0 48.3 52.9 34.5 50.6 60.2 40.5 28.6 27.9 47.8 47.1
1981 50.8 53.5 51.1 38.5 35.2 51.4 38.2 42.4 44.0 48.1 53.3 35.6 52.2 60.7 42.2 30.0 29.3 47.9 47.4
1982 52.3 52.8 51.5 41.4 35.8 52.2 42.0 44.4 43.1 49.1 52.8 37.6 51.4 60.4 42.5 29.4 29.3 48.7 48.0
1983 53.7 54.7 51.1 42.6 36.9 53.3 43.8 46.3 45.4 50.7 52.5 39.7 51.0 62.0 42.3 29.1 29.1 49.5 48.8
1984 54.9 55.8 51.3 45.2 37.8 54.5 45.0 46.1 45.6 49.9 54.1 39.1 52.9 62.1 42.0 28.8 29.5 49.9 49.2
1985 55.3 57.4 51.4 44.7 38.8 54.6 44.0 46.1 45.5 49.6 54.8 39.5 54.5 61.9 41.4 28.8 30.5 50.2 49.2
1986 55.1 59.0 50.9 46.9 39.0 54.6 44.4 47.1 44.2 49.6 54.6 41.7 55.9 62.7 41.7 29.0 30.5 50.2 49.6
1987 56.0 60.4 51.1 47.4 40.1 55.1 44.8 47.6 43.5 50.4 54.4 41.1 54.1 63.8 40.3 29.5 31.6 50.6 49.7
1988 55.4 61.5 51.0 45.5 40.1 55.1 45.6 48.7 44.7 51.0 54.4 42.1 57.6 64.2 40.2 29.2 31.8 50.8 49.8
1989 54.1 60.2 51.6 43.4 40.9 55.1 43.7 50.2 45.7 49.1 53.3 41.2 57.3 66.5 39.2 29.6 32.1 51.1 49.9
1990 54.8 58.4 50.3 47.7 40.4 55.0 43.2 50.7 45.7 48.2 53.6 40.7 58.5 66.4 39.7 29.4 34.3 50.7 49.7
1991 54.6 58.2 50.3 49.6 40.9 55.2 43.2 51.5 45.3 50.5 54.0 40.7 58.5 63.1 40.5 29.5 33.6 50.9 50.0
1992 54.3 58.5 51.0 50.1 42.9 54.8 43.6 51.5 47.0 50.4 54.8 43.3 58.7 61.5 39.5 29.3 33.5 51.3 50.1
1993 56.3 59.3 51.9 51.9 41.9 55.1 43.3 54.0 50.5 51.0 55.8 42.4 59.9 60.3 37.6 29.6 32.9 52.2 50.6
1994 56.8 60.5 53.0 52.8 42.5 56.0 44.3 52.4 49.1 48.7 55.6 42.9 62.9 59.4 38.2 29.9 31.8 52.6 51.0
1995 56.6 60.0 53.1 52.9 41.4 56.1 42.7 52.9 47.7 48.2 55.1 43.6 60.5 60.0 38.8 30.1 32.5 52.5 51.1
1996 57.2 60.6 53.6 54.2 41.9 57.2 42.6 53.8 48.1 47.7 56.1 44.5 60.1 62.6 38.2 30.5 32.4 53.1 51.6
1997 58.0 60.8 54.2 54.9 41.9 57.1 42.9 55.7 48.2 47.0 57.1 44.5 59.1 63.2 38.2 30.9 32.7 53.6 51.6
1998 58.1 60.3 54.4 55.7 42.0 57.0 42.9 54.1 48.1 46.3 57.0 45.3 58.6 64.9 39.9 31.0 32.7 53.3 51.6
1999 57.9 61.3 55.1 56.7 42.7 57.8 44.3 54.0 47.8 47.5 56.8 48.2 58.3 65.5 39.6 31.3 32.1 53.8 51.9
2000 57.5 60.4 54.9 56.5 42.8 56.7 43.4 53.7 48.0 47.0 56.4 49.2 58.2 63.8 39.4 31.0 32.5 53.4 51.3
2001 57.0 60.1 53.8 56.5 42.9 56.5 43.0 53.6 48.0 44.9 56.2 49.7 58.1 63.2 39.4 30.9 32.9 52.8 50.975
Table BI.11. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CAPITAL (GROSS) –KETG-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 16.0 23.3 18.3 9.2 8.9 15.5 26.9 11.9 13.7 19.5 15.5 9.2 14.6 20.1 35.2 26.3 19.0 15.5 19.0
1971 17.0 23.0 17.8 9.6 9.7 14.3 26.1 12.9 15.2 20.7 15.7 9.1 14.0 19.0 32.4 24.0 21.2 15.5 18.4
1972 17.7 23.4 17.3 9.6 9.8 14.3 22.1 14.1 14.9 20.5 15.4 8.6 14.1 19.3 29.8 26.1 20.4 15.5 17.9
1973 19.9 25.3 19.5 6.8 10.4 14.9 20.8 12.7 15.6 21.6 14.8 8.4 14.7 18.7 28.6 25.5 23.6 16.4 18.2
1974 20.3 24.6 19.2 9.3 9.8 16.1 28.2 9.9 18.6 22.0 15.8 9.8 14.7 19.0 34.8 25.9 31.9 16.2 18.8
1975 21.6 21.6 17.8 7.9 10.5 15.4 22.5 11.2 22.9 23.4 16.8 23.2 14.0 20.3 32.3 22.6 29.3 16.1 18.5
1976 21.2 22.8 19.1 10.4 10.5 17.9 23.8 12.1 24.7 22.1 15.5 19.7 16.1 20.0 28.7 23.7 27.9 17.2 18.8
1977 21.4 21.7 20.8 9.1 10.2 16.9 18.0 13.0 32.6 22.7 15.7 10.8 13.8 16.5 27.3 24.5 29.8 17.5 18.7
1978 21.9 22.4 19.9 9.7 10.2 15.5 15.6 15.7 34.2 22.8 17.3 7.8 13.6 17.4 27.1 24.1 28.5 17.4 18.6
1979 22.4 22.1 19.5 8.6 11.1 16.1 17.0 14.5 28.1 22.0 17.3 7.9 13.4 18.6 27.9 23.2 28.9 17.2 18.7
1980 21.3 20.9 19.0 8.6 11.6 17.7 18.5 15.8 27.4 22.5 16.9 8.2 13.2 17.8 31.8 22.4 30.1 17.5 19.7
1981 20.4 19.4 17.8 7.5 11.8 18.1 19.3 17.3 27.5 21.7 16.8 9.4 14.1 17.4 34.9 21.1 30.5 17.5 20.3
1982 21.6 19.8 17.6 9.8 10.2 18.9 18.9 18.4 26.4 21.0 15.3 9.9 14.4 19.3 35.5 19.3 30.1 17.6 20.6
1983 21.4 22.4 17.4 8.9 11.6 17.8 18.9 19.1 29.6 19.7 15.4 11.4 14.4 20.8 34.1 18.1 30.2 17.5 20.3
1984 22.7 25.1 17.7 8.7 11.4 18.6 19.1 19.9 26.8 18.4 16.4 11.0 14.8 21.4 35.5 18.7 30.3 17.9 20.8
1985 21.8 25.7 18.4 8.4 12.3 18.3 18.2 19.5 29.7 19.4 17.2 11.1 14.9 21.3 36.2 18.8 29.2 18.1 21.2
1986 22.1 28.6 18.0 9.3 12.8 18.5 19.0 19.9 26.6 20.6 16.7 9.1 15.1 23.7 34.5 18.9 28.8 18.2 20.9
1987 22.0 25.3 17.5 9.8 16.1 18.5 19.1 21.1 28.4 22.5 15.9 8.5 14.1 27.6 34.3 20.4 31.9 18.6 21.2
1988 21.7 23.9 17.4 10.0 16.3 18.1 20.3 20.3 28.6 21.7 16.5 9.9 16.1 26.1 35.2 20.3 32.2 18.4 21.3
1989 21.1 24.6 18.1 9.4 19.0 18.1 17.9 22.1 29.6 20.5 17.6 15.2 16.3 25.3 38.0 20.4 31.8 19.2 22.3
1990 20.1 23.1 16.2 12.4 19.9 17.9 18.9 22.7 31.0 21.5 17.5 18.0 15.2 22.4 34.4 19.9 29.5 18.8 21.3
1991 19.6 23.0 15.1 11.1 18.8 17.3 20.0 22.8 30.2 22.6 18.1 21.7 11.6 21.5 31.8 19.5 28.7 18.3 20.3
1992 18.3 23.6 14.9 11.7 19.0 17.3 21.5 24.2 30.5 21.6 19.3 23.4 11.1 20.9 28.6 19.3 26.7 18.4 19.9
1993 20.7 25.7 14.1 12.0 17.4 16.7 22.6 26.3 37.4 22.7 18.1 19.7 11.2 21.6 28.2 19.9 23.8 18.1 19.7
1994 21.4 27.6 13.5 13.9 16.5 17.3 23.8 24.4 34.3 21.4 14.6 18.9 14.1 23.5 28.6 20.4 23.4 17.5 19.4
1995 22.2 27.1 13.7 14.8 16.3 17.8 20.6 23.5 34.1 20.9 15.8 19.7 17.8 25.4 30.4 20.8 23.5 17.5 19.6
1996 22.2 27.9 15.3 14.1 17.0 18.4 21.3 24.7 35.9 23.6 18.5 21.9 20.4 27.4 30.8 21.2 23.3 19.0 20.9
1997 23.4 27.9 15.2 15.9 18.6 19.7 21.5 26.2 34.2 24.2 18.4 23.2 22.6 28.2 33.0 21.6 22.7 19.8 22.3
1998 23.8 28.4 15.4 20.3 18.5 21.6 20.5 25.5 34.3 24.3 19.2 22.1 24.3 28.5 34.1 22.3 23.5 20.2 22.9
1999 23.4 29.0 15.9 19.5 18.5 22.8 20.8 26.5 34.0 24.9 18.8 24.6 24.2 27.9 35.0 22.8 18.7 20.9 23.7
2000 23.7 28.8 16.0 18.5 18.4 22.0 19.8 25.6 33.4 24.0 17.9 25.4 24.4 27.5 34.5 22.7 17.9 20.6 23.5
2001 23.5 29.0 14.8 17.8 18.5 21.8 19.5 25.4 32.2 23.3 17.3 26.0 24.3 27.3 34.0 22.9 17.6 20.0 23.076
Table BI.12. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CAPITAL (NET) –KETN-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 31.0 52.0 30.9 12.8 18.4 25.6 51.0 21.7 23.0 39.2 30.4 12.3 27.0 38.0 62.7 40.3 35.3 27.3 33.8
1971 34.4 56.2 31.4 13.0 20.0 24.0 50.8 25.3 31.4 47.6 33.5 12.5 31.3 40.7 57.6 36.5 45.2 28.8 34.3
1972 35.5 48.1 30.6 13.0 19.5 24.1 36.1 27.4 29.0 45.8 31.6 11.7 30.9 39.7 53.0 39.4 45.4 28.6 33.1
1973 38.3 48.9 35.1 8.5 20.3 25.1 32.9 24.3 28.2 46.0 33.1 10.8 31.8 35.8 50.3 38.2 54.2 30.1 33.2
1974 42.1 59.4 37.9 12.0 18.6 30.0 59.5 19.9 31.5 52.5 34.8 13.6 30.3 37.7 77.2 40.8 84.2 32.3 38.7
1975 49.5 61.6 36.4 10.3 21.9 34.3 39.6 27.9 115.2 73.0 48.7 13.0 42.1 40.8 84.1 36.2 102.3 36.0 42.9
1976 49.2 57.7 36.3 13.8 22.7 41.5 43.7 27.8 60.0 55.8 38.4 12.0 61.5 47.0 66.9 37.4 89.7 37.0 41.3
1977 54.4 59.1 39.9 12.9 21.1 38.6 27.1 31.1 115.1 60.2 38.3 11.5 53.5 54.3 54.7 38.2 100.8 39.1 41.7
1978 55.2 62.6 37.4 14.1 20.2 35.2 23.5 35.0 91.2 60.9 98.2 11.3 41.3 51.3 55.2 37.5 81.5 39.4 42.1
1979 56.6 67.2 36.6 12.6 23.4 37.5 28.1 29.7 73.7 65.3 60.4 10.7 34.2 47.0 59.0 36.8 82.7 38.0 41.5
1980 54.3 76.5 39.8 12.3 24.7 49.1 41.7 31.4 87.4 65.9 65.9 11.1 35.9 43.5 78.0 37.3 81.5 42.4 48.2
1981 52.6 68.9 39.7 11.4 28.2 52.5 38.4 38.6 98.4 58.7 95.8 13.1 42.7 45.4 94.6 35.3 88.6 45.2 53.4
1982 52.3 56.4 39.7 15.1 22.2 55.6 35.3 41.6 65.5 57.0 59.1 13.8 40.5 44.1 82.8 34.7 89.6 44.6 50.6
1983 52.3 60.8 36.4 15.3 26.1 50.5 36.0 43.8 72.5 47.6 46.2 15.5 39.6 45.4 71.9 30.5 88.7 42.1 47.0
1984 50.8 63.6 35.9 13.9 22.7 47.8 31.9 42.0 61.3 39.0 54.6 14.5 39.9 43.8 77.3 30.0 79.9 40.2 46.3
1985 47.7 64.4 36.4 13.5 24.0 44.1 28.5 40.4 69.0 39.0 57.4 14.3 44.3 45.0 75.1 30.2 68.5 39.3 45.5
1986 47.7 73.5 34.0 14.3 23.3 38.9 30.4 38.3 53.4 43.4 55.5 11.6 47.4 50.5 74.9 30.5 65.2 37.1 43.5
1987 48.2 80.3 33.4 15.1 28.3 38.1 30.5 40.2 63.2 52.0 55.5 10.8 45.1 60.4 71.4 33.2 75.6 38.0 44.3
1988 45.4 84.2 32.0 15.2 28.1 36.4 31.1 38.4 54.7 49.5 52.7 12.4 47.8 57.2 73.4 33.0 72.4 36.4 43.7
1989 40.7 72.2 32.5 14.8 31.6 34.8 27.0 41.4 54.4 42.9 51.0 19.0 48.6 59.4 85.5 32.6 73.0 36.5 45.4
1990 42.2 61.2 28.5 19.7 33.6 35.0 28.0 44.4 63.5 43.9 46.4 23.2 58.5 60.9 81.7 31.8 67.3 36.6 44.4
1991 43.9 59.5 29.6 16.1 31.8 34.2 30.5 45.9 69.1 46.7 48.1 29.5 131.1 57.1 80.9 31.9 66.3 38.4 45.3
1992 42.1 59.1 31.1 16.9 32.9 34.1 33.7 49.2 69.2 47.5 55.4 33.2 70.7 49.4 61.5 31.5 65.1 38.4 42.0
1993 49.3 63.6 31.4 16.9 30.3 32.8 34.3 54.2 77.7 52.0 58.8 27.1 39.4 49.5 56.1 31.9 59.1 38.5 41.4
1994 50.1 58.5 28.6 19.6 27.6 33.0 36.8 46.7 63.9 44.8 45.7 25.1 39.1 45.6 53.6 32.7 62.2 35.2 38.3
1995 49.6 57.0 28.4 21.3 26.2 33.5 29.9 42.4 65.6 43.4 45.7 26.2 41.3 44.8 57.1 33.0 66.2 34.2 37.8
1996 52.9 58.5 31.8 20.3 27.2 35.1 30.3 43.6 69.7 49.8 46.2 29.0 46.8 52.4 56.0 33.1 61.1 36.8 40.1
1997 55.3 60.7 30.6 24.4 29.7 37.1 29.8 46.9 58.4 48.8 45.8 30.7 47.5 55.2 58.3 33.6 60.2 37.8 41.9
1998 55.1 62.0 30.0 32.4 29.8 40.5 28.2 46.1 56.4 48.9 47.6 28.6 48.0 58.8 61.1 35.1 72.4 38.2 43.0
1999 55.0 63.0 31.7 31.1 29.9 42.9 28.5 48.0 56.5 51.1 48.9 32.7 48.6 62.7 63.6 36.2 54.2 39.9 44.9
2000 52.9 60.2 31.1 29.2 29.8 39.7 27.2 45.3 55.1 48.3 44.8 34.4 48.6 54.8 61.8 36.0 47.6 38.2 43.3
2001 50.1 59.0 27.7 27.6 29.9 38.7 26.7 44.0 51.9 45.5 42.6 35.2 47.3 51.8 62.1 36.5 45.9 36.2 41.877
Table BI.13. “IMPLICIT” TAX RATES ON CAPITAL (GROSS) –KITG-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 16.5 24.7 17.1 6.6 5.3 14.8 15.0 8.7 13.5 20.5 15.1 7.2 14.9 23.0 31.6 24.2 13.4 14.1 17.4
1971 17.5 25.4 17.2 7.0 5.8 13.9 15.5 9.3 15.0 22.1 15.4 6.8 15.2 21.8 29.4 22.2 14.7 14.3 17.2
1972 18.3 25.0 16.9 6.9 6.0 14.1 14.6 10.3 14.6 22.4 15.7 6.4 15.3 21.8 27.1 24.1 14.5 14.5 16.9
1973 20.3 26.3 19.3 5.8 6.4 14.4 14.3 9.5 15.3 23.2 15.7 6.5 16.0 20.5 26.4 23.8 16.3 15.4 17.3
1974 21.0 27.2 19.4 7.6 6.2 15.4 16.7 8.2 17.9 24.2 16.6 6.7 15.9 21.3 31.5 24.2 20.2 15.6 18.1
1975 23.5 24.4 18.3 6.6 6.8 15.1 15.0 9.0 22.4 26.1 16.8 7.2 17.0 22.7 29.6 21.3 18.1 15.6 17.9
1976 23.0 24.8 19.4 8.3 7.0 17.2 16.7 11.4 23.6 24.9 16.1 7.2 20.1 23.1 27.0 22.4 17.4 17.0 18.6
1977 24.0 24.0 21.0 7.4 7.1 16.9 14.7 12.4 29.8 25.5 16.8 7.4 18.1 21.0 25.8 23.0 18.5 17.7 18.8
1978 25.0 24.7 20.0 7.5 7.5 16.2 13.4 14.3 31.4 25.9 19.0 6.9 16.3 21.7 25.4 22.8 18.3 17.6 18.8
1979 25.4 24.7 19.6 7.5 8.3 17.1 14.1 17.7 26.6 25.8 18.7 7.3 15.3 22.3 25.6 22.2 19.6 18.2 19.3
1980 24.5 24.4 19.4 7.9 9.0 18.6 16.0 15.4 26.2 26.1 18.8 7.5 16.2 21.2 28.4 21.4 21.1 18.1 19.8
1981 24.5 23.2 18.4 6.9 9.3 19.1 16.8 16.9 26.4 25.8 19.4 8.6 18.0 20.8 30.6 20.4 22.0 18.2 20.3
1982 25.6 23.0 18.2 9.2 8.5 20.0 17.0 18.7 27.8 26.2 18.3 9.5 17.7 22.2 31.5 18.9 22.1 18.7 20.8
1983 25.6 25.2 18.4 9.0 11.6 19.7 17.3 19.4 31.0 26.3 18.0 10.9 17.5 23.3 30.5 17.7 22.8 19.1 21.1
1984 26.5 27.3 19.1 9.0 11.9 20.5 17.9 19.8 28.6 24.9 19.1 10.7 18.0 23.5 31.1 18.2 23.3 19.6 21.5
1985 26.2 28.1 20.2 8.7 12.6 20.3 17.3 20.0 31.0 24.3 20.1 10.7 18.6 23.4 31.7 18.4 23.5 19.9 21.9
1986 26.1 30.5 19.9 9.2 14.2 20.3 18.2 20.2 28.2 24.8 19.8 9.0 19.4 25.5 29.5 18.6 23.4 20.0 21.7
1987 25.9 28.5 19.8 9.1 16.8 20.5 18.5 21.3 29.9 27.7 19.2 8.3 17.8 29.2 29.5 20.0 25.4 20.5 22.2
1988 25.1 27.9 19.7 9.2 16.9 20.1 19.8 20.9 30.1 27.6 19.5 9.8 19.7 27.9 30.1 20.0 25.8 20.4 22.2
1989 23.6 27.8 20.3 8.1 19.5 20.2 17.5 22.3 31.1 25.6 19.1 13.0 19.7 27.9 31.5 20.1 26.0 20.9 22.8
1990 22.9 25.9 18.4 8.0 20.2 20.1 18.1 22.9 32.4 26.6 19.4 14.0 19.7 25.2 29.3 19.7 25.2 20.6 22.0
1991 22.8 25.8 17.3 8.1 20.0 20.0 19.2 23.4 31.8 28.2 20.0 15.8 18.1 23.4 27.3 19.5 24.9 20.3 21.4
1992 22.2 26.4 17.6 8.2 20.8 19.6 20.3 24.4 32.5 27.7 21.1 17.4 17.3 22.6 25.3 19.2 23.6 20.5 21.2
1993 24.6 28.2 17.1 8.6 19.9 19.1 21.2 27.3 38.7 29.1 21.0 15.6 16.3 23.3 24.7 19.5 21.7 20.7 21.3
1994 25.2 29.7 16.6 10.1 19.2 19.5 22.3 25.2 36.0 27.8 18.4 15.5 18.7 24.7 25.1 20.1 21.1 20.1 21.0
1995 25.8 29.0 17.1 10.8 18.7 20.0 19.5 24.7 35.9 27.1 19.5 16.1 20.8 26.3 26.7 20.6 21.1 20.2 21.3
1996 25.9 29.8 18.6 10.4 19.1 20.9 20.2 25.1 37.3 28.5 21.5 17.8 23.2 28.3 27.1 21.0 21.1 21.4 22.4
1997 26.9 29.8 18.3 11.7 20.4 21.9 20.5 26.4 35.5 28.8 22.1 18.6 24.4 29.1 28.6 21.4 20.8 22.0 23.3
1998 27.2 30.0 18.5 14.5 20.7 23.0 19.6 24.2 35.6 29.6 22.6 18.2 25.7 29.6 30.0 22.1 21.0 22.0 23.6
1999 26.9 30.6 19.1 14.1 20.9 24.3 19.9 25.1 35.3 30.6 22.3 20.3 25.6 29.1 30.6 22.6 17.5 22.8 24.3
2000 26.9 30.3 19.1 13.4 20.9 23.6 19.0 24.3 34.9 29.7 21.3 20.8 25.8 28.5 30.2 22.6 17.2 22.4 24.0
2001 26.4 30.3 17.6 13.1 21.0 23.4 18.8 24.3 33.8 28.1 20.7 21.3 25.6 28.2 29.8 22.8 17.2 21.8 23.578
Table BI.14. IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON CAPITAL (NET) –KITN-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 25.0 39.3 23.9 7.3 7.1 19.8 19.0 12.1 20.3 30.5 20.6 8.3 21.8 37.5 48.2 34.0 18.2 19.6 25.3
1971 26.9 41.9 24.7 7.8 7.8 18.9 19.9 13.1 25.6 34.4 21.5 7.9 23.9 38.6 44.6 31.2 20.6 20.4 25.4
1972 28.2 39.5 24.5 7.6 8.0 19.3 18.2 14.5 24.1 34.7 21.9 7.5 24.1 38.0 41.4 33.7 20.7 20.8 24.9
1973 30.6 40.6 28.2 6.5 8.4 19.9 17.7 13.4 24.5 35.2 22.4 7.4 25.4 34.7 40.5 33.1 23.3 22.2 25.5
1974 32.6 46.1 29.6 8.5 8.4 22.2 21.8 11.9 27.2 38.0 23.7 7.7 25.4 37.1 54.6 34.8 29.3 23.4 28.3
1975 37.4 44.3 28.6 7.5 9.4 23.2 18.9 13.9 52.3 44.1 24.9 8.7 29.7 40.1 54.3 31.2 26.7 24.4 29.3
1976 36.4 43.4 29.7 9.4 9.6 27.0 21.4 17.3 42.5 40.6 23.3 8.5 37.1 45.2 48.1 32.5 25.4 26.3 30.0
1977 39.3 43.6 32.5 8.5 9.8 26.6 18.3 19.0 59.8 42.4 24.4 8.5 34.8 49.9 43.2 33.2 27.1 27.7 30.7
1978 40.8 45.8 30.8 8.6 10.3 25.6 16.9 21.3 57.8 43.4 29.4 7.9 30.2 48.7 42.6 32.8 26.4 27.5 30.4
1979 41.7 47.8 30.3 8.6 11.5 27.4 18.5 25.7 49.9 44.8 28.2 8.3 27.1 46.0 44.0 32.3 28.6 28.4 31.3
1980 39.6 50.7 31.8 9.2 12.7 31.6 22.7 22.2 53.2 45.8 29.1 8.5 29.4 43.2 52.2 32.4 31.0 29.4 33.6
1981 39.7 48.9 31.3 8.0 13.4 33.1 23.3 25.1 56.7 45.2 31.0 9.8 33.9 44.3 58.2 31.0 33.2 30.2 35.5
1982 41.0 45.1 31.4 10.7 12.2 34.9 23.3 28.0 51.9 46.2 28.7 10.9 32.7 43.6 55.7 30.1 33.9 31.0 35.5
1983 41.3 48.8 30.6 10.7 16.8 34.4 23.7 28.8 58.1 44.9 27.8 12.5 32.4 44.8 51.3 27.0 35.4 31.2 35.0
1984 41.6 51.8 31.5 10.6 17.1 35.0 23.6 28.8 52.3 40.8 30.1 12.2 33.2 43.5 52.2 26.8 36.1 31.4 35.3
1985 40.8 53.5 33.0 10.3 18.0 34.0 22.4 29.0 57.9 38.8 31.7 12.2 35.7 44.6 51.9 27.2 36.1 31.6 35.6
1986 40.5 59.1 31.8 10.9 20.0 32.6 24.0 28.7 48.4 40.5 31.3 10.2 38.1 49.1 49.1 27.6 35.8 31.2 34.8
1987 40.7 60.9 31.8 10.8 23.4 32.9 24.4 30.1 54.6 46.8 30.6 9.4 35.8 57.6 47.7 29.8 39.6 32.1 35.6
1988 39.3 62.7 31.0 10.8 23.4 32.3 25.6 29.6 50.5 46.7 30.9 11.1 39.0 55.4 48.3 29.7 39.9 31.5 35.4
1989 35.9 58.9 31.7 9.5 26.9 31.9 22.6 31.5 50.9 42.2 30.0 14.7 39.6 58.1 51.5 29.7 41.0 31.9 36.2
1990 35.9 52.8 28.4 9.5 28.0 32.2 23.2 32.6 57.2 43.3 29.9 16.0 43.9 58.6 48.6 29.1 40.0 31.5 35.2
1991 36.4 52.2 29.1 9.6 27.8 32.4 25.1 33.6 60.4 46.3 31.0 18.3 51.4 53.5 46.2 29.1 40.3 32.2 35.1
1992 35.8 52.3 30.6 9.7 29.0 31.8 26.7 35.3 61.7 46.6 33.3 20.3 45.0 47.0 40.5 28.7 39.5 32.9 34.5
1993 39.6 55.8 30.9 10.1 28.0 31.1 27.7 40.0 69.8 49.7 34.3 18.2 36.6 46.8 38.4 28.8 37.1 33.8 34.9
1994 40.5 53.9 29.1 12.0 26.7 31.4 29.6 36.4 60.4 45.5 30.3 17.9 38.0 43.8 38.0 29.7 37.1 32.2 33.5
1995 41.0 52.9 29.6 12.8 25.7 31.9 25.3 35.1 61.7 44.5 31.9 18.7 38.7 43.3 40.5 30.3 37.8 32.1 33.7
1996 42.4 54.1 32.2 12.4 26.2 33.8 26.1 35.3 64.7 47.1 34.5 20.6 42.7 49.5 40.7 30.5 37.4 34.0 35.4
1997 44.2 55.8 31.2 14.2 28.0 35.2 26.2 37.4 56.1 46.6 35.6 21.6 42.7 51.8 42.4 31.1 37.0 34.5 36.4
1998 44.9 56.3 30.9 17.9 28.6 37.0 25.1 34.6 54.8 47.9 36.5 21.0 43.6 54.7 44.8 32.5 39.1 34.5 37.0
1999 44.8 57.3 32.2 17.4 29.0 39.4 25.4 36.1 54.9 50.2 36.6 23.6 43.9 57.3 46.0 33.6 32.2 35.9 38.4
2000 43.9 55.3 31.7 16.6 29.3 37.3 24.3 34.8 53.9 48.3 34.7 24.4 43.8 51.4 45.1 33.4 31.5 34.9 37.4
2001 42.6 54.5 28.7 16.2 29.7 36.9 23.9 34.4 51.4 45.1 33.6 25.0 42.8 48.9 45.0 33.9 31.6 33.5 36.379
APPENDIX BI I
DETAILED TABLES FOR AUXILIARY
TRANSFORMATIONS80
Table BII.1. SSC PAID BY THE EMPLOYERS (% TOTAL NWLC) –SERR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 64.4 25.2 52.1 38.0 80.1 70.9 54.4 80.5 51.7 47.0 35.5 59.2 62.3 73.1 38.9 52.7 51.9 64.2 59.3
1971 65.3 23.6 51.8 38.6 78.4 70.7 51.7 80.5 52.4 46.8 35.5 59.0 78.6 71.9 43.2 53.0 52.0 64.0 59.7
1972 65.7 26.3 52.1 39.8 79.1 69.5 49.4 80.5 52.5 45.7 35.5 59.7 81.2 71.4 45.5 53.3 52.0 63.7 60.1
1973 64.9 44.4 52.3 40.4 79.6 69.0 54.0 80.5 52.4 47.0 35.4 60.2 83.8 64.3 52.3 54.0 52.3 63.5 61.2
1974 64.9 58.7 52.5 40.6 80.4 69.3 57.3 80.8 53.0 46.9 36.4 59.6 83.3 65.8 56.1 53.9 52.1 63.8 62.4
1975 64.2 53.2 52.6 40.5 80.8 69.0 59.8 80.3 53.2 45.9 38.1 56.1 83.2 76.9 59.6 53.2 52.1 64.0 63.4
1976 64.5 46.4 52.6 41.1 81.8 67.8 60.9 78.9 53.0 45.8 38.0 54.9 82.5 79.1 60.3 53.8 51.9 63.3 62.9
1977 64.3 44.0 52.5 42.6 80.7 67.1 61.3 78.5 53.1 45.9 38.2 55.9 83.8 78.9 55.1 54.9 51.5 62.7 61.7
1978 64.1 39.9 52.6 43.5 80.2 66.4 63.4 78.1 52.8 45.3 40.3 56.9 83.5 85.0 52.0 55.4 51.2 62.5 61.2
1979 63.6 35.2 52.7 42.2 79.8 64.3 64.7 63.2 53.0 45.5 40.4 56.2 91.7 88.0 48.2 55.2 50.8 60.1 58.7
1980 63.7 40.7 53.5 41.5 77.8 63.3 64.7 73.4 53.7 46.8 40.4 55.1 95.1 88.0 47.9 54.5 51.0 62.0 60.0
1981 61.0 48.4 53.8 41.5 79.0 63.6 65.2 73.4 52.8 44.9 41.9 56.0 94.0 88.5 45.7 53.9 51.1 62.3 60.0
1982 57.2 48.0 53.8 39.6 76.8 62.9 60.5 70.6 48.7 42.3 41.7 54.9 94.9 88.3 43.5 53.2 51.0 61.1 58.6
1983 56.5 47.6 53.3 39.4 74.2 62.4 55.7 70.2 46.9 39.6 41.9 53.8 95.2 83.4 47.8 54.3 51.0 60.2 58.4
1984 57.1 45.3 52.5 40.8 75.6 61.1 54.2 69.6 48.2 39.7 42.7 52.1 94.0 82.2 51.1 55.4 51.1 59.9 58.8
1985 59.3 38.4 51.8 40.3 75.2 61.8 55.1 70.2 48.1 40.0 42.4 52.4 92.9 83.1 51.2 54.5 51.0 60.2 58.8
1986 60.3 33.4 51.4 39.7 70.5 61.2 57.2 69.7 47.9 41.6 41.9 65.8 95.2 82.7 52.3 53.6 51.6 59.7 58.6
1987 60.8 41.0 51.2 41.8 71.4 60.5 57.8 69.2 48.9 39.6 41.8 63.0 94.9 83.1 52.6 53.3 51.7 59.3 58.6
1988 61.6 19.7 51.0 43.2 72.5 60.3 54.7 69.3 48.9 38.6 41.8 61.4 95.4 87.1 53.3 52.5 52.0 59.5 58.5
1989 61.3 16.7 50.9 47.4 71.8 59.3 55.1 70.7 48.8 38.4 41.7 60.4 95.1 87.2 54.7 52.3 52.3 59.8 59.0
1990 63.8 18.7 50.8 48.7 71.9 59.2 55.6 71.0 48.7 20.1 41.7 59.9 95.0 87.7 58.3 51.9 51.8 58.8 58.9
1991 64.3 18.0 51.4 49.2 71.4 59.3 55.8 69.5 48.4 19.8 41.7 59.6 94.9 86.4 58.7 51.4 51.7 58.4 58.5
1992 63.2 16.9 50.9 48.8 71.5 59.6 54.6 68.9 48.6 18.9 41.9 59.4 94.7 88.2 58.6 51.9 51.7 57.7 57.9
1993 62.3 15.1 50.8 48.4 69.1 59.2 53.4 65.8 48.3 18.5 41.8 59.6 85.0 89.2 58.9 52.7 51.9 55.9 56.3
1994 61.9 17.6 51.0 47.5 68.7 58.7 53.5 65.8 46.8 14.5 40.8 57.2 81.1 86.5 55.5 52.3 51.4 55.3 55.3
1995 61.4 17.3 50.6 47.0 69.1 58.2 56.7 65.3 46.1 16.0 41.4 57.1 80.1 79.7 54.7 52.0 51.2 54.9 54.7
1996 61.1 18.4 50.2 46.7 69.5 57.4 55.9 69.1 45.8 16.5 41.5 56.1 79.5 77.4 55.1 52.0 51.0 55.6 55.3
1997 61.2 18.8 50.1 44.5 70.1 58.7 58.3 70.0 45.2 15.1 41.5 56.3 78.9 73.3 54.1 51.8 51.0 56.2 55.4
1998 61.2 17.2 49.8 44.5 68.2 63.7 55.4 72.2 43.9 17.9 40.7 54.3 77.9 67.3 52.3 51.8 51.0 57.5 55.9
1999 61.2 17.2 49.8 44.5 68.2 63.7 55.4 72.2 43.9 17.9 40.7 54.3 77.9 67.3 52.3 51.8 51.0 57.5 55.9
2000 61.2 17.2 49.8 44.5 68.2 63.7 55.4 72.2 43.9 17.9 40.7 54.3 77.9 67.3 52.3 51.8 51.0 57.5 55.8
2001 61.2 17.2 49.8 44.5 68.2 63.7 55.4 72.2 43.9 17.9 40.7 54.3 77.9 67.3 52.3 51.8 51.0 57.4 55.881
Table BII.2. SSC PAID BY THE EMPLOYEES (% TOTAL NWLC) –SEMR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 29.4 74.8 44.0 42.2 19.9 18.4 45.6 19.5 38.6 43.6 34.0 36.3 4.3 12.3 33.6 43.0 38.3 29.5 30.5
1971 28.8 76.4 44.2 42.3 21.6 18.7 48.3 19.5 38.2 43.5 34.0 36.5 4.7 10.4 36.8 42.9 38.0 30.0 31.4
1972 27.9 73.7 43.6 42.2 20.9 19.8 49.0 19.5 38.9 44.2 34.2 34.4 4.1 11.1 39.1 42.8 37.9 30.0 31.7
1973 28.4 55.6 43.2 41.9 20.4 20.4 44.7 19.5 38.7 43.4 34.0 34.1 3.4 10.0 43.1 42.3 38.1 30.2 31.9
1974 28.7 41.3 42.9 41.6 19.6 20.3 41.8 19.2 38.6 43.0 33.7 34.5 3.3 11.4 40.0 42.2 38.1 29.9 30.9
1975 28.1 46.8 42.7 40.8 19.2 20.2 39.6 19.7 37.2 42.7 32.4 36.0 3.3 0.0 37.5 42.8 37.1 29.3 29.7
1976 28.2 53.6 43.1 39.4 18.2 21.2 38.6 16.3 38.0 42.9 32.7 36.3 3.6 0.0 37.0 42.4 37.3 29.3 29.7
1977 28.3 56.0 43.2 38.9 19.3 21.4 37.9 16.8 37.8 42.3 32.5 34.8 3.9 0.0 34.1 41.4 36.7 29.8 29.8
1978 27.7 60.1 43.4 39.8 19.8 21.5 36.0 16.8 38.0 42.5 32.9 34.4 4.3 0.0 31.6 41.1 35.8 30.0 29.9
1979 28.2 64.8 43.5 39.2 20.2 23.7 35.0 16.4 38.3 42.5 33.0 34.6 4.1 0.0 30.0 41.2 35.4 30.3 30.0
1980 28.5 59.3 44.2 41.8 22.2 24.8 32.5 17.9 38.5 41.4 33.6 35.1 0.4 0.3 30.5 42.0 35.2 30.6 30.2
1981 30.2 51.6 44.5 41.7 20.6 24.1 33.1 17.9 39.4 41.9 33.8 35.2 0.5 0.3 33.9 42.8 35.3 30.2 30.2
1982 34.2 52.0 44.5 40.8 21.9 24.7 34.0 18.8 36.6 43.0 34.1 35.1 0.5 0.3 37.3 42.9 35.3 30.8 31.4
1983 35.1 52.4 44.1 40.6 19.9 25.0 32.5 19.4 36.6 43.9 34.2 35.7 0.4 0.4 42.7 42.5 35.2 30.9 32.3
1984 34.8 43.5 43.7 42.6 17.3 26.1 30.7 19.6 35.8 42.5 34.4 36.1 0.4 0.4 46.2 41.0 35.3 30.5 32.3
1985 32.0 43.5 43.3 42.7 17.7 26.0 30.7 19.2 36.2 44.6 35.1 35.7 0.4 0.4 45.7 41.7 35.6 30.2 32.1
1986 31.3 51.8 43.2 42.9 17.8 26.6 31.6 19.1 36.4 44.0 35.5 30.4 0.3 0.4 47.7 42.3 36.3 30.3 32.4
1987 31.1 43.9 43.1 43.8 16.7 27.4 33.2 19.1 37.2 43.9 35.5 33.1 0.3 0.4 44.6 42.2 35.9 30.4 31.9
1988 30.3 70.5 43.2 43.3 16.1 27.7 33.4 19.5 37.4 44.1 35.7 34.7 0.2 0.4 43.6 42.3 35.8 30.3 32.3
1989 31.1 65.9 43.1 39.3 16.3 28.6 32.7 19.0 37.8 44.7 35.8 35.9 0.3 0.4 42.1 42.7 36.2 30.1 31.7
1990 29.8 64.0 43.2 48.9 16.3 28.8 32.1 19.0 38.3 61.7 35.7 36.5 0.3 0.4 38.3 42.6 37.8 31.1 32.0
1991 28.7 64.2 43.7 49.1 16.0 28.5 31.9 19.7 38.9 61.9 35.8 36.9 0.2 0.4 37.9 42.4 38.0 31.8 32.4
1992 28.6 66.5 43.8 49.0 15.6 28.3 32.8 19.7 38.6 62.5 36.2 37.1 0.2 0.6 37.9 42.5 38.0 32.2 32.8
1993 29.5 59.8 43.7 49.6 16.9 28.6 30.6 20.7 38.4 62.2 36.5 36.8 10.4 4.0 37.3 42.7 37.8 33.5 33.9
1994 29.6 68.1 43.3 50.1 17.2 29.3 31.1 21.0 39.1 64.8 36.5 38.0 14.6 6.7 41.0 42.6 38.4 34.0 35.1
1995 29.8 70.0 43.2 50.4 16.9 29.4 30.6 20.9 40.0 63.5 35.9 37.5 15.9 11.3 41.8 42.6 39.0 34.1 35.4
1996 30.0 69.5 43.2 50.7 17.1 29.7 30.5 19.8 40.8 63.9 35.7 37.3 16.3 13.3 41.1 42.9 39.0 33.6 35.0
1997 29.9 65.5 43.5 53.3 16.0 28.5 27.8 19.7 41.6 64.7 35.1 36.8 17.0 15.3 42.3 43.2 39.0 33.1 35.0
1998 29.9 61.9 43.6 53.3 16.9 24.0 30.6 19.5 42.7 60.1 35.6 38.5 17.7 17.2 44.3 43.2 39.0 32.0 34.5
1999 29.9 61.9 43.6 53.3 16.9 24.0 30.6 19.5 42.7 60.1 35.6 38.5 17.7 17.2 44.3 43.2 39.0 32.0 34.6
2000 29.9 61.9 43.6 53.3 16.9 24.0 30.6 19.5 42.7 60.1 35.6 38.5 17.7 17.2 44.3 43.2 39.0 31.9 34.7
2001 29.9 61.9 43.6 53.3 16.9 24.0 30.6 19.5 42.7 60.1 35.6 38.5 17.7 17.2 44.3 43.2 39.0 31.9 34.782
Table BII.3. SSC PAID BY THE SELF-EMPLOYED (% TOTAL NWLC) –SSER-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 6.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 6.4 9.4 7.3 0.6 0.0 7.7 3.3 4.4 9.8 3.6 3.6
1971 5.9 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 5.8 9.6 7.2 0.5 0.0 4.9 3.6 4.1 10.0 3.5 3.4
1972 6.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 7.2 1.6 0.0 5.2 10.2 7.0 0.6 0.0 4.3 3.8 3.9 10.2 3.6 3.5
1973 6.6 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 6.6 1.2 0.0 5.2 9.6 7.2 0.5 0.0 3.8 4.3 3.7 9.6 3.5 3.5
1974 6.4 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.9 0.0 4.8 10.2 6.8 0.4 0.0 4.3 3.9 4.0 9.9 3.5 3.5
1975 7.6 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.6 0.0 6.2 11.4 6.9 1.2 0.0 4.9 2.9 4.0 10.7 3.7 3.5
1976 7.3 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.5 4.8 6.2 11.3 7.0 1.5 0.0 3.8 2.7 3.8 10.7 4.4 4.0
1977 7.4 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.8 4.7 6.2 11.8 7.3 1.8 0.0 3.8 2.7 3.7 11.8 4.5 4.1
1978 8.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.7 5.1 6.3 12.2 7.6 1.5 0.0 3.8 2.7 3.5 13.0 4.7 4.2
1979 8.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.3 4.9 5.9 12.0 7.6 1.6 0.0 4.0 1.8 3.6 13.8 4.7 4.1
1980 7.7 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 7.0 1.3 7.1 5.6 11.9 7.5 1.7 3.6 3.4 1.8 3.6 13.9 5.1 4.3
1981 8.9 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 7.3 1.1 6.8 5.6 13.2 7.2 1.6 5.2 3.2 1.8 3.3 13.5 5.2 4.4
1982 8.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 7.4 0.6 8.7 12.6 14.7 7.3 2.7 4.6 3.4 2.2 3.9 13.8 5.7 4.8
1983 8.4 0.0 2.7 0.0 6.0 7.6 0.3 8.6 14.5 16.6 7.4 2.8 4.3 3.3 2.5 3.2 13.8 6.6 5.6
1984 8.1 0.0 3.8 0.0 7.1 7.6 0.4 9.0 14.0 17.8 7.4 3.1 4.2 3.4 2.7 3.6 13.6 7.2 6.1
1985 8.8 0.0 4.8 0.0 7.1 7.7 0.5 9.0 13.7 15.3 7.3 2.0 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.9 13.3 7.4 6.3
1986 8.4 0.0 5.4 0.1 7.5 7.7 0.5 9.6 13.7 14.4 7.3 2.3 4.4 3.2 0.0 4.1 12.2 7.6 6.1
1987 8.0 0.0 5.7 0.1 7.3 7.8 0.7 10.1 14.0 16.5 7.4 3.4 4.8 3.1 2.8 4.5 12.5 8.0 6.8
1988 8.1 0.0 5.8 0.1 7.2 7.9 2.4 9.6 13.7 17.4 7.4 3.9 4.4 3.1 3.1 5.2 12.2 8.0 6.8
1989 7.6 0.0 6.0 0.1 6.9 8.0 4.0 8.8 13.4 17.0 7.3 3.7 4.6 3.9 3.2 5.0 11.4 7.8 6.7
1990 6.4 0.0 6.0 0.1 6.8 7.9 4.1 9.0 13.0 18.2 7.1 3.5 4.8 3.6 3.4 5.6 10.3 7.8 6.8
1991 7.0 0.0 4.9 0.1 6.8 8.0 4.2 9.8 12.8 18.3 6.9 3.5 4.8 2.2 3.3 6.2 10.3 7.6 6.6
1992 8.1 0.0 5.3 0.1 6.7 7.4 4.7 10.5 12.8 18.5 6.8 3.5 5.0 2.1 3.5 5.7 10.2 7.7 6.7
1993 8.2 0.0 5.5 0.1 7.0 7.2 4.4 12.6 13.4 19.3 7.0 3.7 4.6 2.3 3.8 4.6 10.2 8.2 7.1
1994 8.5 0.0 5.7 0.1 7.8 6.9 5.1 12.2 14.1 20.7 7.0 4.8 4.3 2.2 3.5 5.1 10.2 8.3 7.2
1995 8.8 0.0 6.2 0.1 8.4 7.0 4.9 12.9 13.9 20.5 7.1 5.4 4.0 2.0 3.5 5.4 9.9 8.6 7.4
1996 8.9 0.0 6.6 0.1 8.7 7.4 5.0 10.7 13.4 19.6 7.4 6.6 4.2 1.5 3.8 5.1 10.0 8.5 7.4
1997 8.9 0.0 6.4 0.1 9.2 7.3 6.0 9.9 13.1 20.2 8.0 6.9 4.2 1.5 3.7 5.0 10.0 8.4 7.2
1998 8.9 0.0 6.6 0.1 9.7 6.1 5.2 7.8 13.4 22.0 8.1 7.2 4.4 1.3 3.4 5.0 10.0 8.0 6.8
1999 8.9 0.0 6.6 0.1 9.7 6.1 5.2 7.8 13.4 22.0 8.1 7.2 4.4 1.3 3.4 5.0 10.0 8.0 6.8
2000 8.9 0.0 6.6 0.1 9.7 6.1 5.2 7.8 13.4 22.0 8.1 7.2 4.4 1.3 3.4 5.0 10.0 8.1 6.7
2001 8.9 0.0 6.6 0.1 9.7 6.1 5.2 7.8 13.4 22.0 8.1 7.2 4.4 1.3 3.4 5.0 10.0 8.1 6.783
Table BII.4. OTHER SSC (% TOTAL NWLC) –SOTR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
1971 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1972 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1973 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1974 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1975 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1976 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1977 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1978 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1979 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.1
1980 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1981 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1982 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1983 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1984 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1985 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
1986 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
1987 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
1988 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
1989 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
1990 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
1991 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5
1992 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5
1993 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5
1994 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
1996 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3
1997 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3
1998 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
1999 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
2001 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.484
Table BII.5. TAXES ON PAYROLL AND WORKFORCE (% TOTAL NWLC) –TWFR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.3 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 23.3 3.9 33.4 6.9 24.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 6.3
1971 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.4 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 23.2 4.0 16.8 12.7 16.5 0.0 0.0 2.6 5.2
1972 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 23.3 5.2 14.7 13.2 11.6 0.0 0.0 2.7 4.4
1973 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.5 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 23.3 5.2 12.8 22.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.8 3.2
1974 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.7 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 23.1 5.5 13.3 18.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 3.0
1975 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.6 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 22.5 6.8 13.4 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.2
1976 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.6 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 22.3 7.3 13.9 17.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.2
1977 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.3 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 22.0 7.5 12.3 17.3 8.1 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.2
1978 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.2 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 19.2 7.2 12.2 11.2 13.6 0.0 0.0 2.9 4.5
1979 0.0 0.0 1.8 5.8 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 19.0 7.6 4.3 8.1 20.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 5.2
1980 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.3 0.0 4.9 1.5 1.7 2.2 0.0 18.6 8.1 0.9 8.3 19.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 5.3
1981 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.4 5.0 0.7 1.9 2.2 0.0 17.2 7.2 0.4 8.1 18.6 0.0 0.0 2.3 5.2
1982 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 1.3 5.0 4.9 1.8 2.1 0.0 16.9 7.2 0.0 8.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 5.0
1983 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 5.0 11.5 1.8 2.0 0.0 16.5 7.7 0.0 12.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.4
1984 0.0 11.2 0.0 4.1 0.0 5.1 14.8 1.8 2.0 0.0 15.5 8.7 1.4 14.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.6
1985 0.0 18.1 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.5 13.7 1.6 2.0 0.0 15.2 8.7 2.8 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.6
1986 0.0 14.9 0.0 4.8 0.0 4.5 10.7 1.6 2.0 0.0 15.3 0.0 0.0 13.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.5
1987 0.0 15.1 0.0 3.6 0.0 4.3 8.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 15.3 0.0 0.0 13.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.4
1988 0.0 9.7 0.0 3.4 0.0 4.1 9.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.0
1989 0.0 17.4 0.0 4.6 0.0 4.1 8.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 15.3 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.2
1990 0.0 17.3 0.0 2.2 0.0 4.1 8.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.0
1991 0.0 17.8 0.0 1.6 0.0 4.2 8.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.0
1992 0.0 16.7 0.0 2.1 0.0 4.6 8.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.0
1993 0.0 25.1 0.0 1.9 0.0 5.0 11.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 14.7 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.1
1994 0.0 14.4 0.0 2.3 0.0 5.2 10.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 15.7 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.0
1995 0.0 12.7 0.0 2.4 0.0 5.4 7.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 15.6 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.1
1996 0.0 12.1 0.0 2.5 0.0 5.6 8.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.0
1997 0.0 15.7 0.0 2.1 0.0 5.5 7.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.1
1998 0.0 20.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 6.2 8.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.4
1999 0.0 20.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 6.2 8.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.4
2000 0.0 20.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 6.2 8.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.4
2001 0.0 20.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 6.2 8.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.485
Table BII.6. SSC ON EMPLOYED LABOUR (% TOTAL SSC) –SELR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 93.8 100.0 98.1 82.5 100.0 92.5 100.0 100.0 93.6 90.6 92.7 99.4 100.0 92.3 96.7 95.6 90.2 96.4 96.2
1971 94.1 100.0 98.3 83.3 100.0 92.7 100.0 100.0 94.2 90.4 92.8 99.5 100.0 95.1 96.4 95.9 90.0 96.5 96.3
1972 93.5 100.0 98.1 84.3 100.0 92.8 98.4 100.0 94.8 89.8 93.0 99.4 100.0 95.7 96.2 96.1 89.8 96.4 96.3
1973 93.4 100.0 97.9 84.8 100.0 93.4 98.8 100.0 94.8 90.4 92.8 99.5 100.0 96.2 95.7 96.3 90.4 96.5 96.3
1974 93.6 100.0 97.7 84.9 100.0 93.6 99.1 100.0 95.2 89.8 93.2 99.6 100.0 95.7 96.1 96.0 90.1 96.5 96.3
1975 92.4 100.0 97.6 83.9 100.0 93.8 99.4 100.0 93.8 88.6 93.1 98.8 100.0 95.1 97.1 96.0 89.3 96.3 96.2
1976 92.7 100.0 97.9 84.1 100.0 93.7 99.5 95.2 93.8 88.7 93.0 98.5 100.0 96.2 97.3 96.2 89.3 95.6 95.8
1977 92.6 100.0 97.9 84.8 100.0 93.5 99.2 95.3 93.8 88.2 92.7 98.2 100.0 96.2 97.3 96.3 88.2 95.5 95.7
1978 91.8 100.0 98.0 86.5 100.0 93.3 99.3 94.9 93.7 87.8 92.4 98.5 100.0 96.2 97.3 96.5 87.0 95.3 95.6
1979 91.8 100.0 98.1 87.2 100.0 92.9 99.7 79.7 94.1 88.0 92.4 98.4 100.0 96.0 98.2 96.4 86.2 92.9 93.8
1980 92.3 100.0 98.1 88.6 100.0 93.0 98.7 92.9 94.4 88.1 92.5 98.3 96.4 96.6 98.2 96.4 86.1 94.9 95.5
1981 91.1 100.0 98.3 88.7 100.0 92.7 98.9 93.2 94.4 86.8 92.8 98.4 94.8 96.8 98.2 96.7 86.5 94.8 95.4
1982 91.4 100.0 98.3 85.2 100.0 92.6 99.4 91.3 87.4 85.3 92.7 97.3 95.4 96.6 97.8 96.1 86.2 94.3 94.9
1983 91.6 100.0 97.3 84.8 94.0 92.4 99.7 91.4 85.5 83.4 92.6 97.2 95.7 96.7 97.5 96.8 86.2 93.4 94.2
1984 91.9 100.0 96.2 87.5 92.9 92.4 99.6 91.0 86.0 82.2 92.6 96.9 95.8 96.6 97.3 96.4 86.4 92.8 93.7
1985 91.2 100.0 95.2 87.0 92.9 92.3 99.5 91.0 86.3 84.7 92.7 96.8 96.0 96.5 96.9 96.1 86.7 92.6 93.5
1986 91.6 100.0 94.6 87.4 88.2 92.3 99.5 90.4 86.3 85.6 92.7 96.2 95.6 96.8 100.0 95.9 87.8 92.0 93.5
1987 92.0 100.0 94.3 89.2 88.1 92.2 99.3 89.9 86.0 83.5 92.6 96.2 95.2 96.9 97.2 95.5 87.5 91.7 92.8
1988 91.9 100.0 94.2 89.9 88.6 92.1 97.6 90.4 86.3 82.6 92.6 96.1 95.6 96.9 96.9 94.8 87.8 91.7 92.8
1989 92.4 100.0 94.0 91.3 88.0 92.0 96.0 91.2 86.6 83.0 92.7 96.3 95.4 96.1 96.8 95.0 88.6 91.7 92.9
1990 93.6 100.0 94.0 99.9 88.1 92.1 95.9 91.0 87.0 81.8 92.9 96.5 95.2 96.4 96.6 94.4 89.7 91.7 92.8
1991 93.0 100.0 95.1 99.9 87.4 92.0 95.8 90.2 87.2 81.7 93.1 96.5 95.2 97.4 96.7 93.8 89.7 91.8 93.0
1992 91.9 100.0 94.7 99.9 87.0 92.6 95.3 89.5 87.2 81.5 93.2 96.5 95.0 97.9 96.5 94.3 89.8 91.6 92.8
1993 91.8 100.0 94.5 99.9 86.0 92.8 95.6 87.4 86.6 80.7 93.0 96.3 95.4 97.7 96.2 95.4 89.8 91.2 92.4
1994 91.5 100.0 94.3 99.9 85.8 93.1 94.9 87.8 85.9 79.3 93.0 95.2 95.7 97.8 96.5 94.9 89.8 91.2 92.4
1995 91.2 100.0 93.8 99.9 86.0 93.0 95.1 87.1 86.1 79.5 92.9 94.6 96.0 98.0 96.5 94.6 90.1 91.0 92.2
1996 91.1 100.0 93.4 99.9 86.6 92.6 95.0 89.3 86.6 80.4 92.6 93.4 95.8 98.5 96.2 94.9 90.0 91.1 92.3
1997 91.1 100.0 93.6 99.9 86.2 92.7 94.0 90.1 86.9 79.8 92.0 93.1 95.8 98.5 96.3 95.0 90.0 91.2 92.5
1998 91.1 100.0 93.4 99.9 85.1 93.9 94.8 92.2 86.6 78.0 91.9 92.8 95.6 98.7 96.6 95.0 90.0 91.5 92.9
1999 91.1 100.0 93.4 99.9 85.1 93.9 94.8 92.2 86.6 78.0 91.9 92.8 95.6 98.7 96.6 95.0 90.0 91.5 92.9
2000 91.1 100.0 93.4 99.9 85.1 93.9 94.8 92.2 86.6 78.0 91.9 92.8 95.6 98.7 96.6 95.0 90.0 91.5 92.9
2001 91.1 100.0 93.4 99.9 85.1 93.9 94.8 92.2 86.6 78.0 91.9 92.8 95.6 98.7 96.6 95.0 90.0 91.4 92.986
Table BII.7. SSC ON EMPLOYED LABOUR (% GDP) –ELRV-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 10.5 2.2 12.1 6.5 7.4 12.6 3.3 11.3 8.0 11.3 10.4 4.5 5.6 8.6 6.1 4.3 3.9 11.3 10.1
1971 11.0 2.2 12.7 6.5 8.2 12.8 3.4 11.8 8.7 11.9 10.7 4.8 6.1 9.3 5.9 4.4 4.1 11.8 10.4
1972 11.2 2.2 13.2 6.6 8.5 13.1 3.5 11.9 8.7 12.0 10.7 5.1 6.0 9.9 6.3 4.6 4.2 12.0 10.8
1973 11.5 1.5 14.0 6.0 8.6 13.1 3.6 11.9 8.4 13.1 10.9 5.3 6.4 9.4 6.3 5.3 4.2 12.5 11.2
1974 11.8 1.3 14.6 6.5 8.7 13.6 4.8 11.8 8.9 13.8 11.3 5.4 6.6 9.5 7.1 5.5 4.6 12.8 11.5
1975 12.7 1.4 15.6 6.6 9.9 15.1 5.6 12.8 11.4 13.9 12.2 7.4 10.6 10.0 7.9 5.3 5.7 13.9 12.5
1976 12.7 1.3 16.2 6.9 10.5 15.5 5.9 12.1 12.0 13.7 12.3 7.3 11.4 12.6 8.2 5.4 5.7 14.2 12.9
1977 12.9 1.4 16.2 7.5 11.3 16.0 5.8 11.9 12.8 13.5 12.6 7.2 11.9 14.1 7.9 5.4 6.0 14.4 13.1
1978 12.7 1.4 16.0 7.8 12.0 16.1 5.6 11.8 12.3 13.7 14.0 6.9 10.8 14.9 7.3 5.6 5.9 14.4 13.1
1979 12.8 1.4 16.0 7.9 12.5 16.7 5.8 10.3 12.0 14.2 13.9 6.7 10.6 14.8 7.2 5.8 6.2 14.4 13.0
1980 12.9 1.6 16.3 8.4 12.7 17.6 6.3 12.2 12.5 14.5 14.3 6.9 10.5 15.3 7.5 5.8 6.3 15.0 13.5
1981 13.1 1.8 16.9 8.6 12.9 17.6 6.3 12.2 12.7 14.7 14.5 7.3 10.5 15.8 7.9 6.1 6.7 15.2 13.6
1982 13.4 2.1 17.3 9.2 12.8 18.1 7.2 12.7 11.4 15.2 14.2 7.7 10.1 15.2 8.0 6.2 6.9 15.5 13.9
1983 13.9 2.5 16.6 9.6 12.3 18.5 7.4 13.0 10.7 16.5 14.0 7.8 9.9 14.9 8.3 6.3 7.0 15.5 14.0
1984 14.6 2.5 16.5 10.1 11.5 18.8 7.4 12.5 10.7 15.5 14.2 7.8 10.1 14.4 8.3 6.4 7.0 15.3 13.8
1985 15.0 2.5 16.5 10.3 11.6 19.0 7.3 12.5 10.5 15.7 14.5 7.4 10.9 14.1 8.1 6.4 7.1 15.4 13.8
1986 15.3 2.2 16.3 10.0 10.9 18.7 7.2 12.7 10.3 15.2 14.6 8.3 10.9 14.3 8.4 6.6 7.3 15.3 13.9
1987 15.6 2.6 16.3 10.3 10.8 18.8 7.1 12.6 10.6 15.5 14.6 8.5 10.9 13.9 7.9 6.6 7.4 15.3 13.8
1988 15.1 2.2 16.2 9.9 10.7 18.6 7.1 12.6 10.7 15.4 14.6 8.1 10.9 14.2 7.8 6.7 7.4 15.1 13.6
1989 14.8 2.2 15.9 10.4 10.9 18.7 6.7 12.9 10.8 14.2 14.6 8.1 11.0 15.1 7.6 6.7 7.3 15.0 13.5
1990 15.1 2.3 15.6 11.7 11.2 18.8 6.8 13.2 11.0 12.6 14.4 8.5 12.3 15.6 7.2 6.7 8.2 14.9 13.5
1991 15.6 2.3 16.4 11.3 11.4 18.9 7.1 13.3 11.3 13.4 14.5 8.9 13.0 15.7 7.4 6.8 8.1 15.3 13.9
1992 15.5 2.4 16.7 11.2 12.1 19.2 7.2 13.5 11.4 13.7 15.1 9.3 13.9 15.1 7.4 6.9 8.3 15.6 14.2
1993 16.0 2.5 17.2 12.1 12.2 19.3 7.3 13.6 11.3 13.6 15.7 9.9 14.4 14.7 7.3 7.0 8.4 16.1 14.5
1994 15.7 2.8 17.5 12.3 11.9 19.1 7.0 13.2 10.7 13.6 16.1 9.5 15.1 14.7 7.3 6.9 8.5 16.1 14.5
1995 15.3 2.6 17.6 12.6 11.2 19.1 6.5 12.9 10.7 13.7 16.2 9.5 14.3 15.0 7.3 6.9 9.3 16.0 14.5
1996 15.3 2.6 18.1 12.9 11.4 19.2 6.0 13.4 10.7 13.3 16.1 9.8 13.7 16.0 7.2 6.8 9.2 16.1 14.6
1997 15.3 2.6 18.3 13.1 11.4 18.7 5.6 13.9 10.3 13.3 15.9 9.8 12.8 15.9 7.2 6.7 9.4 16.1 14.3
1998 15.1 2.6 17.9 13.2 11.2 17.2 5.5 11.9 10.0 12.8 15.8 10.0 12.5 15.9 7.4 6.7 9.8 15.2 13.6
1999 15.0 3.3 17.7 13.7 11.2 17.6 5.9 11.7 10.0 13.3 15.7 11.4 12.5 14.9 7.3 6.8 10.0 15.2 13.6
2000 14.5 3.5 17.3 13.8 11.1 17.3 5.4 11.6 10.0 13.2 15.5 11.7 12.4 16.4 7.2 6.7 10.2 14.9 13.3
2001 14.1 3.5 16.8 13.8 11.1 17.2 5.3 11.5 9.8 11.5 15.3 11.8 12.4 16.5 7.2 6.7 10.2 14.5 13.087
Table BII.8. SSC PAID BY THE EMPLOYERS (% GDP) –ERRV-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 7.2 0.6 6.5 3.0 6.0 9.7 1.8 9.1 4.4 5.9 4.0 2.7 3.5 6.8 2.4 2.4 2.2 7.5 6.5
1971 7.6 0.5 6.7 3.0 6.5 9.8 1.8 9.5 4.8 6.2 4.1 2.9 4.8 7.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 7.8 6.7
1972 7.9 0.6 7.0 3.1 6.8 9.8 1.8 9.6 4.8 6.1 4.1 3.1 4.8 7.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 7.9 6.9
1973 8.0 0.7 7.5 2.9 6.9 9.7 2.0 9.6 4.7 6.8 4.2 3.2 5.3 6.3 3.5 3.0 2.4 8.1 7.1
1974 8.2 0.8 7.8 3.1 7.0 10.1 2.8 9.5 4.9 7.2 4.4 3.2 5.5 6.5 4.2 3.1 2.7 8.3 7.4
1975 8.8 0.7 8.4 3.2 8.0 11.1 3.4 10.3 6.5 7.2 5.0 4.2 8.8 8.0 4.8 2.9 3.3 9.1 8.2
1976 8.8 0.6 8.7 3.4 8.6 11.2 3.6 10.0 6.8 7.1 5.0 4.1 9.4 10.3 5.1 3.0 3.3 9.2 8.5
1977 8.9 0.6 8.7 3.8 9.1 11.5 3.6 9.8 7.2 7.0 5.2 4.1 10.0 11.6 4.5 3.1 3.5 9.3 8.5
1978 8.8 0.6 8.6 3.9 9.6 11.5 3.6 9.7 6.9 7.1 6.1 4.0 9.0 13.2 3.9 3.2 3.5 9.3 8.5
1979 8.8 0.5 8.6 3.8 10.0 11.6 3.8 8.1 6.8 7.4 6.1 3.8 9.7 13.6 3.5 3.3 3.7 9.2 8.3
1980 8.9 0.7 8.9 3.9 9.9 12.0 4.1 9.6 7.1 7.7 6.3 3.9 10.4 14.0 3.6 3.3 3.7 9.7 8.6
1981 8.8 0.9 9.2 4.0 10.2 12.1 4.2 9.6 7.1 7.6 6.5 4.2 10.4 14.4 3.7 3.4 4.0 9.8 8.7
1982 8.4 1.0 9.5 4.3 9.8 12.3 4.4 9.8 6.3 7.5 6.4 4.4 10.1 13.9 3.6 3.5 4.1 9.9 8.7
1983 8.6 1.2 9.1 4.4 9.7 12.5 4.1 10.0 5.9 7.8 6.3 4.3 9.8 12.9 4.1 3.5 4.1 9.9 8.8
1984 9.1 1.1 9.0 4.7 9.4 12.5 4.0 9.6 6.0 7.5 6.6 4.2 9.9 12.2 4.3 3.7 4.1 9.7 8.7
1985 9.7 1.0 9.0 4.7 9.4 12.7 4.1 9.6 5.9 7.4 6.6 4.0 10.6 12.1 4.3 3.6 4.2 9.9 8.8
1986 10.1 0.7 8.8 4.5 8.7 12.4 4.1 9.8 5.7 7.4 6.6 5.7 10.9 12.2 4.4 3.7 4.3 9.8 8.8
1987 10.3 1.1 8.9 4.8 8.8 12.3 4.1 9.7 6.0 7.4 6.6 5.5 10.8 11.9 4.3 3.7 4.4 9.7 8.8
1988 10.1 0.4 8.8 4.7 8.8 12.2 4.0 9.6 6.1 7.2 6.6 5.2 10.9 12.8 4.3 3.7 4.4 9.6 8.6
1989 9.8 0.4 8.6 5.4 8.9 12.0 3.8 10.0 6.1 6.6 6.5 5.1 10.9 13.7 4.3 3.7 4.3 9.6 8.7
1990 10.3 0.4 8.4 5.7 9.1 12.1 3.9 10.3 6.1 3.1 6.5 5.3 12.3 14.2 4.4 3.7 4.7 9.5 8.6
1991 10.8 0.4 8.8 5.5 9.3 12.2 4.1 10.3 6.2 3.2 6.5 5.5 13.0 13.9 4.5 3.8 4.7 9.6 8.8
1992 10.7 0.4 9.0 5.5 9.9 12.3 4.1 10.4 6.4 3.2 6.8 5.7 13.8 13.6 4.5 3.8 4.8 9.7 8.9
1993 10.8 0.4 9.3 5.9 9.8 12.3 4.1 10.3 6.3 3.1 7.1 6.1 12.8 13.4 4.5 3.8 4.9 9.8 8.9
1994 10.7 0.5 9.5 5.8 9.5 12.0 4.0 9.9 5.8 2.5 7.1 5.7 12.8 13.0 4.2 3.8 4.9 9.6 8.7
1995 10.3 0.4 9.5 5.9 9.0 11.9 3.9 9.7 5.7 2.8 7.2 5.8 11.9 12.2 4.2 3.8 5.3 9.5 8.6
1996 10.3 0.5 9.7 6.0 9.2 11.9 3.5 10.4 5.6 2.7 7.2 5.9 11.4 12.6 4.1 3.7 5.2 9.7 8.8
1997 10.3 0.5 9.8 5.8 9.3 11.8 3.5 10.8 5.3 2.5 7.2 5.9 10.6 11.8 4.1 3.7 5.3 9.8 8.7
1998 10.2 0.4 9.6 5.9 9.0 11.7 3.2 9.3 5.1 2.9 7.0 5.9 10.2 10.8 4.0 3.7 5.6 9.3 8.3
1999 10.1 0.6 9.4 6.1 9.0 11.9 3.4 9.2 5.0 3.1 7.0 6.7 10.2 10.2 4.0 3.7 5.7 9.3 8.2
2000 9.7 0.6 9.2 6.1 8.9 11.7 3.2 9.1 5.0 3.0 6.9 6.8 10.1 11.2 3.9 3.7 5.8 9.2 8.0
2001 9.5 0.6 9.0 6.1 8.9 11.7 3.1 9.0 5.0 2.6 6.8 6.9 10.1 11.2 3.9 3.7 5.8 9.0 7.988
Table BII.9. PERSONAL INCOME TAX REVENUES (% DIRECT TAX REVENUES) –TRIIR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 71.1 84.9 71.6 47.1 43.8 54.9 46.3 46.4 47.7 72.8 71.8 74.7 84.1 89.5 59.8 57.2 38.8 60.9 62.3
1971 71.8 86.6 75.3 46.9 44.9 55.6 54.7 47.1 54.8 73.3 73.0 71.7 86.4 90.2 61.6 57.2 42.4 62.8 64.1
1972 72.9 86.6 76.3 37.7 44.8 55.7 54.0 47.9 55.7 75.0 75.1 71.2 86.6 89.9 60.3 56.1 44.0 63.6 64.3
1973 71.5 85.2 76.8 42.7 45.6 53.3 57.6 50.5 51.7 74.0 77.9 69.1 86.7 88.9 60.6 56.4 43.2 63.8 64.6
1974 74.0 86.4 78.6 47.1 46.5 54.0 55.3 62.5 48.5 74.3 77.7 71.7 87.0 91.0 61.3 58.2 39.0 66.8 67.2
1975 76.9 86.2 78.4 40.6 52.3 58.9 63.4 61.3 56.7 72.8 74.4 78.5 88.4 89.4 67.9 57.8 44.6 67.9 68.9
1976 77.7 85.3 77.8 41.4 56.4 57.2 66.0 64.0 52.5 73.8 76.7 84.1 86.2 90.3 69.6 58.0 44.7 68.5 69.6
1977 79.2 85.4 76.7 44.0 59.2 59.4 69.3 66.2 52.3 72.5 77.4 85.1 88.0 91.8 66.3 57.7 43.0 69.5 70.0
1978 80.3 84.8 75.9 45.5 64.0 61.5 71.9 62.6 49.5 72.3 78.7 87.2 86.9 91.6 64.7 59.6 41.6 69.6 69.8
1979 79.8 84.9 75.4 58.7 65.0 60.1 71.7 65.2 52.5 73.4 78.0 88.8 87.1 91.4 62.0 62.6 44.7 69.5 69.4
1980 81.4 85.6 77.2 64.1 67.9 59.9 76.5 66.7 54.8 72.1 78.3 87.8 87.1 92.4 59.0 64.6 44.8 70.3 69.6
1981 82.7 87.2 77.8 65.4 68.4 60.0 76.6 68.5 56.2 70.3 79.3 88.9 86.9 91.4 56.8 67.3 46.2 70.8 69.5
1982 82.3 88.4 77.5 64.7 70.6 59.1 77.7 68.4 55.9 70.3 80.5 89.0 86.6 90.4 55.5 68.9 46.9 70.7 69.1
1983 82.1 86.4 76.8 69.2 70.9 62.2 79.4 69.4 53.3 69.7 79.8 88.0 86.5 88.5 54.9 69.7 46.8 71.5 69.6
1984 81.4 84.2 76.4 73.5 72.1 61.0 81.3 67.4 55.8 69.7 79.5 88.0 86.9 87.9 53.3 66.9 44.5 70.7 68.9
1985 82.8 84.8 75.8 71.9 69.2 59.0 81.3 69.4 51.9 65.0 79.5 87.7 86.9 86.9 51.4 67.5 44.6 70.0 67.9
1986 81.4 81.6 76.0 66.3 65.8 56.7 81.7 67.5 53.2 65.0 80.2 85.3 87.5 83.5 54.2 67.2 44.3 68.8 67.4
1987 80.8 84.0 78.1 63.8 64.8 56.5 82.0 66.6 50.7 63.3 80.4 83.5 86.4 79.0 52.6 66.4 41.3 69.0 67.2
1988 79.4 85.3 77.4 66.7 64.6 54.0 81.7 69.3 48.7 65.5 79.2 86.0 85.4 82.4 52.2 65.0 39.3 68.8 67.0
1989 77.2 85.9 77.5 62.2 62.6 52.6 79.5 68.4 46.8 65.9 75.0 69.9 84.4 84.7 50.7 65.4 41.7 67.6 65.9
1990 79.7 87.7 77.1 58.2 60.3 53.1 76.8 68.1 48.8 68.8 76.9 59.7 84.7 85.3 58.8 66.3 46.7 67.5 67.2
1991 79.8 88.3 79.2 60.0 64.9 58.5 75.5 68.6 48.9 70.7 77.4 60.4 84.8 81.7 61.8 65.3 47.8 70.4 69.8
1992 81.1 88.1 80.7 53.3 67.8 55.2 74.1 65.7 50.9 70.9 76.1 66.2 86.9 84.6 64.4 64.8 47.8 70.1 69.9
1993 79.1 86.1 81.1 52.3 69.2 57.5 72.2 64.9 46.5 70.3 78.0 67.4 92.0 82.7 59.9 64.1 49.6 70.9 69.8
1994 78.7 87.4 82.4 53.8 68.9 56.7 70.4 63.9 46.7 64.1 81.0 66.4 92.1 81.0 59.3 63.3 46.4 70.8 69.6
1995 77.6 87.9 83.2 55.6 68.3 55.1 70.3 64.5 46.3 62.0 80.1 63.3 85.3 79.7 57.4 63.7 44.3 70.6 69.3
1996 76.6 87.0 78.4 56.2 66.5 56.6 68.5 63.2 45.6 55.6 77.2 61.2 82.1 79.0 54.7 64.7 42.1 68.0 66.8
1997 75.0 86.0 77.9 56.5 61.5 55.6 67.9 63.5 43.7 50.8 78.6 57.1 76.2 77.6 51.9 65.9 44.3 66.7 64.9
1998 75.0 84.7 78.8 53.3 61.0 61.9 66.1 57.7 40.7 49.5 77.3 57.3 74.0 78.6 56.1 65.9 38.7 67.0 65.7
1999 75.0 84.7 78.8 53.3 61.0 61.9 66.1 57.7 40.7 49.5 77.3 57.3 74.0 78.6 56.1 65.9 38.7 67.0 65.6
2000 75.0 84.7 78.8 53.3 61.0 61.9 66.1 57.7 40.7 49.5 77.3 57.3 74.0 78.6 56.1 65.9 38.7 66.9 65.4
2001 75.0 84.7 78.8 53.3 61.0 61.9 66.1 57.7 40.7 49.5 77.3 57.3 74.0 78.6 56.1 65.9 38.7 66.8 65.489
Table BII.10. CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUES (% DIRECT TAX REVENUES) –TRCIR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 20.0 4.6 15.2 7.9 31.2 28.9 22.4 28.0 39.3 18.2 15.3 0.0 11.1 7.9 16.5 20.7 47.5 22.4 20.2
1971 20.4 3.9 12.4 8.8 31.2 27.9 14.6 28.1 32.2 18.9 14.9 0.0 9.1 7.2 14.0 17.6 42.4 21.0 18.7
1972 19.7 3.8 12.5 16.7 29.5 27.7 13.4 28.3 29.8 17.8 13.9 0.0 9.1 7.7 12.4 18.7 40.4 20.8 18.5
1973 21.1 5.1 13.4 13.9 29.1 28.1 13.6 29.5 34.6 18.3 11.7 0.0 8.8 8.6 14.7 19.4 43.1 21.3 19.4
1974 19.4 4.9 12.2 18.0 28.5 36.0 17.0 21.8 40.8 18.1 13.1 0.0 8.6 6.9 16.8 18.8 47.5 21.4 19.8
1975 17.5 4.8 11.6 15.4 24.9 24.8 12.2 25.5 32.9 20.8 15.0 0.0 7.7 8.4 10.5 19.0 38.5 19.1 17.1
1976 16.1 6.1 11.9 14.6 23.4 26.4 11.3 24.2 36.6 19.0 12.3 0.0 8.1 7.5 8.8 18.1 38.6 19.0 16.8
1977 14.7 5.1 13.5 13.7 21.3 25.6 10.3 22.8 37.4 18.6 12.2 0.0 7.6 6.3 11.3 19.9 39.8 18.7 16.9
1978 13.7 5.2 14.7 12.8 17.9 22.7 12.6 27.1 41.0 17.1 11.1 0.0 8.4 6.6 12.9 19.7 42.3 18.6 17.0
1979 14.0 5.2 15.7 16.2 17.4 23.1 13.7 23.7 36.3 16.1 11.9 0.0 8.3 6.6 14.5 19.3 39.1 18.5 17.2
1980 13.1 5.3 14.2 16.2 16.9 23.8 10.9 22.5 33.8 18.1 11.9 0.0 8.7 5.5 16.9 17.8 40.2 18.2 17.2
1981 12.6 4.6 13.5 17.0 17.0 23.5 12.2 22.4 32.0 19.9 11.1 0.0 9.0 6.6 17.6 15.4 37.7 18.0 17.2
1982 13.8 4.3 13.7 17.5 15.8 24.1 12.3 23.5 31.8 19.9 10.1 0.0 8.7 7.4 19.3 12.7 36.6 18.4 17.8
1983 13.7 4.9 14.0 13.0 16.5 21.0 10.2 23.5 34.6 19.9 10.5 0.0 8.4 7.7 20.9 10.4 35.9 17.7 17.6
1984 14.5 8.9 14.7 13.0 15.9 19.7 8.6 25.3 32.2 19.2 11.3 0.0 7.7 8.4 22.9 13.6 38.4 17.9 18.1
1985 13.0 8.1 16.2 14.1 18.4 20.5 8.4 24.0 36.9 23.3 12.0 0.0 7.4 7.8 24.9 13.4 37.9 18.8 19.1
1986 13.9 10.5 15.9 20.0 21.1 22.1 8.8 25.7 34.3 23.5 11.7 0.0 6.7 10.4 20.7 13.2 36.5 19.6 19.3
1987 13.8 7.4 13.6 22.9 20.4 22.6 7.7 26.8 35.3 25.0 11.6 0.0 7.3 8.8 20.8 14.9 39.4 19.3 18.9
1988 14.8 6.9 14.2 19.0 19.6 23.6 8.9 24.2 35.5 23.4 11.7 0.0 7.7 11.0 21.7 15.7 41.9 19.1 19.0
1989 15.9 6.9 14.5 21.7 23.6 24.6 8.4 25.8 36.2 22.3 14.9 22.5 8.0 8.1 24.6 15.6 41.1 20.5 20.4
1990 13.7 5.3 13.5 22.7 24.5 23.9 11.9 26.0 33.7 21.0 13.1 30.0 10.1 6.9 24.4 13.6 37.6 20.2 20.1
1991 13.8 5.5 12.5 21.6 21.4 19.3 13.7 24.9 34.3 19.6 12.8 30.4 10.1 8.5 20.3 13.7 35.6 18.1 17.9
1992 12.4 5.4 11.5 23.9 18.4 20.2 15.8 25.7 30.8 18.8 14.3 26.3 8.2 6.9 17.9 13.6 32.4 17.6 17.1
1993 13.9 7.1 10.8 27.9 16.4 20.0 18.4 22.1 36.1 19.3 12.7 24.3 1.2 10.1 16.1 14.6 28.9 16.2 16.0
1994 14.5 6.6 9.0 29.1 14.4 19.8 19.6 22.4 36.8 23.0 12.6 25.1 2.1 11.9 17.5 15.9 30.1 15.6 15.8
1995 16.3 6.5 8.4 29.2 15.7 20.6 19.4 21.5 38.1 24.5 14.1 28.1 9.3 13.9 20.0 16.5 31.6 15.8 16.3
1996 16.8 7.6 12.0 28.5 17.1 21.8 21.0 23.2 38.6 30.3 17.5 30.7 12.8 12.6 22.6 16.4 34.3 18.5 18.8
1997 18.1 8.5 13.1 27.2 22.0 23.2 21.6 23.8 39.7 34.2 16.6 35.0 18.5 13.6 25.4 15.9 32.5 20.2 20.7
1998 18.1 9.3 13.7 32.7 21.4 20.0 22.9 28.0 41.1 34.5 18.1 33.2 20.6 13.2 22.3 15.9 26.4 20.6 20.6
1999 18.1 9.3 13.7 32.7 21.4 20.0 22.9 28.0 41.1 34.5 18.1 33.2 20.6 13.2 22.3 15.9 26.4 20.6 20.6
2000 18.1 9.3 13.7 32.7 21.4 20.0 22.9 28.0 41.1 34.5 18.1 33.2 20.6 13.2 22.3 15.9 26.4 20.7 20.7
2001 18.1 9.3 13.7 32.7 21.4 20.0 22.9 28.0 41.1 34.5 18.1 33.2 20.6 13.2 22.3 15.9 26.4 20.7 20.790
Table BII.11. PROPERTY INCOME TAX REVENUES (% DIRECT TAX REVENUES) –PROPR-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 8.9 10.4 13.2 45.0 24.9 16.3 31.2 25.6 13.0 9.1 13.0 25.3 4.8 2.6 23.7 22.1 13.7 16.8 17.5
1971 7.8 9.5 12.4 44.3 23.9 16.6 30.7 24.8 13.0 7.8 12.1 28.3 4.4 2.6 24.5 25.1 15.2 16.1 17.2
1972 7.4 9.6 11.1 45.6 25.7 16.7 32.6 23.8 14.5 7.1 10.9 28.8 4.4 2.4 27.4 25.2 15.6 15.6 17.1
1973 7.4 9.8 9.9 43.3 25.3 18.6 28.8 20.0 13.7 7.7 10.4 30.9 4.6 2.5 24.7 24.3 13.7 14.9 16.0
1974 6.6 8.7 9.2 34.9 25.0 10.1 27.8 15.7 10.7 7.6 9.3 28.3 4.4 2.0 21.8 23.0 13.5 11.8 13.0
1975 5.6 9.0 10.1 44.0 22.8 16.3 24.4 13.3 10.4 6.4 10.7 21.5 3.9 2.2 21.6 23.3 16.9 12.9 14.0
1976 6.1 8.6 10.3 43.9 20.2 16.5 22.7 11.8 11.0 7.2 11.0 15.9 5.7 2.2 21.7 23.9 16.7 12.6 13.6
1977 6.1 9.5 9.7 42.3 19.5 15.0 20.4 11.0 10.3 8.9 10.4 14.9 4.4 2.0 22.5 22.4 17.2 11.8 13.1
1978 6.0 10.1 9.4 41.7 18.0 15.7 15.5 10.3 9.6 10.6 10.2 12.8 4.7 1.8 22.4 20.7 16.1 11.7 13.2
1979 6.2 9.9 8.8 25.1 17.6 16.8 14.6 11.0 11.3 10.5 10.1 11.2 4.6 2.0 23.5 18.0 16.2 12.0 13.4
1980 5.4 9.1 8.5 19.8 15.2 16.3 12.6 10.8 11.3 9.8 9.7 12.2 4.2 2.1 24.1 17.6 15.1 11.4 13.1
1981 4.7 8.2 8.7 17.6 14.6 16.5 11.1 9.1 11.8 9.8 9.6 11.1 4.1 2.0 25.6 17.2 16.1 11.2 13.3
1982 3.9 7.3 8.8 17.8 13.6 16.7 10.0 8.1 12.3 9.8 9.4 11.0 4.8 2.2 25.3 18.4 16.6 10.9 13.0
1983 4.2 8.8 9.2 17.7 12.6 16.8 10.4 7.1 12.1 10.4 9.7 12.0 5.1 3.8 24.2 19.9 17.2 10.8 12.8
1984 4.1 6.9 8.9 13.5 12.0 19.4 10.1 7.3 12.0 11.1 9.3 12.0 5.4 3.7 23.8 19.5 17.1 11.3 13.0
1985 4.3 7.1 8.0 14.0 12.4 20.4 10.4 6.5 11.2 11.6 8.5 12.3 5.7 5.3 23.7 19.0 17.5 11.3 13.0
1986 4.8 7.9 8.1 13.7 13.1 21.3 9.5 6.8 12.4 11.5 8.1 14.7 5.7 6.1 25.1 19.5 19.2 11.6 13.3
1987 5.4 8.6 8.3 13.2 14.7 20.9 10.4 6.6 14.0 11.7 8.0 16.5 6.3 12.2 26.6 18.7 19.3 11.7 13.8
1988 5.8 7.8 8.3 14.3 15.8 22.4 9.4 6.4 15.8 11.1 9.1 14.0 6.9 6.6 26.1 19.3 18.8 12.1 14.0
1989 6.9 7.3 8.0 16.0 13.9 22.8 12.1 5.8 17.0 11.7 10.1 7.6 7.5 7.2 24.7 18.9 17.2 11.9 13.6
1990 6.6 7.0 9.4 19.1 15.3 23.1 11.3 5.9 17.5 10.2 10.0 10.2 5.2 7.8 16.8 20.1 15.8 12.3 12.8
1991 6.4 6.2 8.3 18.4 13.8 22.2 10.8 6.5 16.8 9.7 9.8 9.1 5.2 9.8 17.9 21.0 16.6 11.5 12.3
1992 6.4 6.5 7.8 22.8 13.8 24.5 10.2 8.6 18.3 10.3 9.6 7.5 4.8 8.6 17.7 21.6 19.8 12.3 12.9
1993 7.0 6.8 8.1 19.9 14.4 22.5 9.4 12.9 17.4 10.4 9.4 8.2 6.8 7.3 24.0 21.2 21.5 12.9 14.2
1994 6.8 6.0 8.6 17.1 16.7 23.5 10.0 13.7 16.5 13.0 6.5 8.5 5.8 7.1 23.2 20.7 23.4 13.6 14.6
1995 6.1 5.6 8.4 15.3 16.0 24.2 10.3 14.0 15.7 13.5 5.8 8.7 5.4 6.4 22.7 19.7 24.1 13.6 14.4
1996 6.6 5.4 9.6 15.2 16.4 21.7 10.5 13.6 15.8 14.1 5.3 8.0 5.1 8.5 22.7 18.9 23.6 13.5 14.4
1997 7.0 5.5 8.9 16.4 16.4 21.2 10.6 12.8 16.6 15.0 4.8 7.9 5.4 8.8 22.6 18.2 23.3 13.1 14.4
1998 7.0 6.0 7.5 14.0 17.6 18.0 11.0 14.3 18.2 16.0 4.6 9.4 5.5 8.2 21.6 18.2 34.8 12.4 13.7
1999 7.0 6.0 7.5 14.0 17.6 18.0 11.0 14.3 18.2 16.0 4.6 9.4 5.5 8.2 21.6 18.2 34.8 12.4 13.8
2000 7.0 6.0 7.5 14.0 17.6 18.0 11.0 14.3 18.2 16.0 4.6 9.4 5.5 8.2 21.6 18.2 34.8 12.5 13.9
2001 7.0 6.0 7.5 14.0 17.6 18.0 11.0 14.3 18.2 16.0 4.6 9.4 5.5 8.2 21.6 18.2 34.8 12.5 13.991
Table BII.12. PERSONAL INCOME TAX REVENUES (% GDP) –PIRV-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 7.5 18.8 7.8 1.5 1.3 3.6 3.6 2.4 5.0 9.1 6.7 4.0 10.8 17.2 10.1 7.7 3.1 5.3 6.8
1971 8.0 20.6 8.6 1.6 1.5 3.4 4.7 2.5 6.2 9.8 6.9 3.5 11.8 17.1 10.1 7.2 3.7 5.7 7.1
1972 8.6 20.0 8.5 1.3 1.5 3.4 4.5 2.9 6.1 10.4 7.3 3.3 11.9 17.0 9.0 7.6 3.8 5.8 7.0
1973 9.2 20.4 9.8 1.3 1.6 3.4 4.8 2.9 6.1 10.4 7.5 3.2 12.6 15.5 9.0 7.5 4.1 6.3 7.3
1974 10.1 23.3 10.3 2.0 1.6 3.6 5.0 3.4 6.4 10.7 8.1 3.4 12.9 17.8 10.9 8.0 4.3 6.8 8.0
1975 12.0 21.2 9.6 1.3 2.1 3.8 5.8 3.7 8.2 10.9 7.3 3.7 14.3 18.0 12.4 7.1 4.2 6.7 8.2
1976 11.8 20.5 10.0 1.8 2.3 4.2 6.8 4.5 7.7 10.8 7.4 4.2 16.4 19.3 12.1 7.6 4.0 7.2 8.6
1977 13.1 20.0 10.7 1.6 2.6 4.4 7.1 5.2 9.0 10.6 7.7 4.6 15.5 19.7 10.8 7.8 4.0 7.6 8.7
1978 14.1 20.3 10.0 1.7 3.1 4.3 7.1 5.6 9.0 10.6 8.7 4.7 13.3 19.8 10.1 8.2 3.8 7.5 8.5
1979 14.2 20.6 9.6 2.4 3.5 4.3 7.4 5.7 8.4 10.8 8.5 5.3 12.4 19.5 9.3 8.8 4.4 7.4 8.3
1980 13.9 21.6 10.0 3.0 4.2 4.6 8.9 6.5 8.5 10.8 8.6 5.1 12.5 18.9 9.4 8.9 4.8 7.7 8.6
1981 14.1 21.9 9.7 2.6 4.3 4.8 9.1 7.6 8.8 10.1 9.2 6.0 13.7 18.3 9.5 9.2 5.2 7.8 8.7
1982 14.8 21.9 9.5 3.2 4.2 4.8 9.5 8.2 8.7 10.0 9.0 6.4 13.5 18.5 9.6 8.9 5.3 7.9 8.8
1983 14.8 22.4 9.3 3.2 4.9 5.1 10.1 8.7 9.2 9.1 8.8 7.1 13.5 18.3 9.3 8.6 5.4 8.1 8.8
1984 15.1 22.6 9.4 3.7 5.2 5.2 11.0 8.6 9.2 8.6 9.2 7.0 13.9 17.8 9.1 8.1 5.2 8.1 8.9
1985 15.0 23.7 9.6 3.4 5.1 5.0 10.7 9.2 9.0 7.9 9.8 7.1 14.4 17.4 8.8 8.3 5.4 8.2 8.9
1986 14.5 23.5 9.4 3.4 4.8 4.9 11.4 8.8 8.4 8.3 9.9 5.2 15.4 17.4 8.9 8.3 5.4 8.0 8.8
1987 14.1 24.6 9.8 3.3 5.8 4.9 11.8 9.0 8.0 8.5 9.5 4.6 13.6 18.0 8.4 8.7 5.3 8.2 8.9
1988 13.4 26.0 9.5 3.6 5.9 4.5 12.5 9.4 7.8 9.0 9.4 5.8 14.6 19.1 8.4 8.3 5.1 8.2 8.9
1989 11.9 25.9 9.9 2.9 6.6 4.4 10.1 9.9 7.6 8.8 8.2 5.7 14.2 20.5 8.4 8.5 5.6 8.3 9.1
1990 12.5 25.0 8.7 3.2 6.4 4.4 10.1 9.9 8.2 10.2 8.9 4.9 14.8 19.1 9.9 8.4 6.3 8.1 9.0
1991 12.2 25.3 9.0 3.4 6.8 5.1 10.5 10.0 7.6 11.4 9.4 5.5 15.0 15.5 9.8 8.0 6.5 8.5 9.2
1992 11.9 25.7 9.4 3.0 7.4 4.6 10.6 9.7 8.4 10.8 9.7 6.8 14.5 16.6 9.6 7.8 6.0 8.5 9.1
1993 12.6 26.1 9.2 3.1 7.2 4.7 10.8 10.5 9.0 11.2 10.0 6.3 14.5 16.4 8.3 7.9 5.7 8.6 9.0
1994 12.8 26.9 9.0 3.8 7.0 4.8 10.8 9.6 8.5 8.5 9.1 6.0 15.8 16.0 8.5 8.0 4.9 8.2 8.8
1995 13.0 26.7 9.3 4.1 6.9 4.7 9.6 9.5 8.1 7.7 9.6 5.9 14.8 16.1 8.6 8.3 4.4 8.2 8.8
1996 12.8 26.6 9.0 4.0 6.9 5.0 9.7 9.7 8.4 7.2 10.1 6.1 15.5 17.1 8.2 8.8 4.2 8.2 8.8
1997 12.9 26.2 8.7 4.5 6.5 5.3 9.7 10.2 7.6 6.3 10.6 5.8 14.0 16.9 7.8 9.4 4.4 8.2 8.7
1998 13.2 25.2 9.1 5.1 6.3 7.2 9.1 8.3 7.0 6.0 10.6 5.7 14.0 17.8 9.2 9.6 3.4 8.3 9.0
1999 13.0 25.7 9.5 4.9 6.3 7.6 9.2 8.7 6.8 6.1 10.4 6.1 13.8 17.6 9.2 9.8 2.8 8.6 9.3
2000 13.1 25.1 9.5 4.6 6.3 7.4 8.8 8.4 6.7 5.8 9.8 6.2 13.9 16.7 9.1 9.8 2.8 8.5 9.1
2001 13.0 24.9 8.6 4.5 6.3 7.4 8.7 8.4 6.5 5.7 9.5 6.3 13.7 16.3 8.9 9.9 2.8 8.2 8.892
Table BII.13. CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUES (% GDP) –CORV-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 2.1 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.9 1.9 1.8 1.4 4.1 2.3 1.4 0.0 1.4 1.5 2.8 2.8 3.8 1.7 1.8
1971 2.3 0.9 1.4 0.3 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.5 3.7 2.5 1.4 0.0 1.3 1.4 2.3 2.2 3.7 1.6 1.6
1972 2.3 0.9 1.4 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.1 1.7 3.2 2.5 1.4 0.0 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.5 3.5 1.6 1.6
1973 2.7 1.2 1.7 0.4 1.0 1.8 1.1 1.7 4.0 2.6 1.1 0.0 1.3 1.5 2.2 2.6 4.1 1.7 1.7
1974 2.7 1.3 1.6 0.8 1.0 2.4 1.5 1.2 5.4 2.6 1.4 0.0 1.3 1.4 3.0 2.6 5.2 1.8 1.9
1975 2.7 1.2 1.4 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.1 1.5 4.8 3.1 1.5 0.0 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.3 3.7 1.6 1.6
1976 2.5 1.5 1.5 0.6 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.7 5.3 2.8 1.2 0.0 1.5 1.6 1.5 2.4 3.5 1.7 1.7
1977 2.4 1.2 1.9 0.5 0.9 1.9 1.0 1.8 6.4 2.7 1.2 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.8 2.7 3.7 1.8 1.8
1978 2.4 1.2 1.9 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.2 2.4 7.5 2.5 1.2 0.0 1.3 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.8 1.9 1.8
1979 2.5 1.3 2.0 0.6 0.9 1.6 1.4 2.1 5.8 2.4 1.3 0.0 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.7 3.9 1.8 1.8
1980 2.2 1.3 1.8 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.3 2.2 5.2 2.7 1.3 0.0 1.2 1.1 2.7 2.5 4.3 1.9 1.9
1981 2.1 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.1 1.9 1.5 2.5 5.0 2.9 1.3 0.0 1.4 1.3 3.0 2.1 4.3 1.9 2.0
1982 2.5 1.1 1.7 0.9 0.9 2.0 1.5 2.8 5.0 2.8 1.1 0.0 1.4 1.5 3.3 1.6 4.1 2.0 2.1
1983 2.5 1.3 1.7 0.6 1.1 1.7 1.3 3.0 6.0 2.6 1.2 0.0 1.3 1.6 3.6 1.3 4.2 1.9 2.2
1984 2.7 2.4 1.8 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.2 3.2 5.3 2.4 1.3 0.0 1.2 1.7 3.9 1.6 4.5 2.0 2.3
1985 2.3 2.3 2.1 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.1 3.2 6.4 2.8 1.5 0.0 1.2 1.6 4.3 1.7 4.5 2.1 2.4
1986 2.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.2 3.3 5.4 3.0 1.4 0.0 1.2 2.2 3.4 1.6 4.4 2.2 2.4
1987 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.2 1.8 2.0 1.1 3.6 5.5 3.4 1.4 0.0 1.1 2.0 3.3 1.9 5.0 2.2 2.4
1988 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.4 3.3 5.7 3.2 1.4 0.0 1.3 2.6 3.5 2.0 5.4 2.2 2.4
1989 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.0 2.5 2.0 1.1 3.7 5.9 3.0 1.6 1.8 1.3 2.0 4.1 2.0 5.5 2.4 2.6
1990 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.6 2.0 1.6 3.8 5.6 3.1 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.5 4.1 1.7 5.1 2.3 2.5
1991 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.2 2.3 1.7 1.9 3.6 5.3 3.2 1.6 2.8 1.8 1.6 3.2 1.7 4.8 2.2 2.3
1992 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.3 2.0 1.7 2.3 3.8 5.0 2.8 1.8 2.7 1.4 1.3 2.7 1.6 4.1 2.1 2.1
1993 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.8 3.6 7.0 3.1 1.6 2.3 0.2 2.0 2.2 1.8 3.3 2.0 2.0
1994 2.4 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.7 3.0 3.4 6.7 3.1 1.4 2.3 0.4 2.3 2.5 2.0 3.2 1.8 1.9
1995 2.7 2.0 0.9 2.2 1.6 1.8 2.7 3.2 6.7 3.0 1.7 2.6 1.6 2.8 3.0 2.2 3.2 1.8 2.0
1996 2.8 2.3 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.9 3.0 3.6 7.1 3.9 2.3 3.1 2.4 2.7 3.4 2.2 3.4 2.2 2.4
1997 3.1 2.6 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.2 3.1 3.8 6.9 4.2 2.2 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.8 2.3 3.2 2.5 2.7
1998 3.2 2.8 1.6 3.1 2.2 2.3 3.2 4.0 7.0 4.2 2.5 3.3 3.9 3.0 3.7 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8
1999 3.1 2.8 1.6 3.0 2.2 2.5 3.2 4.2 6.9 4.2 2.4 3.6 3.9 3.0 3.7 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.9
2000 3.2 2.8 1.6 2.8 2.2 2.4 3.0 4.1 6.7 4.1 2.3 3.6 3.9 2.8 3.6 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.8
2001 3.1 2.7 1.5 2.8 2.2 2.4 3.0 4.1 6.6 4.0 2.2 3.7 3.8 2.7 3.6 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.893
Table BII.14. PROPERTY INCOME TAX REVENUES (% GDP) –PWRV-
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LA PF I NSU K U S J P E U R - 1 1 E U - 1 5
1970 0.9 2.3 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.1 2.5 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 0.6 0.5 4.0 3.0 1.1 1.2 1.7
1971 0.9 2.2 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.0 2.7 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.4 0.6 0.5 4.0 3.1 1.3 1.2 1.6
1972 0.9 2.2 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.0 2.7 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.5 4.1 3.4 1.3 1.2 1.6
1973 1.0 2.3 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.2 2.4 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.4 0.7 0.4 3.7 3.2 1.3 1.2 1.5
1974 0.9 2.4 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.7 2.5 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.4 3.9 3.2 1.5 1.0 1.4
1975 0.9 2.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.1 2.2 0.8 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.4 3.9 2.9 1.6 1.0 1.4
1976 0.9 2.1 1.3 1.9 0.8 1.2 2.3 0.8 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.5 3.8 3.1 1.5 1.1 1.5
1977 1.0 2.2 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.1 2.1 0.9 1.8 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.4 3.7 3.0 1.6 1.1 1.5
1978 1.0 2.4 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.4 3.5 2.9 1.5 1.1 1.4
1979 1.1 2.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.8 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.4 3.5 2.5 1.6 1.1 1.5
1980 0.9 2.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.4 3.8 2.4 1.6 1.1 1.5
1981 0.8 2.1 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.4 4.3 2.4 1.8 1.1 1.6
1982 0.7 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 4.4 2.4 1.9 1.1 1.6
1983 0.8 2.3 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.3 0.9 2.1 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.8 4.1 2.5 2.0 1.1 1.6
1984 0.8 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.7 1.4 0.9 2.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 4.0 2.4 2.0 1.2 1.6
1985 0.8 2.0 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.7 1.4 0.9 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 4.1 2.3 2.1 1.2 1.6
1986 0.8 2.3 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.3 0.9 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.3 4.1 2.4 2.3 1.2 1.6
1987 0.9 2.5 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.5 0.9 2.2 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 2.8 4.3 2.5 2.5 1.3 1.8
1988 1.0 2.4 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.4 0.9 2.5 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.5 4.2 2.5 2.4 1.3 1.8
1989 1.1 2.2 1.0 0.7 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.8 2.8 1.6 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.7 4.1 2.5 2.3 1.3 1.7
1990 1.0 2.0 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.5 0.8 2.9 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.7 2.8 2.5 2.1 1.3 1.5
1991 1.0 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.9 2.6 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.9 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.3 1.5
1992 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.3 3.0 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 1.3 1.5
1993 1.1 2.0 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.4 2.1 3.4 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.4 3.3 2.6 2.5 1.5 1.7
1994 1.1 1.9 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.5 2.1 3.0 1.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 3.3 2.6 2.5 1.5 1.7
1995 1.0 1.7 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.1 1.4 2.1 2.7 1.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.3 3.4 2.6 2.4 1.5 1.7
1996 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.5 2.1 2.9 1.8 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.8 3.4 2.6 2.3 1.5 1.8
1997 1.2 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.0 1.5 2.1 2.9 1.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.9 3.4 2.6 2.3 1.5 1.8
1998 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.1 1.5 2.1 3.1 1.9 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.9 3.5 2.7 3.1 1.5 1.9
1999 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.5 2.2 3.0 2.0 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.8 3.5 2.7 2.5 1.6 1.9
2000 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.2 1.8 2.1 1.5 2.1 3.0 1.9 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.7 3.5 2.7 2.5 1.6 1.9
2001 1.2 1.8 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.1 1.4 2.1 2.9 1.8 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.7 3.4 2.7 2.5 1.5 1.994
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